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This dissertation explores the role of ideologies in the production 
of space while constructing national identity. In this regard, Kizilay 
Square and Taksim Republican Square, which have been dominated 
by two contending ideologies in return in two different periods, have 
been chosen for the case study. On the one hand, the secular 
nationalist ideology of the Republican regime constructed these two 
squares as the symbolic spaces of secular, modern, and westernised 
identity. On the other hand, in the following years political Islam 
created visible religion-related identities in these two squares. 
Moreover, these two squares have been witnessed to several 
uprisings, social movements, political tensions and in accordance to 
those have been transformed regarding in form, function, and 
meaning. In the Early Republican Era, the dominant ideology has tried 
to build a national identity by crowning the city squares with 
monuments as the culmination of commemorating and celebrating a 
patriotic history for national purposes. To represent the new regime 
and its ideals, Ankara was declared as the new capital city of the 
Turkish Republic, and following this decision, various serious 
initiatives were undertaken to design the new capital city. Moreover, 
Istanbul, as a representative of the old regime of the Ottoman Empire, 
was slated for a redesign in which its Ottoman-Islamic heritage was 
deliberately denied. 
 
More specifically, Kizilay Square in Ankara and Taksim 
Republican Square in Istanbul are the prominent squares of those 
periods where the dominant ideology works to rebuild the national 
identity. In the Early Republican Era from 1923 until the 1950s when 
secular Turkish nationalism dominated other contending ideologies, 
state and religion were separated, and the state claimed for itself a 
hegemonic status in interpreting and representing the national history 
and identity by constructing the national space. With the rise of 
political Islam in the 1980s, Islamic ideology became the dominant 
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one. While attempts were made to rebuild the national identity as a 
synthesis of Turkish and Muslim in the squares, the built environment 
changed dramatically. In this respect, the role of ideologies in 
placemaking the experience to fit national identities will be discussed 
and the competing strategies of these two contending ideologies will 
be illustrated. In order to elevate some histories privileged over 
others, urban squares with monuments can be powerful agents of 
erasure, forgetting or remembrance. This thesis addresses how 
national identity works through and on urban squares and how 
aspects of such spaces and their landscapes reflect on to the national 
identity. This includes the role that ideologies and their spatial 
policies play in the representation and performance of such identities 
through the use and construction of those spaces. This dissertation 
tries to bring together three overlapping arguments about the 
relationship between national identity, ideology and the production of 
public space. First, the discursive meaning is constructed by spatial 
context. In this respect, with its landscape and spatial narration, 
urban squares are used to connect individuals to the nation. Second, 
ideologies keep struggling over and on the public space in order to 
take command over society. Finally, the official and practical uses of 
urban squares in ways both reinforce the dominant ideology and 
undermine the contending ideologies. These arguments are 
supported by examples from two squares, with a focus on how they 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to The Study 
Turkish citizens have experienced a deep identity crisis for a long 
time. Besides Turkish national identity, religious identity, different 
ethnic identities and radical nationalism have defined distinct 
identities in society as well. After the Turkish Republic was 
established, the secular nationalist ideology dominated in society and 
built a national identity that was able to cover all different ethnic 
groups, religions and sects in order to build the nation-state. 
According to Karal (1981 cited in Gulalp, 2002), Turkish does not 
refer to any ethnic or religious group but refers to people who live in 
a certain geographical area, the territory defined as Turkey. While 
the nation-state and national identity have been built through modern 
urbanism, architecture and spatial practices, the role of ideology is 
significant enough to be worth discussing in detail. Here it is 
significant to emphasise that the idea of the construction of the 
Turkish national identity is a part of the nation-building project. So, 
their construction went hand in hand and nurtured each other. 
 
However, socio-political circumstances and different ideologies 
have continuously transformed the identity. As being the founding 
ideology of the Turkish Republic, the secular nationalist ideology 
positioned itself as strongly separated from any other ideologies such 
as Ottomanism, Islamism, or conflicting national ideologies by cutting 
all ties with them and successfully suppressing them. Yet on any 
convenient ground, contested ideologies have never missed the 
chance to question the national identity or try to negotiate with it the 
twentieth century. Ongoing conflicts in the political arena today still 
have roots in those times (Cinar, 2007). More precisely, modern 
national identities, particularly in Muslim geographies, have 
negotiated with the traditional ones from the beginning. Especially by 
the rise of political Islam and the wide criticism of modernity, Turkish 
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modernisation and secular Turkish nationalism also began to be 
questioned. In this process, while micro identities rise, in Muslim 
geographies the Muslim identity reasserts itself. All around the 
Muslim geographies, with the reassertion of Muslim identity, socio-
economic, structural, and spatial changes have been experienced 
from Malaysia to Indonesia to Iran (Bozdogan, n.d.; Bazik, 2014). 
However, what Turkish society has experienced in this process is 
quite unique in terms of its economic, political, cultural and socio-
spatial reforms. Therefore, Turkish modernisation in the general 
overall social transformation and the construction of the capital city, 
in particular, can be accepted as one of the most radical and 
successful models of the modernisation process (Bozdogan and 
Kasaba, 1997; Koker, 2000; Lewis, 2001; Tekeli, 2001, cited in 
Sargin, 2004). In the context of nation-state building, the Early 
Republican Era gave effort to constitute national architecture, urban 
planning, and urban design. However, with the rise of political Islam, 
the effort to create national, representative and symbolic spaces was 
replaced with rent-based projects that were garnished with an 
Ottoman-imitation mosque as a representation of Islam. The gains of 
the Early Republican Era in terms of urban planning, urban design and 
architecture were ignored, and rather than creating a characteristic, 
specific approach to all these concerns, Islamists preferred to imitate 
Ottoman and Islamic elements. The success of the Turkish Republic 
which was achieved in the Early Republican Era, since as Bruno Taut 
(1880-1938) declares that “all nationalist architecture is bad, but 
all good architecture is national”, was put aside in favour of a 
nostalgia for the Ottoman times and for the sake appealing urban 
projects. Since the 1980s, the modernisation project of the Turkish 
Republic has been destroyed, and the national identity, which was 
previously defined by secular nationalist ideology, was officially 
redefined as being Muslim and Turkish. The new definition of national 
identity created an Islam and Turkish synthesis, which did not 
correlate with the secular national identity at all. In the following 
decades, besides the Islam and Turkish synthesis, the reassertion of 
the Muslim identity became more visible in the public sphere. In order 
 
 3 
to give a better understanding, it is necessary to emphasise that, 
although the secular nationalist ideology did not totally reject Islam 
and used its social power for the nation state (Dox, 2000, Balci, 
2009), in the public sphere the visibility of Islam was restricted. 
However, with the rise of political Islam and Islam as an ideology, the 
Islamic identity began to be visible in the public sphere. 
 
The reason behind this change was the ongoing conflict between 
the secular nationalist and Islamist nationalist ideologies. The 
Ottoman heritage of the Turkish Republic was a traditional 
community with Islamic features in every aspect of daily life. During 
the Early Republican Period (1923-1950s), out this traditional 
society the Kemalist revolution tried to create a modern society with 
a modern, secular, westernised national identity. According to 
Batuman (2005), the biggest challenge to the newly established 
secular nation-state was to attempt to build a modern national 
identity within an Islamic society. In order to do it, all the Ottoman 
elements and symbols of Islamic tradition were replaced with secular 
and modern values. However, the conflict between traditional and 
modern continued in the public sphere. The Early Republican Era, in 
which the ideology of secular nationalism and the Kemalist revolution 
transformed the public sphere, creating its own spaces by using 
modern urbanisation, architecture and spatial practices. Yet, the 
conflict between modern and traditional never ever ends. At the very 
first chance, traditional forces tried to dominate over the society 
again. This chance emerged during the 1980s when all around the 
world neo-liberalism gained momentum. In Turkey neo-liberalism 
was accompanied by political Islam. Since then, the oppressed 
ideology of Islam became stronger day by day and began to extract 
revenge against modernism. While Islam has been rising as a political 
ideology, it has tried to via urban policies and spatial practices to 
make the Muslim identity visible by destroying the spaces of the 
Early Republican Era, which are the symbols of national identity 




These are well-known facts of ideological conflicts. In this 
dissertation, what I am trying to do is to discuss how different 
ideologies relate to space in the modern Turkish context. The Islamic 
or Ottoman city concept belongs to traditional times. However, 
political Islam in Turkey expresses itself through urban space by 
imitating the architectural style of Ottoman cities. Then, why political 
Islam eagerly tries to imitate Ottoman architecture and urbanisation, 
or else why it destructs the national architecture and urbanisation, 
become significant questions. The answer is related not to naive 
nostalgia but the desire to have power, resources and domination 
other ideologies. The conflict and struggle between distinct 
ideologies take place in urban spaces. In order to dominate other 
ideologies and society, ideologies deconstruct the meaning, form, and 
function of existing urban spaces which were created by ex-
ideologies, and construct its own new spaces. Teber (2004) argues 
that naturally none of urban planning and design is neutral or 
independent of power struggles, especially in the production of public 
space. There are always power relations, cultural hegemonies and 
economic concerns in this process and they have the impact on 
planning and design processes of public spaces. Ideologies and 
powers try to maintain control over public spaces whether it is a park 
or a square. In this process, the dominant ideology or power creates 
the urban images over which struggles between distinct ideologies 
are always undertaken. In this respect, I am going to discuss how the 
Kemalist revolution with the ideology of secular nationalism and 
Islamist nationalism create urban space, to build the national identity 
for the desired society. Two different ideologies, their spatial 
practices and social organisations will be the focus of this dissertation.  
 
This dissertation focuses on the cases of Kizilay Square and 
Taksim Republican Square in two different eras. These two squares 
symbolise the political ideals of the two different eras when two 
contested ideologies dominated. The main focus of this study, rather 
than addressing the placemaking experiences of urban squares, is to 
examine the role of ideologies and their spatial policies in order to 
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create their desired national identity through the urban squares. More 
precisely, with a particular focus on Kizilay Square and Taksim 
Square, this dissertation explores how Turkish nationalism dealt with 
the Islamic-Ottoman heritage through building the modern identity 
of its citizens, and also how Islamist ideology negotiated with the 
Republican cadre by building the Muslim identity. There are several 
studies about these two squares that generally focused on the socio-
spatial, and economic changes of their features. Beyond previous 
ones, this study tries to investigate the identity building through 
public spaces at two distinct periods when different ideologies 
dominated, and the spatial policies of these different ideologies along 
with their ideological inclinations.   
 
The reason behind choosing these two squares as a case study 
is to discuss the Early Republican Era’s socio-spatial practices 
through two locations: the newly announced capital city of Ankara 
and its centre, Kizilay Square, and the last capital city of Ottoman 
Istanbul and its centre, Taksim Republican Square. Moreover Taksim 
Republican Square offers a chance to discuss how the Ottoman 
Empire’s heritage dissolved into Republican spatial practices and 
how political Islam, via mimicry of Ottoman architecture under the 
influence of neo-liberal urban policies, has deconstructed this 
heritage. The ideological and identity wise changes in the form, 
function and meaning of these two squares, the ideological and 
identity changes is discussed or vice versa. More precisely, urbanism, 
architecture, and spatial practices have always been used by 
ideologies in order to create their desired society. There are many 
different ways used by modern nation-states to construct a national 
identity: creating national history, anthems, flags, national emblems, 
and symbols are some of those that nation states use. Urban space, 
national architecture, and spatial practices are also significant tools 
of which nation states take advantage. These two distinct ideologies 
have different spatial expressions to give people a sense of national 
belonging in everyday life. The focus of this dissertation will be these 
spatial expressions of two distinct ideologies, and their role in 
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creating representative landscapes. In order to clarify the theoretical 
background, Lefebvre’s conception of the production of space and 
the formation of the nation-state through the concept of the invention 
of culture are used.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
Each and every power builds the public sphere according to its 
ideological inclinations builds public sphere where the power struggle 
takes place, in order to have the consent of society, and, thereby, 
permanent power. In modern and postmodern times, different 
ideologies have dominated over the societies. The foremost effort 
among various ideologies to gain power was to (re)build the national 
identity at the dawn of modern times from the emergence of nation-
states onwards. Since then, the effort of creating a national identity 
and politics became interlinked with the consideration of constructing 
a modern national identity through urban planning. However, with an 
increase in criticism of modernity and modern national identity, 
Turkish society began to experience the reassertion of Muslim 
identity as an alternative to the modernist idea of building a national 
identity. Islam, as a political as well as religious ideology started to 
build its own space, spatial practices and social organisation while 
redefining the national identity.    
 
In Turkey, this shift has manifested over two distinct periods, the 
Kemalist revolution and political Islam. The Kemalist revolution, with 
the assertion of secular nationalism, attempted to build a modern 
national identity in the Early Republican Period (1923-1940s). 
However, the Islamist practice of positioning itself against Kemalist 
secularist activism reconstructed the national identity with the 
reassertion of a Muslim identity over the last 20 years, during which 
Turkish society has become postmodern. The power struggles 
between these two groups have taken place in the public sphere, 
especially in symbolic urban spaces. To have a better understanding 
about the distinct ideologies and their engagement in the process of 
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national identity building, it is crucial to analyse and formulate the 
way urban squares were constructed materially and discursively, 
because they often became the focal sites of the power struggle. 
More precisely, the successful display of power depends on its ability 
to command national space, which, in turn, utilizes spatial practices 
to consolidate a sense of belonging in the public. This thesis 
addresses how national identity works through and on urban squares 
and how their landscapes reflect back on to the national identity, 
including representation and performance through spatial practices. 
Public space/urban squares have been used to bond individuals to the 
nation by narrating the past, present, and future. These arguments 
are underpinned by examples from the two prominent squares of two 
significant cities with a focus on how they were designed and 
transformed over time and also used to build a national identity. 
 
Based on this research statement, the main research question is 
the following; 
What is the role of ideologies and their spatial practices in the 
social production of space? 
 
Several questions also arise with regard to this; how have the 
struggles between ideologies over symbolic spaces taken place, in 
order to disseminate different values and propagandas, while 
constructing the national identity constantly renegotiated among 
proponents and citizens? As the centres of social and political events, 
public spaces contain the collective memories of society, which are 
apt to be proliferated and fragmented by political interference. 
Regarding this tendency, what are the relationships between space 
and politics in ideological contests in the context of national identity 
building? 
 
Why are public spaces in general, urban squares in particular, so 
significant in the context of national identity building? 
 
According to Castells (2010), national identity and religious 
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identity are two different types of identities. Therefore, it is not quite 
complicated to merge Muslim identity with national identity. In that 
case, other significant questions for this dissertation present 
themselves: how Muslim identities can survive national identities, or 
else, if religious identity and national identity are distinct, then how 
can religious identity be part of the definition of national identity? 
 
The last question depends on the close relationship among 
politics, ideology, architecture and urban planning. Tekeli (2001) 
argues that architecture and urban planning have been playing major 
roles to represent the ideology of political regimes. Specifically, 
nation states have used architecture and urban planning as tools to 
symbolise their power through spatial existence. Although this 
dissertation is questioning the role of ideologies in placemaking 
experiences, the role of architecture and urban planning in 
representing the ideology of a political regime is also significant. The 
relationship among different approaches therefore, needs to be 
examined.  
 
In order to develop a comprehensive explanation for this 
phenomenon, it is necessary to have a deep look at the turning points 
of national identity building processes according to ideological 
inclinations. Moreover, for exploring the debates over the projects 
applied to these squares, it is necessary to deal with the competing 
discourses on the identity of the squares, which is legitimised by 
alternative historical narratives. Thus, in this dissertation it is 
examined how different ideologies uses different readings of the past 
in order to re-create national identity. 
 
1.3 Research Methods 
The squares as city centres have played a significant role in the 
spatial production of nation-states. In this respect, two monumental 
squares in two metropolitan cities have been chosen. The city of 
Istanbul and Ankara, from the very beginning of the Turkish Republic, 
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has been the representative of two distinct ideologies. While Ankara, 
as the capital city, has been the symbol of the modern nation-state 
of secularists, Istanbul has always been considered as an alternative 
cultural capital by Islamists. Two squares in these two prominent 
cities are selected: Kizilay Square in Ankara and Taksim Republican 
Square in Istanbul. The transformation of the spatial narration of 
these squares occurred along with the distinct ideologies, which in 
turn played a key role in national identity building.  
 
In order to provide a better understanding about the role of 
ideologies in building a national identity through urban squares and 
answer the research questions, the spatial policies in different time 
periods of Turkish urbanisation are examined. For the analysis of the 
case studies, including key concepts such as ideology, space and 
national identity; various sources were reviewed. Two important 
historical periods in Turkish urbanisation were selected for analysis 
in this dissertation: The Early Republican period (1923-1950) 
during which the secularist national ideology was dominant, and after 
1980 during which Islamism rose as an independent force. The 
transformation of the squares is analysed and discussed according to 
this historical shift. Written sources such as journal articles, theses, 
books, reports, laws and institutions, legislation, official documents, 
various urban projects and plans and their reports, maps, newspaper 
articles, and documents of relevant professional chambers have been 
reviewed. These resources have been classified in terms of time and 
space in related periods. In order to grasp two distinct ideologies that 
dominate two different time periods of Turkey, their initiatives to 
construct, reconstruct, or deconstruct the national identity and the 
features of urban squares in terms of meaning, structures, and 
functions, Kizilay and Taksim Squares as case studies are analysed 
with the guidance of these resources. Besides written resources, 
personal experiences and observations of the selected areas are also 
incorporated into a conceptual framing of ideological conflicts and the 
changes in spatial narrations. In order to clarify the parallelism among 
the breaking points in urban planning practices, promoted national 
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identity, and change in dominant ideology, a comparison of two 
distinct periods is useful. Besides those materials, newspaper 
archives, posts and ongoing online debates on social media (Twitter, 
Facebook etc.), photographs which were taken in different time 
periods, some legal cases in court trials and related documents are 
analysed for further detailed information about the transformation of 
urban squares. Online sources were mostly downloaded from web 
pages①. Moreover, press statements are evaluated, especially on the 
controversial projects lead by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a key politician, 
a former Mayor of Istanbul (1994-1998) and Prime Minister (2003-
2014) who finally became the president of Turkey in 2014. In 
addition, important institutional actors such as the Turkish Union of 
Chambers of Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) and its member 
institutions including the Chamber of Architects of Turkey and 
Chamber of City Planners are comprehensively analysed, with 
particular focus on conflicts between Ankara Metropolitan 
Municipality’s ex-Mayor Melih Gokcek and the Chamber of City 
Planners, which turned out to be a good representation of the 
conflicts between Islamists and secularists.  
 
These materials have been analysed and evaluated to produce 
the knowledge of the transformation of national identity through the 
spatiality of the squares during two different periods: 1923-1950s 
and 1980s-2018. In these two different time periods, to analyse the 
projects, urban plans, court decisions, discussions between different 
actors, news from social media and also ocal and global newspapers 
help to answer the major and minor research questions. Moreover, to 
analyse all these materials, a theoretical framework about ideology 
and space is suggested (next chapter).  
 
In the light of these findings, theprimary objective is to examine 
the social production of Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares in the 
context of identity building through the spatial construction of public 
                                            





1.4 Outline of the Dissertation 
This dissertation has 7 chapters. The introduction gives brief 
information about the background of the study, research statement 
questions, the main methods of research and its limitations. The 
second chapter introduces a conceptualisation of basic concepts and 
a related theoretical framework. Especially, the spatial theories of 
Lefebvre’s and Foucault’s theorisation of power and, finally, 
Harvey’s theoretical and empirical research will be the focus of this 
chapter. These all together will provide a better understanding of the 
relationship between spatial production and ideological construction. 
Moreover, national identity building in different time periods, 
especially right after World War I and the 1980s, will be discussed in 
terms of economy-politics nexus. Marxist theories provide useful 
insights in this regard. However, it is necessary to note that a whole 
comprehensive discussion of the connections between the ideological 
initiatives, which serve the aim of economic models and their 
reflections on the urban context or the complete political history of 
the Turkish Republic, and its spatial policies is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. Finally the trilogy of space, ideology and national 
identity will be examined in detail. In other words, what is significant 
in this study is the ideological context of the national identity building 
through using public spaces. 
 
The third chapter presents a historical framework to examine the 
ideological conflicts in public space. It discusses of the evolution of 
urbanisation practices in the Turkish Republic in the context of 
ideological differences. It will also give the basic understanding of the 
case study. This chapter is dedicated to the effort of building national 
identity through public spaces.  
 
The fourth and fifth chapters will focus on the case study of 
Kizilay and Taksim Republican Squares. These two chapters will 
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concentrate on the power struggles and ideological conflicts in terms 
of national identity building at these two squares since their 
construction. The struggle and conflict will be examined in two 
distinct periods and ideologies. The very first period is defined as the 
Early Republican Era, in which the Kemalist revolution and ideology 
of secular nationalism dominated society, when these public squares 
were built with modern urban planning inclinations. The second 
period covers from the 1980s to 2018 when the ideology of Islamist 
nationalism dominated society. The desire of Muslim identity to be 
visible in the public space became prominent in this era and Islamic 
practices began to transform the spatial practices from modern to 
Islamic. From this point, spatial projects, legal arrangements, rules 
and regulations of local authorities and the central government will 
be discussed. 
 
Following chapter deals with case findings. The last chapter 
consists of two parts, which are the contribution of discussions and 
further implications. Dynamics and mechanisms behind the 
production, destruction and re-production of these two squares in 
terms of national identity building with respect to the consent 
ideologies struggle will be concluded. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Background to The 
Study 
 
This chapter considers how the notion of national identity, power 
and ideology tie in with urban public space. Since the nation and 
national identity are highly related to everyday life, they are 
constructed through urban space. Thus, ideologies solve the 
identity-building issue with space. On the one hand, they destruct 
the spaces which other ideologies build while, on the other, they 
reconstruct the spaces which are symbols of their ideological 
inclinations. It also gives them a chance to change everyday life 
practices. This makes subsequent generations not only remember the 
prevailing social order but also forget previous ones. It is a way of 
achieving permanence. As ideologies, Islam and secular Turkish 
nationalism are not free from this manifestation. While these two 
distinct ideologies struggle for power and offer conflicting 
worldviews, they both change urban space to create their desired 
society and nation. They (re)/(de)construct the urban space 
constantly according to their ideological inclinations. According to 
Vale (2014), the effort of building a new identity asserts itself on 
space through urban planning, design and architecture. In other words, 
space has a political character, and so the production of space is not 
independent of the social, political and ideological context. Moreover, 
the concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’ not only refer to 
the people who share common roots, culture and history but also to 
the people with the shared ideology (Dean and Butler, 2012).  
 







2.1. Space, Ideology and The Social Production 
of Space 
Different theories have been developed to explain the theory of 
space. One of the most common conceptualisations of space is that it 
is dependent on the relationships between power, ideology and space. 
This has been a focus of both academics and practitioners, although 
the notion that the various backgrounds of scholars and practitioners 
have resulted in different interpretations of these concepts 
(Merrifield, 1993). In this study, rather than the (chronological) 
history of space, a history of the representation of space and its 
relationship with power and ideology will be discussed in 
consideration of Lefebvre’s conceptualisation of space. Moreover, 
his theory will help to develop a comprehensive discussion of how 
different powers and their ideological approaches (re)construct 
national identity through urban space through the use of urban 
planning. Lefebvre’s approach focuses on space as being a social 
product filled with ideologies; it also provides a lens through which 
to understand the relationship between space, power and ideology. 
Lefebvre’s main point is that the process of production of space is 
not independent of the power relations between different ideologies. 
Lefebvre (1976) argues that to understand the knowledge of space, 
it is necessary to focus on means, practices and uses of space—all of 
which are significant elements in the production of space—since how 
space is produced is the most crucial question. In order to make it 
entirely concrete, the following questions ought to be considered: 
‘What is the role of power and ideologies in the production of 
space?’, ‘Who produces space?’, ‘What are the spatial practices 
under distinct ideologies?’, ‘How do different ideologies construct 
spaces?’, ‘How does space have ideological content?’ and ‘How 
is public space constructed socially?’. All these questions address 
the process of space production. Since urban space is a social product, 
discussions on space and the production process offer a starting point 
in tackling these questions. 
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The Social Production of Space: 
 
In his study, Tony Ward argues that “all the concepts, theories 
and meanings that shape our lives are socially constructed” (Ward, 
2006). This is to say that nothing around us is granted. Space is also 
mostly taken for granted as a ‘natural’ part of the routine of 
everyday life, and so it is not questioned at all. Yet space does not 
have meaning in and of itself, but only that meaning that is given or 
ascribed (Ward, 2006: Kant, 1781). To Lefebvre (1991: 26) 
‘(social) space is a (social) product’. He defines social space as 
“neither a ‘subject’ nor an ‘object’ but rather a social reality…a 
set of relations and forms”. 
 
As noted, Lefebvre, for the comprehensive understanding of 
space and its production, it is necessary to analyse ‘the anatomy of 
space’ that is used for the physical representation of space. And he 
defines spatial concepts in the production of space. Lefebvre explains 
his triad as follows: 
 
1. Spatial practice, “which embraces production and 
reproduction, and the particular locations and spatial sets 
characteristic of each social formation. Spatial practice 
ensures continuity and some degree of cohesion. In terms 
of social space, and of each member of a given society’s 
relationship to that space, this cohesion implies a 
guaranteed level of competence and a specific level of 
performance.”  
2. Representations of space, “which are tied to the relations 
of production and to the ‘order’ which those relations 
impose, and hence to knowledge, to signs, to codes, and to 
‘frontal’ relations.”  
3. Representational spaces, “embodying complex 
symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not, linked to 
the clandestine or underground side of social life, as also 
to art (which may come eventually to be defined less as a 
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code of space than as a code of representational spaces)”. 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 33) 
 
He notes that the relationship between spatial concepts “must 
account for both representational spaces and representations of 
space, but above all for their interrelationships and their links with 
social practice” (Lefebvre, 1991: 116). His conceptual triad was 
designed to reveal the relations between spatial practices and socio-
spatial organisation to allow for the analysis of planning as an 
operation of power and ideology in creating representations of space 
(Zieleniec, 2007; 61). Lefebvre defines his triad as three moments 
of social space (Lefebvre, 1991: 40). The three moments of social 
space as perceived, conceived and lived are involved in space 
altogether, and thus it is not possible within the space concept to 
categorise them separately. In other words, these three concepts 
refer to three different facets of the same place (Zhang, 2006). At 
this point, it is necessary to define these relationships as 
contradictory as well as dialectical. For instance, the main focus of 
this dissertation is that social space is not free from ideology; 
however, conflicts and contradictions over the ideological 
significance of a social space, and its perception by society, does 
occur. In his article, Lefebvre discusses this through the different 
concepts of space. According to him, physical and social space is the 
outcome of human beings’ actions, and state occupies the mental 
space representations of the state which is also constructed by 
human beings. Therefore, mental space is a different entity to the 
physical or space; yet it cannot be separated from them (Lefebvre, 
2003). 
 
To give a better understanding of the relationship between these 
three moments of space, Lefebvre in his book uses a mirror as a 
metaphor. The ‘subject’ stands in front of a mirror that represents 
space. What the subject perceives is the same as what is reflected. 
When the ‘subject’ passes through the mirror, lived abstraction 
occurs. (Lefebvre, 1991; 313-314). When he explains his triad, his 
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approach to the knowledge of space is to comprehend the ‘anatomy 
of space’, and he explains it through the human body. According to 
him, representations of space refer to ideology and knowledge of the 
human being, representational space constitutes the culture for the 
body, and finally, spatial practice refers to the reactions and 
perceptions of the body to the outside (Lefebvre, 1991: 40). 
 
In Lefebvre’s reinterpretation, it is considered that 
representational space (lived space) happens in between spatial 
practice (perceived space) and representations of space (conceived 
space) (Wright, 2000; Elden, 2004). Representations of space refer 
to the conceptual and technical conceptions for master plans, zoning 
etc. produced by bureaucrats and professionals of urban space like 
urban planners and architects. Dogan (2007) argues that 
representations of space are designed and so they designate a sphere 
under the control and hegemony of the state. Representational space, 
however, in a specific time and space refers to hegemonic or 
conflicting interests. Activities, images and memories shape its 
frontiers (Dogan, 2007). Therefore, it is also called lived space—the 
space of inhabitants. According to Shields (1999), urban space is 
reproduced through the relationship among these three facets of 
Lefebvre’s spatial triad. In emphasising the significance of this 
intricate relationship, Lefebvre (1991: 116) notes that “the long 
history of space, even though space is neither a ‘subject’ nor an 
‘object’ but rather a social reality...must account for both 
representational spaces and representations of space, but above all 
for their inter-relationships and their links with social practice.” 
 
In practice, therefore, how a citizen perceives and lives within an 
urban space and how ideologies construct such spaces become 
essential questions. Lynch (1990) argues that pattern, symbols, 
paths, nodes, boundaries and regions make it possible to read and 
understand urban space. In the built environment, these concepts 
play a central role in public spatial practices and perceptions. 
Moreover, these concepts together shape the image of the 
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environment. According to Lynch (1990), the images of the 
environment “are the results of a two-way process between the 
observer and his environment. The environment suggests 
distinctions and relations, and the observer –with great adaptability 
and in the light of his own purposes – selects, organizes, and endows 
with meaning what he sees. The image so developed now limits and 
emphasizes what is seen, while the image itself is tested against the 
filtered perceptual input in a constantly interacting process. Thus, 
the image of a given reality may vary significantly between different 
observers” (Lynch, 1990: 6). This dissertation seeks to reveal how 
an urban image is created in practice by ideologies. Of course, every 
individual has his/her own image; however, it is not free from 
influence by the societies in which (s)he lives. Members of the same 
society share common or collective images. The images of the case 
study in this dissertation will be analysed and their evolution 
discussed, with a consideration of how they were created and 
reproduced in the context of national identity building. 
 
Therefore, the issue of social production of space is a significant 
topic among scholars exploring different geographies and the socio-
cultural and economic-political circumstances in the production of 
space. For instance, in his seminal book Watson (2011) discusses 
how space was produced in Seoul, Taipei and Singapore and the 
transformation of them through Lefebvre’s spatial triad. According 
to him, Lefebvre’s focus is to show that the essence of social space 
only becomes true once it exists at all levels: material, practical, 
historical, ideological and imaginative. More precisely, space 
transcends physical structure or geographical location; it is a social 
product related to different realities—material, practical and 
ideological. Gieseking et al. (2014) argue that social practices—not 
only material conditions—play a central role in the construction of 
space, which means the process of space production is affected by 
macro-scale policies and developments, everyday routines and the 
cultural background to those societies. Moreover, social patterns, 
relationships and cultural values are also produced according to the 
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structuring of space. Gottdiener (1993: 132) argues that “space is 
both a medium of social relations and a material product that can 
affect social relations.” 
 
Moreover, Andrzej Zieleniec focuses on the production of space 
through urban planning according to Lefebvre’s conceptualisation. 
Zieleniec (2018) argues that it is necessary to discuss and 
comprehend all aspects of the production of space since Lefebvre’s 
statement that ‘politics of space’ brings a challenge to the planning 
and design of the built environment. The assumption that space is 
political drives us to consider planning, design, architecture, and the 
landscape of the cities which are not free from any political processes. 
To Zieleniec (2018: 4-5), architecture, urban planning and design 
can serve the purpose of creating more liveable, accessible cities 
only if it is accepted that space is a social product. More precisely, 
among technocrats, practitioners, and theorists there is a common 
effort that how Lefebvre’s spatial theory, analyses and approach 
can be developed and associate with other fields in terms of practice 
and theory (Harvey, 1978, 1985, 1990, 2012; Merrifield, 1993, 2006, 
2014; Elden, 2004). Zieleniec (2018) argues that, according to 
Lefebvre, there is a need to acknowledge that space comes not only 
from the abstract principle of space or its relation to ideological 
control, but that everyday life and practices can create meaning, 
values, signs and symbols. To understand these intricate relations, it 
is needless to say that the historical, social, political and economic 
context of the production of space should be considered. 
 
The production of space is mostly discussed through Lefebvre’s 
conceptualisation. However, in recent times, scholars have argued 
different angles of space's production deserve to be considered. In 
their article, Wolf and Mahaffey (2016) criticise the professionals of 
design and urban planning and argue that, rather than letting culture 
happen, they fix the culture through their representations of space 
by using their power over people and environment. Moreover, Mee-
Kam Ng (2014) discusses the roles of intellectuals in the process of 
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space production. According to him, Hong Kong and Taipei witnessed 
social and political movements and following it spatial restructuring 
and production of space of those cities are managed under the 
leadership of intellectuals. Wiese et al. (2014) argue that in the 
contemporary urban context and newly developed conception of 
space make us rethink the production of space which requires an 
understanding distinct from space. From the point of production of 
space, they discuss the place-making experiences in two German 
cities regarding social, economic and physical aspects of the cities. 
In his seminal article, Dhananka (2016) discusses the slum areas in 
Bangalore. According to himm within the context of third world 
countries’ housing problems, especially low-income classes living 
in the slum areas, the production of space is highly related to the 
state. Therefore, the production of space process can only happen 
between space, community and government. In his article, he argues 
that for his case study governmentality became a significant issue. 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality and Lefebvre’s concept of 
the production of space are analysed through a case study from India. 
Moreover, Buser (2012) questions the politics and spatiality of 
municipal governance, and also argues that Lefebvre’s 
conceptualisation of the production of space can be used to examine 
socio-economic and governance relations. Gieseking et al. (2014) 
argue that while space is a very significant component of modern life, 
it is subject to manipulation and change; thus, space and social 
relations not only shape the multiple layers of identity but are also 
shaped by them. Unvin, however, criticises Lefebvre’s concept. 
According to him the idea that space is a social construction has 
become a fundamental assumption of contemporary social and 
cultural geography and it causes professionals to think less about 
more essential problems like the conceptualisation of space (Unvin, 
1999). 
 
The Politics and Ideology of Space, and Power: 
 
With modernity, space which is the outcome of architecture and 
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urban planning began to be referred to as not being only physical 
structures but also structures which have their own peculiar social, 
political and economic features. In this respect, the definition of space 
in modern times becomes vital although there are several definitions 
for space; yet the most significant and comprehensive belongs to 
Lefebvre. According to him, space is: “a whole set of errors, a 
complex of illusions, which can even cause us to forget completely 
that there is a total subject which acts continually to maintain and 
reproduce its conditions of existence, namely the state (along with 
its foundation in specific social classes and fractions of classes)” 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 94). In other words, besides having physical 
features, other dimensions of space began to come to the fore, and 
the theory of space gained importance in different fields. In this 
respect, distinct disciplines besides architecture and urban planning, 
sociology, political science, geography have developed a deep 
interest in space to analyse the relations among space, society, 
environment, politics, power and ideology. The focus of modern 
philosophers most likely concentrates on the demonstration of space 
being political. According to Busquet (2013), the reason behind space 
being political cannot be considered without discussing the complex 
relationship between spaces and societies, which prompted the 
development of a politically oriented representation of space called 
“the vision of the world” or “the future of societies”. 
 
After all, space cannot be considered without the political realm, 
since how space is represented and how it is used are not 
independent of the decision-making processes like what purposes, 
by whom, when and why those spaces are produced. Space similar to 
other socially constructed things like culture and identity etc., is a 
social construct and so it is highly bound up with power and authority 
(Knox and Pinch, 2010). To understand what the social construction 
of space is, it is necessary to discuss the relationship between space, 
power and ideology. According to Lefebvre, in modern times, space 
is not neutral or spontaneous; it is subject to any action of power. He 
draws attention to the political and ideological nature of space and 
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argues that “space has been shaped and moulded from historical and 
natural elements, but this has been a political process. Space is 
political and ideological” (Lefebvre, 1977: 341). Harvey, while 
following in his footsteps and taking his studies further, offer an in-
depth analysis of the work of Lefebvre showing its relevance to 
society and power with this argument: “spatial and temporal 
practices are never neutral in social affairs. They always express 
some class or other social content and are more often than not the 
focus of intense social struggle” (Harvey, 1990: 239). According to 
Lefebvre (1976: 29), it is not easy to separate ideology from practice 
since any representation of space is ideological as long as it 
contributes to the reproduction of the relations of production. 
 
In order to exercise control over societies, ideologies need to 
have the ability to control over space. At a national level, any ideology 
can be successful only if it has the ability to consolidate national 
power through spatial practices. Harvey puts it through the 
experience of working-class movements in Paris. To him (1989: 
236); “working-class movements are, in fact; generally better at 
organising in and dominating place than they are at commanding 
space. The various revolutions that broke out in Paris in the 
nineteenth century foundered on the inability to consolidate national 
power through a spatial strategy that would command the national 
space.” 
 
In this complex relation, ideologies dominate space and society 
in order to reproduce themselves. Spatial policies, practices, rules 
and regulations are arranged accordingly to serve this purpose. 
Besides, reproduce themselves, be visible at space is so significant 
for ideologies to create the society which they desire. Since being 
visible at space give them the power to control over society, and 
hence dominate all other conflicting ideologies which try to be also 
visible at space. Therefore, to dominate space, the power struggle 
between different ideologies occurs continuously in space. Space 
becomes the tool by which the dominant ideology represents itself. 
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In other words, space cannot be thought of without society and social 
life; ideologies use space as a tool to construct their desired society 
and social order. More precisely, ideologies reproduce themselves 
through the built environment. The crucial goal of ideologies is not 
only control over the society or space but also domination over other 
ideologies. Therefore, those who have the power to decide spatial 
practices, not only define the basic rules of social life but also 
eliminate the impact of other ideologies on social life. In other words, 
in any given society, ideological hegemony depends on the ability to 
command space and spatial practices. At any period, the ideology 
which dominates the others changes spatial practices and discourses 
for being permanent. Thus, the old is constantly facing destruction 
by the new for reproducing itself and being permanent. Moreover, the 
new one produces its own space while destructing the existing space 
which is the outcome of old ideology. According to Harvey (1989, 
239) “during phrases of maximal change, the spatial and temporal 
bases for reproduction of the social order are subject to the severest 
disruption”. In other words, while power struggle takes places 
between different ideologies, they have struggled over to reorganise 
their spatial bases. They change the space, create it from the 
beginning. To be permanent; be remembered ideologies express 
themselves on urban spaces in different ways according to their 
ideological inclinations. More precisely, each society has its own 
peculiar space and spatial practices while producing space. This 
process of producing space is imbued with ideological inclinations 
because any ideology has the power to change society via space. 
Thus, in any society, the conflict and struggle between different 
ideologies takes place on/at space either changing the space or 
creating it from the beginning while creating the society which they 
desire. The one which dominates space, dominates the others. For 
this reason, space and the process of producing space are significant 
for ideologies. As noted by Gregory (1994: 403) “constellations of 
power, knowledge, and spatiality – in which the dominant social order 
is materially inscribed (and, by implication, legitimised).” Therefore, 
plans of cities, buildings, landscape, monuments and sculptures etc., 
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or anything related to spatial practice not only represent space but 
also represent the prevailing ideology. To Merrifield (1993) space is 
full of hidden elements like jargon, codifications and signs which are 
produced by professionals and technocrats; thus, ideology is always 
naturally embedded in space’s practice. Any changes in these 
elements or spaces itself, refer to a new ideological approach. 
 
In his influential article, Harvey (1979) discusses the radical 
transformation in the economy, institutional structures and social 
order of France and corresponding to these transformations the 
power struggle among French Republicans and Monarchists and their 
intransigent Catholic allies through the symbolic significance of 
construction process of the Basilica Sacre-Coeur. In the process of 
French nation-state building, the US was taken as a role model. 
However, French Republicans considered the Monarchists and 
Catholics as an enemy that prevented the possible development of 
French society. As the symbol of the power of the Monarchists and 
Catholics, the Basilica of Sacre-Coeur, which was completed in 1919, 
was considered a provocative political symbol that had caused civil 
war for so many years. For Christians, it is not more than a religious, 
sacred place. yet others argue that it was inspired by politics and that 
it symbolised the intolerance and fanaticism of the right. It was built 
and completed; however, it has always been the focus of struggles. 
Harvey (1979, 381) argues that “The building hides its secrets in 
sepulchral silence. Only the living, cognizant of these histories, who 
understand the principles of those who struggled for and against the 
"embellishment" of that spot, can truly disinter the mysteries that lie 
entombed there and thereby rescue that rich experience from the 
deathly silence of the tomb and transform it into the noisy beginnings 
of the cradle.” The ongoing struggle over the construction of 
Basilica was continued with the proposal of a ‘colossal statue of 
Liberty’ just in front of the Sacre-Coeur on the land of Paris. The 
statue would serve as a symbol of liberty, democracy, and 
republicanism which The French Republicans deeply attached to their 
principles. However, it was donated to the US. The authors of this 
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proposition argued that a monument would decrease the people’s 
hatred towards the Sacre-Coeur. 
 
2.2. The Structural Transformation of Public 
Space regarding Ideologies  
The history of public space in Turkish cities dates back to the 
times of the Ottoman Modernisation. The Ottoman Empire’s private 
and public space had their peculiarities. As a public space, 
commercial zones never became entirely secular places and Islamic 
elements like mosques and the Islamic practices dominated. However, 
modern public spaces began to emerge for the first time with the 
modernisation efforts of the Ottoman Empire. With the reform 
movement, which began around the 19th century, the organisation of 
space showed itself similar to European counterparts with the 
opening of wide avenues, plazas and squares, more significantly very 
first time the organic pattern of Ottoman cities were replaced with 
geometric rules (Bilsel, 2007). The transformation of the public 
spaces in Ottoman cities continued with the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic in the context of a nation-state and national-
identity building. 
 
First of all, the construction of the capital city played a central 
role in the structural and ideological transformation of public spaces 
all over the country generally, but in Ankara in particular. At this 
point, it is necessary to recall that in order to create national spaces, 
in the context of the nation-state, the state uses its power to create 
its own capital city. Prominent examples of creating politically 
motivated national capital cities over the world are Ankara (Turkey), 
Islamabad (Pakistan), Chandigarh (India), Canberra (Australia) and 
Brasilia (Brazil)②. 
                                            
② Although it is common to design a city as a capital for a newly established 
nation-state, Ankara is unique in that in terms of affecting the strategies of 
governments (Cinar, 2005). Ankara is the city which allows us to understand 




Second, the public spaces of any capital city are so significant in 
order to build “representations of space” where socio-cultural 
practices are constituted. According to Zieleniec (2018: 8), public 
space that shapes the lived experience of the city is continuously 
“codified, regulated, surveilled and policed.” The reason behind the 
importance of this control over public space is related to the 
inhabitants of the city and their interaction with public space. 
Zieleniec (2018: 8) argues that “we learn who we are and where we 
belong by how our lives are structured, ordered, regulated and 
controlled in time and space. That is how or if, when and where we 
are allowed to express our values, aims, identities, dreams to claim 
or make space for ourselves.” In other words, what public space 
means to different people and groups at different times and how they 
become to represent ideals of culture, identity and society are not 
the same. 
 
Further, Habermas points out the construction process of a 
democratic regime and argues that public spaces are the most 
significant tools in the construction of a democratic regime and a 
modern society’s capital city (Sargin, 2002:11). The planning issue 
of Ankara and its public spaces were designed and developed similar 
concerns. Kilinc (2002) argues that the emergence of public spaces 
in Ankara was significant for Republican ideology and its 
representation in two reasons. First of all, public spaces are 
considered urban elements which would make public life viable. In 
other words, the new capital city of Ankara—similar to its European 
counterparts—would have modern streets, large boulevards and 
modern citizens by evoking the new age and civilisation. New 
economic and social circumstances created its new spatial 
                                            
particular local governments. It was planned as the capital city of the Turkish 
Republic according to the republican ideology of creating a secular, modern 





organisation. The modernisation project of the Republican ideology 
would be realised only if the production of public spaces was achieved 
where modern life was practised. Therefore, even though traditional 
lifestyle and its socio-spatial organisation continued, it could not be 
at the very centre of social life at all. In Ankara with its socio-spatial 
organisation, there was an attempt to construct a new lifestyle. 
Another reason is the metaphorical relations between public spaces, 
public buildings and the socio-cultural projects of republican 
ideology. More specifically, concerning creating a new modern 
lifestyle from society to family to individual as a part of Turkish 
modernisation project; Ankara, its planning issue, and public spaces 
of it were very significant concerns of state (Kilinc, 2002: 123-124). 
Thus, in the production of public spaces, state planning became 
prominent, and Ankara was planned with a system of public space 
consisting of squares, parks, boulevard, streets and other open and 
closed spaces. In this respect in his influential article Abrahao (2016) 
discusses how public space plays a role in political expressions which 
gives clues also why state interferes the space and planning issue. 
He argues that “the role of our streets, squares and avenues, as 
spaces of political expression within the urban context, seeking to 
demonstrate that such a political expression comes into being when 
there is evidence of contradictions in the process related to 
dominating those spaces by the ruling classes, and calls into question 
the idea of urbanity, as a system of good civic practices, repeatedly 
conveyed through planning and policy management submitted to the 
interests of the ruling minority” (Abrahao, 2016: 292). 
 
Besides Ankara, other cities and their public spaces also 
experienced this transformation. Although there was little investment, 
the public spaces of Istanbul also underwent transformation. The 
change of Istanbul was quite controversial. It was the representative 
symbol of the Ottoman and Islamic cultures; however, it was essential 
to construct national spaces. The development of Taksim Republican 
Square (Chapter 5 offers a detailed explanation of its ideological base 
and spatial organisation) was the most crucial placemaking 
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experience of this era. During the early Republican Era, public spaces 
were developed with the ideology of secular Turkish nationalism in 
the context of nation-state building. The modernisation project of 
Turkey showed itself on space not only for reflect its power but also 
transform the society. However, this transformation continues under 
the influence of contending ideologies. Here, it is necessary to recall 
that the early Republican Era, the transformation of spaces aimed to 
be created modern spaces similar to spaces of European cities in a 
reaction to the traditional pattern of Ottoman-Islamic cities. Thus, 
when Islamic ideology became dominant, a backward transformation 
occurred. That is to say that the primary motivation to make public 
spaces secular was replaced by the visibility of Islam in public spaces. 
One of the leading research concerns is to investigate how this 
transformation impacts national-identity construction. 
 
To that end, this study will focus on the urban squares as being 
significant elements of public space and will investigate their socio-
spatial transformation under the effect of distinct ideologies in 
(re)constructing national identity. Urban squares as being significant 
elements of public spaces where creative social and cultural 
interaction occurs in harmony with everyday life practices among 
citizens are important components of the planning issue. In a built 
environment, squares are one of the most important public spaces 
which reflect the identity of cities, everyday life practices of masses, 
and the cultural background of society. Levy (2012: 157) explains it 
as “on square citizens are connected to the heart of urban culture, 
history and memory.” Although details change, identity building 
through placemaking experiences of the squares is similar. Since, 
besides their function as places where citizens gather for various 
activities and events, they also contribute to social cohesion and 
identity (Memluk, 2013). More specifically, squares are the places 
where social interactions happen, not to mention that they offer an 
appropriate environment for different socio-economic and cultural 
groups to mingle. Further, squares can easily establish an existence 
in the collective memory, and they are significant components of a 
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city and citizens’ identity. Therefore, in the production process of 
them, the role of ideologies is significant. The production process of 
public space in general and urban squares, in particular, is also 
characterised by continues struggles, rivalries and conflicts between 
distinct ideologies. Moreover, the production of public space also is 
not free from the everyday life practices that take place there. In this 
sense, Massey (2005) argues that public space is the outcome of 
complicated social processes which include several forces and actors 
communicate, conflict and oppress. It is necessary to recall that the 
production of public space should be considered in the context of 
nation-state building of state’s modernisation project in order to 
ensure social control, regime prestige and the future aspirations of 
society. For instance, in Turkey in the early Republican Era, public 
space was used as a means to create desired public and legitimatise 
the state’s policies and guarantee the success of reforms. In this 
period, urban squares were “spaces of representation”, 
constituting a spatial representation of a nation state’s power. 
 
To summarise, squares have constantly transformed within their 
(historical) meaning, (urban) function and (spatial) form accordingly 
ideological changes within a political, social and economic context. 
With the establishment of the Turkish Republic, urban squares were 
designed and developed similar to the squares of European cities and 
became representative symbols of the Republican ideology. However, 
over the last two decades, Turkey has witnessed the dramatic 
transformation of its public spaces and urban squares in particular, in 
terms of socio-political and economic dimensions as well as design 
issues (Catterall, 2013; Civaner, 2013, Gul et al., 2014). With the 
rise of political Islam, cities and spaces have undergone 





2.3. The Formation of Nation-States in the 
Third World Countries  
To be independent and maintain development, the formation of 
the nation-state is essential and is prioritised by the majority of 
Third World countries. Contrary to other western, modern and 
capitalist countries; the formation of nations, national consciousness 
of Third World countries is constructed through top-down social 
engineering projects led by the state. There are different approaches 
and theories about the formation of the nation-state. In order to give 
a deep understanding about the nation formation, first nation and 
nationalism are discussed and following two important approaches 
how to construct and create nation and nation-state ‘the invention 
of tradition’ and ‘imagined communities’ will be addressed. 
 
Approaches to Nation and Nationalism: 
 
The origins of the nation and nationalism are controversial among 
scholars regarding their ontological basis. On the one hand, some 
scholars consider them to be a natural part of society; on the other 
hand, some argue that those concepts are created and constructed. 
Guibernau (1996) while claiming that those concepts summarise the 
controversy between scholars as “there are two main positions: 
First, the assumption that the nation is something natural. 
Schleiermacher talks about the nation as a natural division of the 
human race, endowed by God with its character. Every nationality, 
he proclaims, is destined through its peculiar organisation and its 
place in the world to represent a certain side of the divine image. For 
it is God who directly assigns to each nationality its certain task on 
earth and inspires it with a determined spirit in order to glorify 
himself through each one in a peculiar manner. The second 
perspective holds that the nation and nationalism are modern 
phenomena. According to Gellner, nationalism is explicable as an 
inevitable, or at least as a natural, corollary of specific aspects of 
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modernisation. It is a phenomenon connected to the emergence of an 
industrial society. Giddens understands both the nation and 
nationalism as distinctive properties of modern states and locates the 
emergence of nationalism to the late eighteenth century and 
thereafter. Anderson also argues that nationality, ‘nation-ness’ 
and nationalism are cultural artefacts created towards the end of the 
eighteenth century” (Guibernau, 1996: 48-49). In this respect, 
contemporary theorists on nationalism are Eric Hobsbawm and 
Benedict Anderson, and their discussions will form the basis of this 
part. Both of them, from the Marxist tradition, argue that nations and 
nationalism are not naturally given but rather constructed. According 
to Smith (1991) in third world countries, the nation is something 
created and constructed, and Turkey which has imperial roots is also 
considered to be the outcome of nation formation. He argues that “in 
non-Western instances of the formation of nations, the specifically 
nationalist element, as an ideological movement, assumes greater 
importance” (Smith, 1991: 101). 
 
During the early Republican Era, in the context of building the 
nation-state, the Turkish Republic was formed. In order to 
homogenise society, change everyday life practices and, most 
importantly, build a modern nation, many radical reforms were 
enacted. Guibernau (1996: 58) argues that the homogenisation of the 
population and reproduction and altering of culture, the media and 
education are the two elements controlled by the modern state. In the 
early Republican Era, these two elements are used to build national 
identity and culture. The main concern of Republican ideology was to 
build a modern, secular and Westernised nation-state and national 
identity to create social cohesion between citizens and make them 
develop an attachment to their homeland. In this period, secular 
nationalism dominated other ideologies and conceptualised the 
identity formation. Both Guibernau and Smith concentrates to identity 
building efforts of nationalism in their studies. According to 
Guibernau (1996), nationalism can be understood only if its political 
character and the role in identity building are analysed. Smith (1991: 
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74) argues that “nationalism as an ideological movement for 
attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a 
population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or 
potential 'nation'.” However, it is significant that with the assumption 
of nation, nationalism, and national identity are not naturally given, 
yet constructed conceptions, especially in third world countries they 
are open to negotiating in times according to ideological inclinations. 
 
Invention of Tradition: 
 
In the introduction to The Invention of Tradition, Hobsbawm 
argues that, in order to give a deep understanding of the nation 
phenomenon which consists of constructs, it is necessary to 
scrutinize the invention of tradition. He discusses that “the invention 
of traditions as highly relevant to that comparatively recent historical 
innovation, the ‘nation’, with its associated phenomena: 
nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories and the rest. 
All these rest on exercises in social engineering which are often 
deliberate and always innovative, if only because historical novelty 
implies innovation” (Hobsbawm, 1983: 13). 
 
His argument begins with the invention of tradition. According to 
him, even tradition is invented, constructed, regardless of whether 
societies tacitly or naturally adopt them. Thus, national traditions are 
also examples of invented traditions. He argues that ‘invented 
tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by 
overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, 
which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by 
repetition, which automatically imply continuity with the past. In fact, 
where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a 
suitable historic past. A striking example is the deliberate choice of 
a Gothic style for the nineteenth-century rebuilding of the British 
parliament, and the equally deliberate decision after World War II to 
rebuild the parliamentary chamber on the same basic plan as before 
(Hobsbawm, 1983: 1). He gives attention to the efforts by people to 
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sustain historical continuity even by copying it. In Turkey, with the 
nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire and its power, hegemony over the 
world, the architectural style of many mosques continue imitate the 
Ottoman style, even if they do not serve the current needs of Turkish 
society. 
 
According to Hobsbawm, the concept of a modern nation is filled 
with symbols and national history etc. Although modern nations claim 
to be natural (Hobsbawm, 1983: 14), they are not considered without 
an invented component of concepts of the national phenomenon, since 
all those concepts are related to the past and historiography. He 
claims that history cannot be discussed without considering the 
knowledge or the ideology of the nation. Moreover, what has been 
preserved in the popular memory and what the state or movement 
has selected, written, pictured, popularised and institutionalised are 
totally different from each other. Thus, history is invented according 
to ideology. According to him the modern concept of France or the 
French is not natural yet constructed or invented through history. For 
instance, in order to build a modern national identity in Turkey, the 
state rewrote history and being Ottoman and Muslim were denied 
while national identity of the new Republic was formed depending on 
the Hittites, Sumerians and Turkic tribes, who had migrated to 
Anatolia from Central Asian in the 12th and 13th centuries (White, 
2002: 34). Moreover, the very famous and significant banks of Early 
Republican Era were named as Etibank (Hittite Bank) and Sumerbank 
(Seton-Watson, Nations and States) regarding Hittites and 
Sumerians as its ancestors by Ataturk (Anderson, 1983). In other 
words, in the context of nation-state building, what ideologies and 
power do is social engineering that constitutes national symbols, 
histories and national identities etc. related to historical 
circumstances. Moreover, invented traditions fill the gap between 
this created history and public sphere through other invented 





Moreover, in recent times the use of invented traditions has 
become widespread across Europe which is defined as mass-
producing traditions by Hobsbawm. Especially with the 
standardisation of administration and state education, it was aimed to 
transform people into citizens like peasants into Frenchmen 
(Hobsbawm, 1983). New nation-states which recently gained 
independence from empires also used the invention of tradition, 
constructing capital cities, flags, national anthems and military 
uniforms. For example, in the Italian case, Italian stateman d’Azeglio 
was quoted as saying, “we have made Italy, now we must make 
Italians”. In this respect, the invention of tradition played a central 
role in maintaining the Republic while protecting it from socialism and 
the right (Hobsbawm, 1983). In France, to establish and maintain the 
republic, and also turn all Frenchmen into good Republicans, the 
invention of tradition was used as a tool in different steps: 
1. Development of a secular primary education 
2. The invention of public ceremonies 
3. The mass production of public monuments (Hobsbawm, 
1983) 
 
Another significant example of the invention of tradition is the 
construction of capital cities. According to Cannadine, while 
ceremonies and rituals became significant, the conditions of capital 
city where these rituals and ceremonies took place, also began to be 
considered. For instance, the capital cities with “the grand buildings 
and splendid thoroughfares were monuments to the power of the 
state or the influence of the monarch” (Cannadine, 1983: 113). In 
1868, the builder argues that “‘the stately magnificence of a capital 
city is one of the elements of national prestige, and therefore of 
national power and influence’, it was imperative that London’s 
architecture should become ‘worthy of the capital of the richest 








In his influential book, Imagined Communities, Anderson argues 
that the nation phenomenon is not appropriately defined by different 
theories, especially Marxist theory, rather than dealing with, elided 
it because having anomaly (Anderson, 1983). With his 
conceptualisation of imagined communities, his main aim was to 
suggest tentative discussions for a more satisfactory interpretation 
of the ‘anomaly’ of nationalism (Anderson, 1983). Similar to 
Hobsbawm, Anderson also argues that nation and nationalism are 
cultural artefacts which arose at the end of 18th century. Moreover, 
he suggests a definition for the nation as “an imagined political 
community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” 
(Anderson, 1983: 28). He explains the reason of being imagined as 
in a nation even the smallest ones, the members do not know, meet 
all other members or even hear of them, and so every single member 
of a nation has the image of his/her communion. Gellner (1964 cited 
in Anderson, 1983) points out the roots of nation and nationalism and 
his focus was falsity rather than imagining the character of the nation. 
He argues that nationalism does not mean that self-consciousness of 
nations to their existence yet the invention of nations where they do 
not exist. Anderson criticises this approach regarding the false or 
true concept since according to him if their falsity or genuineness 
distinguish communities, it does not refer to the imaginative 
character of the community. 
 
Lastly, related to the imaginative communities, Anderson (1983) 
argues that the nation is considered a “deep, horizontal comradeship” 
so no matter if there is inequality and exploitation among the 
members of the nation, the fraternity makes each of them is willing 
to die and kill without any questioning. In the following chapter, he 
discusses the roots of nationalism since according to him, the 
“central problem posed by nationalism” can only be understood 
through an in-depth examination of the nationalism phenomenon. 
While discussing the roots of nationalism, Anderson (1983) 
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indicates the close relationship between religion and nationalism 
concerning death and immortality which are neither concerned by 
Marxism nor Liberalism. From this point of view, he argues that 
nationalism cannot be understood without the large cultural systems 
which preceded it and caused it. However, nationalism also tends to 
be secure and finds a way to reproduce itself. For instance, arranging 
the ceremonies for tombs of the unknown soldiers and constructing 
memorial monuments are the reflections of national imaginings in the 
modern secular age (Anderson, 1983). He interprets it as a way of 
“transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning” 
through using collective memory and commemorations to make sure 
remembrance and forget. Moreover, all ceremonies, memorial 
monuments etc. symbolise the immemorial past and ensure a limitless 
future. 
 
In short, Anderson (1983) indicates that the era of nationalism 





There is a common understanding among scholars that culture is 
a social construct. In the case of national identities, it is agreed that 
the nature of national identity is also socially constructed. The 
socially constructed nature of national identity means that they are 
open to re/deconstruction over time. To discuss the concept of 
national identity and how it is constructed through social and cultural 
practices, Anderson (1983 cited in Knox and Pinch 2010) developed 
the idea of an ‘imagined community’. According to him, before the 
modern age, in traditional communities, national identity, which 
makes people develop an attachment to a country, was not a 
fundamental conception. However, with modernity and the 
emergence of nation-states, in order to control a large number of 
people and make them be part of strong patriotic bonds, national 
identities which require to use of an enormous imagination became a 
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compulsory concept. Therefore, national identity is beyond each of 
our individual preferences, yet we are highly concerned about the 
issue of it which defines who we are. People want to know who they 
are and who others are. McCrone and Bechhofer (2010) argue that 
national identity gives a chance for people to choose how to present 
themselves and how to define themselves. For instance, the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) defines national 
identity in the context of nation-state building as “the construction 
of a shared sense of identity and common destiny, to overcome ethnic, 
sectarian or religious differences and counter alternative allegiances” 
(DFID 2010: 18). Leach (2005; 178-179) defines national identity 
as “a ‘way of life’, a somewhat mysterious practice that remains 
accessible only to a certain group, and that is consequently always 
under threat from those that do not belong to that group, and who do 
not subscribe to the same ‘way of thinking’. It may be 
circumscribed by the various rituals and practices that hold that 
community together. It emerges out of a common commitment to a 
‘way of life’, and therefore shares certain properties with religion 
itself, in that its only real base is a ‘belief’ in or ‘commitment’ 
to certain shared values that are themselves no more than 
‘beliefs’.” More precisely, national identity helps to bring a 
community together which shares a common way of life, rituals and 
practices. However, Smith (1991: 21 cited in Bellamy, 2003) argues 
that national identity—rather than shared values related to an ethnic 
core—has six characteristics: a collective proper name, a myth of 
common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more 
differentiating elements of common culture, an association with a 
specific homeland, and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of 
the population. Billig (1995) proposes that national identity is not one 
identity among many; yet it is an ‘ideological consciousness’ that 
establishes nations, national identities and homelands, and embodies 
them to make them occur as ‘natural andancient’. Moreover, 
Radcliffe and Westwood (1996: 23) emphasise that how national 
identities are produced and reproduced through everyday practices 
in different places range from home to neighbourhood to the 
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workplace and the public sphere, and they argue that “national 
identities and nations are embedded in the material and imaginative 
spatialities of collective and individual subjects.” 
 
The different definitions of national identity refer to common 
concepts such as nation, nationality, history, culture and shared 
values etc. In order to comprehend what national identity is, first, 
nation and nationality should be defined. The nation refers to a certain 
group of people being part of historical-cultural characteristics, 
while nationality is the condition of belonging to a nation. According 
to Guibernau (2013), there are five key elements of national identity: 
“psychological: consciousness of forming a community; cultural: 
sharing a common culture; territorial: attachment to a clearly 
demarcated territory; historical: possessing a common past; political: 
claiming the right to rule itself.” 
 
Similar to identity, national identity is also always in process. 
From birth to death, accordingly social, cultural, geographical 
contexts, the identity of individuals keep changing. Edensor (2002; 
29) argues that “identity is always in process, is always being 
reconstituted in the process of becoming and by virtue of location in 
social, material, temporal and spatial contexts. The fluidity of identity 
does not mean that there is no coherence, but rather that this has to 
be continually reproduced to ensure fixity.” In this respect, national 
identity also continually changes. However, since it is a kind of 
collective memory, any change in national identity is only possible 
both by remembering and forgetting. According to Hall (1995), 
national identity is something which is constructed, yet throughout 
history, it is open to being deconstructed and constantly 
reconstructed according to the will of the dominant ideology. 
Bozdogan (2014) argues that national identities are continually 
renegotiated. 
 
In the process of creating, reconstructing national identity, 
national histories, national anthems, and flags, national holidays, 
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national languages, festivals, monuments, commemorations, 
representative landscapes, national landscapes play central roles. 
Ashworth and Graham (2016) argue that national landscape as a part 
of official collective memory is composed of the ceremonial axis, 
monuments, specific names given to streets, squares, significant 
buildings, monuments, etc., the victory arch. In the context of nation-
state building, and constructing the national identity of a nation, to 
consolidate power, national landscapes are created. Ideology and 
power have always been in the centre in the process of national 
identity construction through affecting the place identity. Kenny 
(1992; 176) argues that “a planning document, possibly more than 
any other written text, articulates the ideology of dominant groups in 
the production of the built environment”. More precisely, dominant 
ideologies build place identities which symbolise their power and 
existence. 
 
Urban space is most likely the place where power relations 
between competing ideologies are reconstructed. In this context, 
dominant ideologies which have power, reproduce themselves and 
assure their existence through the dominating urban space according 
to their own will. This domination of public space can occur in 
different ways such as the reconstruction of symbolic spaces, the 
naming of these symbolic spaces or renaming places etc. for 
strengthening their existence through changing the collective 
memory, redefining national history and national identity depending 
on their will. According to Sandercock (1988: 207) “memory, both 
individual and collective, is deeply important to us. It locates us as 
part of something bigger than our individual existences, perhaps 
makes us seem less insignificant... Memory locates us, as part of 
family history, as part of a tribe or community, as a part of city-
building and nation-making.”  
 
Ideology and power construct national identity by means of 
symbols. There are tools for creating symbols. Especially with the 
rise of capitalism within the context of nation building, the symbolism 
 
 40 
of public and ceremonial architecture became more common. 
According to Knox (1982), the reason behind the giving of 
importance to symbolism is to legitimise and promote a particular 
ideology or power system by creating a sentimental national 
architecture. Whelan (2005) argues that if collective memory is 
preserved in the city, symbolic elements like public statues, 
commemorative monuments and places etc., are significant 
contributors to this memory. Therefore, buildings and structured 
environments became the most prominent tools in the process of 
creating symbols. Knox (1982) argues that to give a better 
understanding of the relationship between societies and the built 
environment, it is necessary to consider the symbolic role of 
buildings. According to Eco (1980: 12 cited in Knox, 1982; 109) 
“"every usage is converted into a sign of itself", so that most 
structures have a "secondary function” which is connotative or, in 
other words, symbolic of something.” For example, the buildings 
which remain from the time of Hitler’s Germany are enormous, 
symbolising strength and power. Once they asked Hitler “why are 
the buildings always this colossal?” His response was quite 
predictable: “since I want to build self-awareness into every 
German” (quoted in Dal Co 1981:105 cited in Dovey, 1999; 58). 
According to Whelan (2005) meaning and memory together 
transform neutral spaces into ideological spaces, and in this process, 
symbolic structures do not only play a pivotal role in legitimising the 
authority and dominance but are used to cultivate alternative 
narratives of identity. Thus, in order to overthrow such regimes, 
ideologies and authorities these symbolic structures become easy 
targets which need to removed or have their representative meaning 
destroyed. Leach (2005; 181) argues that “in terms of national 
identity it is perhaps more likely that the common, everyday buildings, 
the familiar streetscapes of our cities and villages, the farmsteads 
and the landscape of our countryside, will become the embodiment of 
what we know as ‘homeland’… national identity comes to be 
grounded in a reflection of the values assigned to aesthetic objects 
around us, in which architecture plays an important role.” Behind all 
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the effort of these achievements is to be practical in everyday life. 
Since as Dovey (1999: 2-13) argues that “the more that the 
structures and representations of power can be embedded in the 
framework of everyday life, the less questionable they become and 
the more effectively they can work. This is what lends built form a 
prime role as ideology. It is what Bourdieu calls the ‘complicitous 
silence’ of place as a framework to life that is the source of its 
deepest associations with power…the struggle to make power visible 
has to deal with the fact that the exercise of power is slippery and 
ever-changing. Power naturalizes and camouflages itself, 
chameleon-like, within its context. The choice of the mask is a 
dimension of power.” 
 
Besides architectural structures, naming is also a significant part 
of national-identity building. The naming of places cannot be 
interpreted as coincidental; names are the results of political 
struggles between different ideologies since place names are part of 
collective memory which is a significant component of place identity. 
While constructing national identity and narrating national history in 
nation states, (re)naming is used actively by political authorities to 
make the public forget one ideology and replace it with a new 
alternative. According to Azaryahu and Golan (2001), in the 19th and 
20th centuries, national toponymies were systematically constructed 
for nation building and state formation. Naming and renaming 
practices have been an important part of this systematic construction. 
For expressing themselves on urban space, ideological values take 
advantage of place names’ symbolic role (Cohen & Kliot 1992). The 
renaming places as an outcome of revolutionary changes also 
introduce the political-ideological shift which directly has an impact 
on the everyday life experience of society. Right after any revolution, 
dominant ideologies focus on the construction of national identity and 
national history through renaming places. Another significant point 
for (re)naming places is that it is being a tool for reconstructed 
collective memory in the process of redefining national identity and 
national history. According to Light (2004), it cannot be denied that 
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renaming is part of the process of creating a new meaning of already 
existent place which consists of the values of current political views 
of time and for this case renaming can be considered as the effort of 
redefining national identities and national history and creating new 
collective memory. This means that any changes in dominant 
ideology have been mostly accompanied by the redefining of the 
national history and national identity. However, to redefine national 
history and national identity, ideologies have to destruct those 
already defined. National history and national identity are not only 
mentioned in history books, or take places on the identity card; 
otherwise, it would be quite easy to replace them with new well-
defined ones. Their existence is embedded in everyday life 
experience, in the collective memory, in urban space, in place names. 
 
Building and designing the urban landscape is also a significant 
tool in the process of identity narration. According to Whelan (2005) 
in order to comprehend the construction and reconstruction of urban 
space which has never been free from the political climate of those 
countries, it is necessary to discuss the intricate relation between 
ideology and landscape. Kenny (1992) argues that the planning 
document represents how the dominant ideology plays a central role 
in the production of the built environment.  
 
In conclusion, to construct national identities in the context of 
nation-state building, there are several ways ideologies and power 
follow. One of the most significant tool ideologies uses while building 
national identity is to use space and spatial relations. Therefore, 
place identity is directly affected by ideological interventions. In this 
process, representative landscapes are created. Monuments, 
commemorative structures, memorial places, architectural artefacts, 
a national architecture, street names began to be representative of 
national landscapes. To impose their ideologies, power uses them. 
While dominant powers (re)construct the national identity, people 
define themselves and others. In Turkish geography, national identity 
discussions began with the collapse of Ottoman Empire; since the rise 
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of national identity concerns naturally coincided with the nation-
state building, these two concepts mostly are defined and discussed 
with the reference one to another with a case study. The reason 
behind the choice of public space, the urban square is open and green 
spaces for recreation and leisure have been significant tools of 
ideologies in the changing of lifestyles as well as perceived urban 
identity, which profoundly impacts on self-identity and collective 
memory. According to Cengizkan (2002) in the nation-state, public 
spaces are the only places that make possible the development of 
identity by individuals. Urban squares, as one of the most important 
components of open spaces, have always been enjoyed the attention 
of competing ideologies. In this respect, activities, meaning, physical 
settings and content of squares in the eyes of the public, their 
transformation accordingly ideological inclinations and political 
preferences of governments, the relationship between square and 
surrounded structured environment happen such significant 
components of the national identity building. Cinar (2005) argues that 
in the context of nation-state building, alternative nationalist 
projects which promote national identity and a sense of nationhood 
began to be visible in cities, spaces and places. Thus, urban planning 
became a part of this construction. As Kostof (2011: 21) states 




























Theoretical Background Conceptual Basis
Methodology
The formation of nation-
state in the 3rd world 

















































Periods of Turkish 
Urbanisation in terms 
of Ideological Changes  












Chapter 3: The Ideological Transformation 
from Ottoman Empire to The Turkish Republic 
 
In this chapter, the main aim is to unravel the spatial practices 
and policies while (re)production of public spaces regarding 
ideological bases at different times. As Smith (1991) argues the 
Turkish Republic was established when Ottoman Empire dissolved; 
hence, nation, nationalism, and national identity were constructed. 
Therefore, different ideologies reconstruct and modify them 
accordingly. I will begin to discuss these concepts in detail, together 
with their historical background, with the aim of providing a better 
understanding of the keywords. 
 
Secular Turkish Nationalism/Republican ideology: This is a 
political ideology that promotes Turkish people. Its secularity is a 
little different from other countries. Rather than denying Islam totally, 
the Kemalist revolution accommodated Islam in their nationalist 
ideology (Asad, 2003) but strictly controlled it, restricting it to the 
private sphere and making it invisible within the public sphere. 
 
Islamic Nationalism: In the political climate of Turkey, Islam 
manifests itself as political Islam or Islamic nationalism. Islamic 
nationalism can be termed as a phenomenon that fuses nationalism 
and religion. The central element of being Turkish regarding identity 
issue is defined through being Muslim, which is highly controversial 
among Turkish people especially seculars. 
 
Neo-Ottomanism: It is also a political ideology that promotes and 
glorifies the Ottoman Empire. Islamic nationalism began to reflect the 
building of Ottoman-style influence. 
 
Ottoman Identity: Ottoman Empire constituted several ethnic 
groups and thus in the modern context, it is difficult to explain this 
identity with a nation concept. In the economic system, the taxation 
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system was based on the religious identity. Rather than ethnicity, 
religion was prominent. However, Turkish and Islamic character is 
visible. But still, ethnic and religious aspects are not as significant as 
territorial hegemony. 
 
Islamic/Muslim Identity: Islamic identity refers to major 
component that shape the Muslim’s mindset and shape his/her views 
towards the universe (n.a, 2018). It is not only related to culture 




3.1. Ideological Conflicts in Different Periods  
Ideological conflicts in different periods of Turkish Republic 
coincided with the economic, socio-spatial changes. In this respect, 
this part is examined by looking at the extent to which these changes 
occurred. Historically, the studies related to economic, socio-spatial 
changes are mostly held according to different periods. There are 
different approaches for these periods, yet the most well-known 
belongs to Sengul who provides a long-term perspective to this 
phenomenon subject to the political- economic perspective, and 
Tekeli who distinguishes four different periods depending on the 
history of city’s modernisation. They both tried to discover these 
periods through spatial policies. In this study, ideological changes will 
also be examined through spatial policies. 
 
‘Shy modernity’ defined the era when the Turkish Republic 
was declared and this period was between the 1860s to 1923 (Tekeli 
2010). The author viewed it in the modernisation context. From Early 
Republican Era until the Second World War when Turkey 
acknowledged multiple-party policy is defined as ‘urbanisation of 
the state’ by Sengul (2003) and ‘radical modernity’ by Tekeli. 
Following period which is called as ‘urbanisation of labour-power’ 
by Sengul, and ‘populist modernity’ by Tekeli lasted from the 
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1950s till 1980s. Lastly, the period of ‘urbanisation of capital’ or 
‘erosion of modernity’ began at the end of the 1980s when the 
military coup happened and the economy was opened to the neo-
liberal incursion. 
 
Table 1 Different Periods of Turkish Urbanisation and Ideological 
Conflicts 





























embedded in it.        
Liberal approach in 
the 1950s, Marxist 
movements in the 
1970s  





While Sengul’s periodisation tells us about political economy 
perspective, Tekeli’s periodisation gives us detailed information 
about the modernisation of cities under the impact of capitalism. In 
this dissertation, the same periods will be used; however, the focus 
will be the ideological conflicts between secular Turkish nationalism 
and Islamist nationalism. The conflict between distinct ideologies can 
be said to be based on these two different phases of Turkish 
urbanisation. Early Republican Era which is defined as Radical 
Modernity and urbanisation of state, and after the 1980s which are 
known as Erosion of Modernity and urbanisation of capital are the 
two periods of Turkish urbanisation. This will be the focus of this 
dissertation in the context of ideological conflicts. The Early 
Republican Era with the Kemalist revolution was shaped by the 
ideology of secular Turkish nationalism. According to Mardin (1981) 
Turkish nationalism as a predominant ideology in the Early 
Republican Era, was able to consolidate and legitimise the state 
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power. At this point, one must remember that this period should be 
considered in the context of nation-state formation where state tried 
to be only hegemonic power over society and take religion under its 
control to be successful. While the formation of the state was 
transformed from an Islamic Empire to a nation state, ideology was 
also transformed from Islam to nationalism by Kemalist revolution 
(Gulalp, 2002). Ahmad (1993) explains this phenomenon as Islam 
was inherited to the Turkish Republic from Ottoman Empire with its 
role as being political instrument; and since it would have conflicts 
with the ideology of secular Turkish nationalism, Kemalist revolution 
tried to eliminate its political feature. Analyses of these two 
ideological approaches will be done by comparing and contrasting 
conflicts between religion and state. One may wonder why religion is 
chosen as a bone of contention and how important is it in this 
discourse. The study of religion and state conflicts is a prerequisite 
for a better understanding of the urban experience of the Turkish 
Republic since its establishment. The Islamic ideology remained 
central in the planning cities and the creation of spaces in Turkey. 
According to Gulalp (2002), ongoing political struggles between 
different ideologies cause the rise or decline of religiosity, and rather 
than being religion, Islam should be comprehended through it being 
an ideology of a political movement. In this dissertation similar 
approach to Islam has been adopted to provide a better understanding 
of distinct ideological struggle on public space. Ali Shari’ati (1981) 
in his prominent work, puts the features of Islam as political ideology 
while comparing it with Marxism: “Islam and Marxism, are two 
ideologies that embrace every dimension of human life and 
thought…Each is keenly interested in the private and social lives of 
people in this world. But in all of these areas, the two ideologies are 
diametrically opposed and completely contradict each other in their 
ontologies and cosmologies.” (Shari’ati, 1981). Thus, behind the 
majority of reforms, the main target was to control Islam. Moreover, 
communities were defined according to their religion and ethnic bases 
at Ottoman Empire. More precisely, identity was related to religion 
and ethnicity. However, the first condition for building a nation-state 
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is to create a national identity. In order to create a homogenised 
society in this era, the Turkish identity was constructed. The 
features of this identity were defined as ‘secular, modern, and 
westernised’. At this point, it is important to emphasise that both 
secular Turkish nationalism and Islamic nationalism ideologies have 
the power to transform the national identity through forming the 
urban spaces and cities in order to reproduce themselves and their 
desired societies accordingly their ideological inclinations. Cinar 
(2007) addresses this issue as although, not all of them were too 
strong to be in power or develop a discourse to be substitute for 
modernity through their political programs; during the twentieth 
century different ideologies such as liberal approach in the 1950s, 
Marxist movements in the 1970s and Islamist discourses in the 
1990s were able to change the discourse of modernity in significant 
regards, and the traces of these changes can easily be observed in 
the transformations of cities in general. However, the massive 
transformation occurred in the 1990s by the rise of political Islam 
and its desire to develop Istanbul as the symbol of Ottoman and 
Islamic ideology as an alternative to Ankara being the symbol of 
Republican ideology. 
 
In Turkish political history, religion has always been a significant 
determinant; yet it couldn’t exist as an independent force until the 
1980s. Modernisation efforts caused a conflict between religion and 
state which has continued since the Turkish Republic was established. 
As being a newly created nation-state, the Turkish Republic had to 
deal with religious issue actively till the 1950s. After the single-
party regime, Turkey experienced the multiple-party policy regime, 
and the Democrat Party won the elections. Similar to the 
Conservative Party, the Democrat Party also consisted of the Islamic 
perspective of life; however, Islam didn’t become a threat to the 
nation-state or its secularity. Thus, the effects of Islam were not as 
powerful as it is currently. With liberalisation in the 1980s, political 
Islam found a convenient ground to dominate the political 
environment of Turkey. This dissertation’s focus will be the Early 
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Republican Era and the era after the 1980s, even though other phases 
also will be mentioned generally.  
 
Briefly, this study will focus on the two different periods in order 
to comprehend how national identity is constructed. In Turkey, after 
the achievement of establishing independent nation-state in different 
periods, symbolic spaces proved to be significant in supporting 
narratives of national identity. First one is the Early Republican 
period which secular, modern, and westernised identity was the 
primary target after traditional, Islamic Ottoman Empire. Second is 
the period from the 1980s till today which global capitalism and neo-
liberal urban policies accompany the rise of political Islam and 
directly reassertion of Muslim identity. These two different 
ideologies used urban planning, architecture, and urban space to build 
the national identity accordingly their ideologies. 
 
3.2. Ideological Conflicts in Identity Building at 
Ottoman Empire 
Ottoman Empire which included almost three continents was 
multicultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious community. Until the 
18th century, the empire was able to manage to have its superiority 
over West outside. Moreover, in its territory, people from different 
ethnic groups went along together. However, the emergence of 
capitalism in Western society brought radical changes in political, 
economic, and social structures. In a short time, capitalism created 
its own institutions, legal rules and regulations which transformed the 
Western society radically. With capitalism on the one hand, socio-
economic and ideological developments; on the other hand, the rise 
of nationalism, became a significant threat to the superiority of the 
empire over the West and more crucially the unity of empire’s 
territorial integrity. With the effect of nationalism, different ethnic 
groups in the empire began to seek their identity through establishing 
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their nation states. Thus, in order to follow the socio-economic 
development of the West; a new ideology was created which could 
make all different ethnic, religious groups stay under the roof of the 
empire; and protect its territorial integrity. Majority of the 
administration class was agreed on the main reasons behind the 
decline of Ottoman Empire (which included the Islamic religion and 
traditional society) thus; they tried to open the country to the 
capitalist economy and be modernised. Moreover, with different 
ideological approaches, they were seeking to build an identity which 
helps them to keep different nations together.  
 
Ottoman Empire tried hard, on the one hand, to follow the West 
regarding socio-economic developments; on the other hand, to find 
an ideological basis of the identity issue. Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism 
and Turkish nationalism began to be discussed for the first time in 
this period. These ideological developments changed the features of 
Ottoman-Islamic cities. While the Ottoman Empire adopted the 
westernised way of life, nationalism kept rising in Europe. The 
identity of the empire was Islamic, and ethnic communities were 
addressed subject to their religion. One of the most potent reform to 
find a cure for this fragmentation, prevent any Balkanisation and keep 
having unity was to create an ideology which covers every person 
living in Empire. Ottomanism was developed as an identity which 
covered all religious and ethnic groups living in the territory of 
empire. According to Karpat (1982), Ottomanism brought the idea of 
equal citizenship no matter what ethnic or religious groups people 
belong. Pan-Islamism also was discussed to create social cohesion 
through the unifying Muslims in the empire; yet both of them were 
unsuccessful (Akcura, 1904, cited in Karpat, 1982) and Balkanisation 









The physical and social organisation of Ottoman cities was ideally 
designed according to Islamic rules and Ottoman elements, in order 
to offer a convenient life for Muslim people. More precisely, Ottoman 
cities were created out of the harmony of Ottoman elements and 
Islamic rules. Thus, they were peculiar to themselves and different 
from the rest of Islamic cities especially the ones residing in the Arab 
world. To understand and analyse Ottoman cities properly, the 
privacy issue which comes from Islamic tradition should be 
considered. Only then the physical and social landscape of the empire 
can be adequately explained. At this point, one must remember that 
on the contrary to general belief that Islamic cities are built randomly 
without any plan, Inalcik (1990, 7) argues that a traditional but 
certain type of plan was followed, while building the main religious 
complexes and commercial centres of the Ottoman cities. The most 
distinct feature identifying the Ottoman city is that it compromises 
two major parts as residential and commercial areas. Their social 
structure and spatial organisation are very different from each other. 
According to Inalcik (1990) the reason behind this division of urban 
space into two parts which are an unplanned residential area and 
highly well-planned commercial area, being a fundamental Islamic 
rule, was the privacy issue. However, both areas had the Islamic 
identity of the empire. 
 
Not surprisingly the neighbourhoods of all Ottoman cities were 
also formed according to ethnic, religious, and sectarian 
differentiation which means people belong to the same ethnic group, 
religion, and sect lived in same neighbourhoods (Inalcik, 1990; Acun, 
2002, Faroqhi, 1984 cited in Sengul, 2003), parallel to its 
multicultural identity. The residential areas which were divided as 
non-Muslim and Muslim zone, were organised around a mosque, 
church, or synagogue depending on the religious inclination and 
religious identity of the neighbourhoods (Inalcik, 1990). At Muslim 
regions, a mosque located in the centre of each neighbourhood served 
as the centre where not only people pray, but also regular courses 
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related with Islam were held for the general public and also the law 
courts were located (Inalcik, 1990, pg6). More precisely, the mosque 
had functions more than being the only religious centre but also other 
urban services. Regarding socio-spatial practices, this settlement 
pattern, and the ethnic-religion difference became very significant 
problems for the Turkish Republic later on while trying to build a 
nation-state (Tekeli; 1973).  
 
In Istanbul, several centres emerged alongside a well-planned 
complex of religious buildings which consisted of madrasa, hospital, 
library, hospice, the school for children, the convent for dervishes 
and fountain for ablution were supported by a waqf or imaret (Inalcik, 
1990, pg 10-11). Contrary to neighbourhood pattern which was 
highly dependent on the ethnic and religion segregation, the planning 
of commercial areas did not reflect the above. Centres where non-
Muslim and Muslim people mingled at public space, were the places 
of religious diversity became visible. However, a great mosque which 
was located in the very heart of commercial zone besides its role on 
religious, political and judicial affairs, had the role of being the public 
space where people socialise, entertain and also trade whatever their 
religions were (Inalcik, 1990). More precisely, although religious 
differences didn’t make any difference in commercial centres, 
because of the hegemony of Islamic practices and Islamic identity 
over others, these centres never became entirely secular places.  
 
Although the Ottoman Empire was a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic 
and multi-religious community, public sphere and public life were 
always formed according to Islamic rules and traditions in both 
residential and commercial zones accordingly reflecting Islamic 
identity. In terms of the architectural style, the features of cities also 
were dominated by Islamic and traditional elements such as minarets 
and domes.  
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3.3. Ideological Conflicts in Identity Building at 
The Turkish Republic 
3.3.1. Building a Modern, Secular and Westernised Identity at 
Early Republican Era  
After World War I, following the collapse of empires the world 
witnessed the emergence of modern nation-states all over the world. 
While a new page of history was opening with the emergence of 
nation-states, national boundaries were redrawn. The Turkish 
Republic is also one of the modern nation-states which arose out of 
the collapses of Ottoman Empire in 1923. Similar to Turkey, nation-
states which were established right after the collapse of empires, 
experienced different circumstances from nation states of its 
European counterparts did. The nation states which occur after the 
dissolution or balkanisation of an empire referred to the 
fragmentation, not an integration; so states have to be built through 
the creation of national identity and nation consciousness (Tekeli, 
2003). Therefore, not surprisingly nation-state building coincides 
with national identity building. This target was achieved in Turkey by 
secular nationalist ideology. While fulfilling this mission, considerable 
attention was given to strategies for the spatial organisation which 
was planned in two different levels. First of these levels was to 
transform space of country into space of nation-state, and the 
second was to organise cities as the central place where modernism 
project of the state was brought into action. The real struggle of 
Turkish Republic just started right after Independence War as Said 
(1994: 6) once underlined, ‘the struggle over geography is not only 
about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about 
images and imaginings’. The Turkish Republic had to deal with on 
the one hand strengthening modern nation-state idea, and on the 
other hand erasing the remaining of Ottoman Empire.  
 
The Turkish Republic from the ashes of Ottoman Empire was 
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established in 1923. However, the Turkish Republic had to confront 
socio-spatial issues as a heritage of the Ottoman Empire, in which it 
was necessary to build and promote a sense of national identity and 
belonging for embodying future-oriented aspiration. In order to build 
national identity, a top-down modernist social engineering project 
was held by Kemalist Revolution with the ideology of secular 
nationalism.  
 
Although ideological changes and identity transformation began 
with the modernisation of the Ottoman Empire, they could find a 
convenient ground for radical evolving with the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic. From 1923 till the 1950s when Turkey 
acknowledged a multi-party policy and conservative party won over 
the elections, secular nationalism, as founding ideology, was 
dominated over all other contending ideologies and national projects. 
Kemalist revolution adopted “high modernist faith” (Bozdogan, 
2002: 6) and secular nationalism. In order to build national identity 
which was defined as secular, modern, and western by ideology of 
secular nationalism; professionals and technocrats using limitless 
state power had been in social engineering project which changed 
people’s lifestyle, vision of the world, working pattern, and ethical 
behaviour according to the ideology of high modernism (Bozdogan, 
2002). According to Gulalp (1995), what the Kemalist revolution did 
was to on the one hand build a nation state from an Islamic empire; 
on the other hand, legitimise laying the foundations of ideological 
transformation from Islam to nationalism. In other words, secular 
nationalism tried to be free from all other ideologies especially 
Islamism and Ottomanism, for building a modern, secular, and 
westernised national identity. Thus, as an official discourse, state, 
not only denigrated the Ottoman past and Ottoman-Islamic identity 
by accusing it as being traditional, Islamic, backward, unable to 
protect its territory; but also, positioned itself as secular, modern and 
more importantly able to protect the nation’s territory (Cinar, 2007). 
As a part of the nationalist project, national identity could only be 
built by the construction of hierarchically organised national space. It 
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is obvious that the process of national identity building can’t be 
realised without the interference of state to create a consciousness 
of its new citizens, make their attention towards the nation-state. 
According to Cinar (2005), ideological interventions on urban space 
like creating new spaces, reorganising, repositioning, or recreating 
already existing ones, have different purposes. First of all, a 
nationalist project always needs these kinds of interventions which 
make them visible on urban space and enable them to organise the 
public life. It is the first step to nationalise public sphere. Following, 
such interventions make national ideology dominate over other 
alternative ideologies easily. Third, in order to create a sense of 
unified national territory, and to demonstrate the state’s power; 
these interventions are necessary. Lastly, the very powerful way to 
reproduce itself is to create new spaces, destroy the others, 
placemarks and symbols of state power to spaces, organise urban 
space according to official national ideology, only through these 
interventions, the state becomes able to reproduce itself on urban 
space. Briefly stated, in order for hegemony over contending 
ideologies to reproduce, the state takes advantage of controlling 
space. Thus,  nothing on the urban space is coincidental but the 
outcomes of strategically planned movements beforehand.  
 
The very first and bravest step of the construction of national 
space was to announce Ankara as the new capital city, instead of 
Ottoman Empire’s capital Istanbul. This decision gave lots of 
pressure to new nation-state since the capital change brought new 
challenges. Although there were entirely valid reasons behind this 
decision, it was an incontrovertible truth that building Ankara as new 
capital city would be so challenging since Istanbul had been the 
capital city of four empires, with its natural beauty, located on a 
significant bridge between Asia and Europe, while Ankara was only 
an insignificant small Anatolian town. One of the most significant 
reason was to cut the ties with Istanbul as being the centre of 
Ottoman and Islamic identity and to make a fresh beginning in order 
to create a modern national identity, it was necessary to build an 
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ideological space. Besides its geographical location and concerns of 
military security, the very acceptable reason behind choosing Ankara 
as capital to relocate and establish new capital city was to prove the 
Turkish Republic was able to formulate a nation-state (Tekeli 1973, 
Sargin, 2004, Batuman 2013,). In other words, out of the remains of 
the Ottoman Empire, a westernised and modernised nation-state 
need to cut all ties with Ottoman and Islamic past, and to enact 
carefully calculated several reforms were enacted (Huntington, 
1996). The declaration of Ankara as the capital city which didn't have 
any relations with Islamic or Ottoman history, one the most 
significant reform that the Kemalist revolution did. The reason behind 
this is the declaration of Ankara as the capital city and giving too 
much effort to its planning process were all related with state’s 
ideological interventions.  
 
The decision of moving the capital from Istanbul to Ankara gave 
a chance to the ruling elite an easy way to build a new identity for 
the Turkish nation. Also, the ideal way to deal with the inheritance of 
Ottoman socio-spatial inheritance was to create a new national 
identity and build centralised single entity. In its founding years, 
Ankara and its planning issue became one of the most crucial socio-
spatial projects of Turkey which had conflicts with the socio-spatial 
inheritance of Ottoman Empire and so this period planning efforts 
focused on dealing with them (Tekeli, 1998). According to Sengul 
(2003), these conflicts are; the lack of hierarchically organised and 
centralised spatial system, ethnic-religious and sectarian 
differences on the pattern of cities, the organic urban structure which 
didn’t allow the national state to control over society. Therefore, 
this period state focused on building national identity through the 
using modern spatial practices including urban planning and 
architecture; yet it created national architecture similar to other 
contemporary European countries. 
 
This notion made Ankara turn into an ideological space more than 
only being a capital city. With its ideological character, Ankara began 
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to play an important role to realise Kemalist revolution and the 
ideology of secular nationalism. The effort of building a national 
identity by transforming Ottomans into modern Turks made the 
government take very serious Ankara’s planning issue. The 
government endeavoured to on the one hand build a modern Turkish 
identity which was the contrast to Ottoman and Islamic identity, on 
the other hand, strengthen newly adopted western, secular, and 
modern political system. In her influential article Kezer (2010b) 
argues that Ankara provided the need for ideological space to realise 
the structural transformation of the Turkish state for Turkish 
nationalists. While building a new nation-state, the effort of 
homogenisation of urban and national space was achieved with 
Ankara which later became a model for other Anatolian cities across 
the country (Tankut, 1993). In the middle of Anatolia, Ankara without 
any connection to Islamic or Ottoman identity was the symbol of a 
Westernised, modernised, and secular nation-state. According to 
Tekeli (1984, 10), the declaration of Ankara as capital city was “the 
rejection of cosmopolitan cultural values of Istanbul” and to Vale 
(1992, 98) “a search for an appropriate setting to nurture the 
development of Turkish national identity”. In this respect, whatever 
plan decisions were taken they only served to create a unified 
national territory, homogenised nation space, and national identity. 
3.3.2. The Rise of Political Islam and The Reassertion of 
Muslim Identity  
During the twentieth century, several ideological approaches 
became prominent, interacted with and influence each other in 
different periods such as the liberalism in the 1950s, the Marxism in 
1970s and finally Islamism in 1990s. However, only some of them 
can be an alternative for the modernity project of Turkey and had a 
powerful impact on changing national identity. For sure, all these 
different ideologies made cities and spaces transform somehow in 
some respects. However, Islamist nationalism positioned itself right 
opposite to secular nationalism and in order to be permanent while 
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attacking the spaces of modernity project of Turkey, began to 
construct its alternative spaces. The scope of this dissertation is to 
focus on secular Turkish nationalism and Islamism in the context of 
building national identity through the making of the urban squares.  
 
Since the Turkish Republic was established, Islam had not 
existed as an independent ideology but manifested itself within 
conservative ideologies. The third military coup d’etat in the history 
of the Turkish Republic occurred in 1980 which not only suppressed 
the ongoing conflicting/struggle since the late 1960s among the 
factions of leftist, nationalists, fundamentalist, and Kurdish 
separatists (Karpat, 1997 cited in Sargin 2004) but also economic 
structure and the political institutions transformed into new forms of 
strict control and discipline (Batuman, 2000).  
 
When the military took control over the government, Islam was 
used as a prominent instrument for suppressing the growing socialist 
movements and bringing about social cohesion. According to White 
(2002), the military based government considered the leftist ideas of 
Turkish youth as a treat to the unity of the nation and so it must have 
been replaced with religious and cultural elements which had 
potential to be driving power for sustaining social unifying. Moreover, 
the 1980s world witnessed the dramatic changes within social, 
political, and economic which had an impact on each country with its 
transnational forces. These transnational forces embodied in the 
global market with neoliberal urban policies in general, and the rise 
of Islamism with the reassertion of Muslim identity in particular 
especially in the urban landscape of Muslim geographies (Bozdogan 
and Kasaba, 1997). Mert (1998, cited in Sargin, 2004: 675) argues 
that besides national policies, changes in the world and supporting 
pro-Islamic governments of the United States and Western allies for 
controlling Soviet influence empowered the Islamists in politics of 
Turkey. Moreover, Batuman (2016: 331) argues that in Turkey 
similar to the rest of the third world, as a populist response to neo-
liberalism, Islam became a global identity. Although 1980’s military 
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coup paved the way for sprouting Islamic ideology, Islamism as an 
independent force didn’t take the central role of Turkish politics 
until the 1990s. According to Karpat (1997) different from other 
military interventions which suppressed both the leftist and pro-
Islamic growth, last military intervention in 1980 while suppressing 
only leftist, transforming the pro-Islamic indoctrination into more 
radical fundamentalism. 
 
The reasons behind the re-emerge of Islamism in Turkey 
parallel to changes all over the world includes (1) to legitimise post-
nationalist politics of identity (Gulalp 2002), (2) to follow global 
transformations, Islam was used as an antileft instrument of state 
(Sargin, 2004), (3) rise of Islam by the influence of military 
repression (White, 2002), (4) as a response to the failing of secular 
nationalist regimes (Gulalp, 1995), (5) coincided with the 
postmodern critique of Western culture and appreciating authentic 
local values with the Islamic critique (Gulalp, 1995). Here it is 
necessary to remember that although the post-modern critique of 
Western culture reflected itself in Third World countries as the 
ascendant of the Islamist critique (Gulalp, 1995), on the contrary to 
Islam which is “ultimately a total doctrine” (Bulac, 1991, cited in 
Gulalp, 1995), post-modernism denies universalism and affirms 
relativism. 
 
Thus, the discussion between scholars about the Islamism either 
it is pre-modernist or post-modernist is highly valuable in order to 
give a better understanding of ascendant of Islamism and reassertion 
of Muslim identity and the results. On the one hand some scholars 
(e.g. Gulalp, 1995, Alam, 2009) claim that Islamism in Turkey is the 
outcome of the failure of the Western modernisation and coincides 
the critique of modernism, thus it is post-modernist manifestation, 
on the other hand, some other scholars (e.g. Yavuz 2005, Waxman, 
2000) state that Islamism has always been a part of Turkish identity 
explicitly or implicitly. In this dissertation, what the author argues is 
that the rise of Islamism and reassertion of Muslim identity with 
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Ottomanism is nothing but a representation of post-modernist, post-
nationalist ideology. It is not the representative of local elements but 
the marketing them for the sake of global capitalism. Global markets 
and neoliberal urban policies with the rise of Islamism and reassertion 
of Muslim identity express in the spatial structure of Third World 
geographies. 
 
The outcomes of the military’s intervention had a substantial 
impact on each and every institution of the state. For the first time 
after the Early Republican Era national identity was redefined. The 
military was confident that this new identity which was officially 
determined as Turkish-Islamic synthesis would be the solution for 
social division. The primary motive of the coup leaders was to 
construct the depoliticised Turkish-Islamic identity, in order to 
consolidate their authority on society. The three fundamental pillars 
of this identity are the family, mosque, and the military (Kafesoglu; 
1985 cited in Yavuz; 2005, 73). According to Oktem (2008, 21) with 
1980 military coup, a combination of nationalist rhetoric with the 
state-controlled version of Islam secular Turkish nationalism was 
replaced with Turkish-Islamic synthesis and shaped Turkey’s 
ideological landscape for almost two decades. Mardin (1991; 1993 
cited in Sargin, 2003) states that since the 1950s as a populist 
discourse of conservative ideologies the homogenised Turkish 
national identity should have been synthesised with religious motifs 
and military intervention succeeded this dream of conservatives and 
Islamist ideology found the suitable ground to be free from 
conservative ideologies and began to express itself freely. More 
precisely, Turkish-secular vision and the effort of creating a national 
identity which was defined as modern, secular, and western replaced 
with Turkish-Islamic vision. The declaration of national identity 
through being Turkish and Muslim does have conflicts with the 
national identity which was defined by Turkish nationalist ideology. 
More precisely, while Islamism rose on the new fraction of Islamic 
approaches which rejects modernisation, the intellectuals of new 
fraction dominated over the Turkish intellectual landscape during the 
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1980s and 1990s (Gulalp, 2002). Yavuz (1998, pg 32) states that 
“Islamic-oriented elite is pivotal in the re-examination of the 
Republican legacy and the construction of a new Ottoman-Islamic 
identity”. In other words, the Kemalist-secular vision of elites 
directed to Ottoman-Islamic identity.  
 
Waxman (2000) argues that the rise of Islamism was considered 
a significant threat to the official concept of Turkish national identity. 
Moreover, Aras and Kirisci (1998) see Islamism as a tool on the one 
hand to construct a Turkish style of Islam and to make Turkish 
nationalist ideology transform into Islamist one. With these changes 
in the political stream of Turkish Republic, Islamic identity which was 
restricted to private space with Kemalist revolution began to be 
visible in the public sphere. Moreover, this convenient ground was 
taken as grantee by Islamists and with strong propaganda; they 
managed to be active in the political arena of the Turkish Republic by 
1994 with the local elections. The results of local and general 
elections gave the power Islamism to expand its influence gradually. 
According to Batuman (2015: 893) Islamism owes its success to 
urban politics, the coexistence of neoliberal policies with social 
welfare mechanisms. Islamist movements finally became a significant 
political figure with successive electoral victories, especially in local 
government in 1994 when they took over the local administrations of 
the three major cities including Ankara and Istanbul. Moreover, in the 
1995 general elections, the Welfare Party had the highest number of 
seats in parliament. In 1994, this new alternative nationalist ideology 
nurtured from Islamism and Ottomanism defined the Turkish nation 
through Ottoman-Islamic civilisation in contrast to official Turkish-
secular national ideology (Cinar, 2005). With the success of local 
elections, Islamic ideology asserts itself in the public-political 
sphere (Alam, 2009). However, with the rise of political Islam, 
although there hasn’t been any attempt to change secular law into 
Islamic law, public life tries to be transformed via Islamic law inspired 




While Islamist practice positions itself against Kemalist secularist 
activism, the rise of Islamism reproduces itself through the eroding 
of the building environment of Kemalist inheritance (Huntington, 
1996). More precisely, as being a rival ideology to secular 
nationalism, Islamism aimed to destroy secular Turkish nationalism 
and its modernity project. Secular Turkish nationalism defined the 
identity as modern, secular, western; however new Islamist ideology 
brought a challenging identity defined as local, Islamic, Ottoman, and 
Eastern. This alternative identity was powerful while Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan was mayor of Istanbul, yet in 1998 with his withdrawal from 
his position lost its ground. The success of Islam-inspired party also 
didn’t last long, and after it was closed down with the reason of 
being the threat for secularity of Turkish Republic, in the 2000s two 
fractions of it remained. On the one hand, anti-capitalist; anti-
western radical Islamists and the other newly established Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP which introduced itself as democratic, 
capitalist, western. According to Sayyid (1997, pg.17): “an Islamist 
is someone who places her or his Muslim identity at the centre of her 
or his political practice. That is, Islamists are people who use the 
language of Islamic metaphors to think through their political 
destinies, those who see in Islam their political future. This should 
not be taken to mean that there are no shades of opinion within 
Islamism, that it is some kind of monolithic edifice without variations 
or internal differences. Islamists are no more (or less) identical in 
their beliefs and motives than postmodern bourgeois liberals or 
socialists or nationalists.” Moreover, the ideological basis of the 
Islamist movements both still nurtured from the Ottoman-Islamic 
identity (Cinar, 2005). 
 
However, in Turkey, Islamist identity includes Ottoman elements. 
Islamists engagement to Ottoman, which is called neo-Ottomanism 
manifested itself in Ottoman practices, objects, architecture, etc. In 
other words different from other Muslim geographies, in Turkey 
reassertion of Muslim identity includes Ottoman elements. In order 
to build this new identity, urban planning and architecture have been 
 
 64 
used as an effective tool since the 1980s. Thus, the national 
landscape has changed significantly.  
 
In this dissertation, the changes on urban squares related with 
the rise of Islam in the public sphere will be examined in three phases. 
First phrase is under the military regime which lasted for 3 years, 
and the next years till Islamic-inspired party Welfare Party won over 
the local elections in 1994. From 1994 to 2002 is the second phase 
when Islamic ideology was dominated and became visible in the public 
sphere. Lastly, 2002 over 16 years when the Islamisation of public 
sphere began with the implementations of local governments and 
followed by the interference of central government.  
 
The author proposed in this paper that Islamism in Turkey is a 
product of the frustration of the promises of Western modernisation 
and represents a critique of modernism. In this period especially 
Istanbul has been the focus of Islamist for constructing their desired 
identity. On the contrary to Ankara, Istanbul was declared as the 
cultural capital which represented Islamic-Ottoman elements. What 
Kemalism and Political Islam offer for the social model is entirely 
opposite to each other however both give an account of the struggle 
on urban space to legitimate their ideology while changing urban 
space through destructing the old one. According to Cinar (2005) 
both secular Turkish nationalism and Islamism used the cities and 
public spaces as their main stage for the construction of a new sense 
of nationhood. After establishing the Turkish Republic as an 
alternative for the imperial capital of Istanbul, Ankara was built for 
the creation of a modern, western, and secular identity. However, by 
1990s the Islamists declared Istanbul the centre of Ottoman-Islamic 
civilisation which represents true identity of Turkish nation 
accordingly to their national ideology. The conflict between Ankara 
and Istanbul was redrawn by Islamists for the sake of Istanbul. On 
the one hand Ankara was pictured as representative of secularist 
state which was not only unsuccessful in governance but also 
alienated the traditions via modernity project; on the other hand, 
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Istanbul which was neglected intentionally by secular state, so it lost 
its true identity, and it would be able to be rebuilt only by the Islamist 
leaders (Cinar, 2005). So behind the physical construction of cities 
and spaces by Islamism was the concept of rebuilding the national 
identity.  
 
In conclusion, the efforts of building national identity throughout 
the history of the Turkish Republic rose from the two 
opposite/counter-ideologies. The first one is the effort of creating 
modern, secular, and westernised identity at Early Republican period 
which secular Turkish nationalist ideology dominated and state 
controlled over the economy; the second one is the reassertion of 
Muslim identity with the rise of political Islam and global markets and 
neoliberal urban policies. Turkish Republic’s modernisation project 
deals with Islam accordingly bringing it under state control and 
announcing a secular state. To Gulalp (2002) Islam had been 
suppressed because of its ideology, yet secular nationalism with the 
global crisis of modernism caused the rise of political Islam. 
Modernity in the global level began to be questioned, rather than 
appreciate westernisation and western culture; authentic culture 
came to the front as the power for dealing with western hegemony. 
Gulalp (2002) argues that recent Islamists movements have become 
the most significant predicament of the modernisation project. In 
these three periods how the public sphere transformed is the very 
significant question for seeking how identity has been built through 
built environment especially on urban squares.  
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Chapter 4: Case Study: Kizilay Square 
 
4.1. Introduction to Cases 
 
Figure 2 The map showing the locations of Ankara and Istanbul 
Source: Google Earth 
 
Kizilay and Taksim Squares have always been the focus of 
ideologies who sought to forge a political identity. The political 
character of these two squares, in return, inevitably results in the 
effort of state power in national identity building. Republican ideology 
tried to constitute modern lifestyle and desired to spread it across 
the country, and the symbolic places had played a crucial role to make 
it realise. However, what political Islam has been doing over 20 years 
is not very different in ideologically. It also has tried to make itself 
permanent in social-political life through using urban space. In this 
respect, the case study of the research is discussed spatial 
production process of these two squares being the characteristics of 
the modern city, will be analysed within the concept of Lefebvre’s 
triad. Further, the spatial representations and practices of them will 
be investigated. 
 
Kizilay and Taksim Squares represented the spatial configuration 
of the newly established nation-state and reflected its political, 
economic and social ideals. The establishment of the Turkish 
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Republic aimed to build a national identity in the context of nation-
state building. For this study, the reason behind the choosing these 
two squares as the case study is that they have always been the focus 
of ideologies and political struggles among them since the Republican 
Period. Kizilay and Taksim Squares, as being the centre of two major 
cities of Turkey Ankara, and Istanbul not only the physical centre 
where people, information, goods, traffic move across the city but 
also the social centre where collective memory preserved which 
consists of the accumulation of historical events and their 
representations. The visions of the Republican regime and the 
political Islam towards these two squares are the mirror of their 
ideological inclinations. Their histories are significant and primary 
elements for studying identity building, politics of memory, processes 
of nationalisation of urban space in those cities, as well as their 
symbolic marking. 
 
In Ankara, constructing the national identity was shaped through 
the building new space which physically excluded from the old the 
city. The existing socio-spatial structure was excluded, and a new 
isolated city with the name of Yenisehir was created. However, in 
Istanbul existing westernised district was chosen for creating 
national space and national identity, and Republican elements were 
erected in this district. In this context, Kizilay Square in Yenisehir 
and Taksim Square in Beyoglu are the best examples of nation 
state’s spatial project while building national identity.  
After examining the role of Kizilay and Taksim Square in the 
formation of the nation-state, the institutionalisation of nationalist 
ideology and building a national identity during the Early Republican 
Era, it will be discussed how these two squares became the stage 
where political Islam attempted to institutionalise an alternative 




Figure 3 The map showing the location of Kizilay Square 




Figure 4 The map showing the location of Taksim Republican Square 







4.2. National Identity Building through Kizilay 
Square 
4.2.1. Kizilay Square as Symbolic Space of Republican 
Ideology (Early Republican Era, 1923-1950s) 
During Early Republican Era, in order to cut all the ties with 
Ottoman and Islamic identity; Kemalist Revolution enacted several 
radical reforms. These fundamental reforms made the social 
structure and spatial organisation transform. Nation-state and 
national identity building process were based on the dissolution of old 
spaces and creating of new spaces where the ideals of the Republican 
regime could be easily displayed. Lefebvre (1991) argues that in 
order to produce new spaces, the representations of space should be 
emphasised. To him: “representations of space have a practical 
impact (and) they intervene in and modify spatial textures which are 
informed by effective knowledge and ideology. Representations of 
space must therefore have a substantial role and a specific influence 
in the production of space” (Lefebvre, 1991: 42). 
 
National identity-building project was flourished through spatial 
practices including the architecture, urban planning and design under 
state-sponsored modernisation program. One of the most significant 
transformation regarding the spatial organisation was to occur 
modern public spaces such as parks, squares, people’s house where 
the state’s ideology was displayed. According to Uludag (1998), 
public spaces of Ottoman-Islamic cities composed of mosque 
courtyards, recreation area, nearby fountain, and bazaar; however, 
squares were still so unique to European cases. Republican ideology 
constructed squares as public spaces where European way of modern 
life tried to be introduced to society. Moreover, the Ottoman-Islamic 
architectural elements which did not overlap with the Republican 
ideals sought to be eliminated (Batur, 1998). In this respect, in 
modern societies, public spaces serve as “lived spaces” where 
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socio-cultural practices are (re)produced. Further, squares among 
other public spaces were used in the new city centre of the nation-
state. While examining Kizilay Square, to provide a better 
understanding, it is necessary to consider the spatial transformation 
of new building capital city Ankara in the context of nation-state 
formation. 
 
Ankara, conceived as representative space of nation-state was 
planned by German urban planner Lorcher who worked with also 
Ottoman Empire for planning Istanbul. He was quite familiar with the 
differences and conflicts between traditional Ottoman-Islamic city 
and modern city that the Kemalist Revolution tried to build. Thus, on 
the one hand with his experience and knowledge on modern planning 
practices he was preparing the plan, on the other hand not only using 
the method of zoning, ranking, ordering, hierarchy but also 
constructing the semantic relations and naming them, he tried to 
construct and conceive the capital city and its spaces. The spatial 
organisation of Kizilay Square which was strategically located on 
Ataturk Boulevard to strengthen the narration of national identity was 
the outcome of Lorcher’s efforts on the public spaces of Ankara via 
the state’s support. Thus, every single detail of this square 
regarding urban planning and architecture has its own narration to 
strengthen the national identity building. In this respect with its 
design, name, meaning, form, and function; Kizilay Square played a 
significant role in national identity building. 
 
Kizilay Square, as the new city centre, consisted spatial 
representations of the ideology of secular Turkish nationalism. It was 
designed and named Cumhuriyet (Republican) Square very first time 
in Lorcher’s plan. Following years it completed spatial and political 
transformation with another German urban planner Herman 
Jansen’s plan. While creating the history of Turkey, Ankara Castle 
believed to be built by Hittites for military purposes, was conceived 
as the main spatial element of historical construction and its 
connection with other public spaces was strategically considered. In 
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Lorcher’s plan, the historical construction of the city which started 
with the castle spread on the radial axis connected public spaces of 
this narration. On one of the most significant radial axis of this 
construction was to Nation (Millet) Street which was running from 
Sihhiye-Kizilay and ending at the Kizilay Square. 
 
 
Figure 5 Kizilay Square and Ankara Castle 





Figure 6 Lorcher’s Plan, 1924-1925 (left) and Jansen’s Plan, 
1932 (right) Open Spaces on Ataturk Boulevard and the location of Kizilay 
Square 
Source: METU, City and Regional Planning Department Archive 
 
Figure 7 Lorcher’s Plan, 1924-1925 (left) and Jansen’s Plan, 
1932 (right) Kizilay Square and Government Quarter 
Source: Memluk, 2016 
 
The area where Kizilay Square locates was an empty lot in the 
mid-1920s and pool which contains a fancy statue in the centre was 
erected in 1925 and this area began to be called as Havuzbasi 
(Batuman, 2005). This place while becoming the first recreational 
area where well-dressed bourgeoisie socialises, also having enough 
space to construct a representative square which has potential to be 
symbolic locus of nation state (Batuman, 2002). According to Knox 
and Pinch (2010) space underpins the cultures since how people 
behave in spaces reflect the particular cultural values. The spatial 
policies of newly born Republic were so aware of the fact that it, 
therefore while constructing spaces, the activities and the patterns 





Figure 8 From Havuzbasi to Bakanliklar (Ministry) Area  




These two significant spaces on the one hand, as being social 
space Havuzbasi where new bourgeoisie socialises; on the other hand, 
as being “conceived space” Kurtulus (Liberation) Square which 
represents the ideology of nation-state need a spatial organisation 
in the context of national identity building. Cumhuriyet (Republic) 
Square from Lorcher’s plan was renamed as Kurtulus (Liberation) 
Square in the list of conditions of planning contest that Jansen’s plan 
got selected. Jansen for this critical space developed a spatial 
strategy for the policy to produce a new public sphere as the symbol 
of not only the new lifestyle of the modern nation but also as the 
ideological meaning of modern nation-state. According to Jansen’s 
plan, Kurtulus (Liberation) Square concerning this strategy was 
designed in the shape of a stage, defined by Guvenpark ended at 
Vekaletler Neighbourhood (Government Quarter), Kizilay Building 
and its park. The formation of the Square would ultimately be 
completed in a few years by erecting all the ministry buildings in the 
Government District except National Assembly -it would remain in 




Figure 9 Kizilay District at the end of the 1930s 
Source: Personal Rendering on Jansen’s Master Plan  
 
 
Figure 10 Kizilay Square, Guvenpark, Ministry Buildings, Turkish 
Grand National Assembly and invisible axis 
Source: Gunay’s personal archive 
 
Following the building of the headquarters of the Kizilay (Red-
Crescent) Organization just opposite of Republic Square in 1930, the 
pool was removed (Batuman, 2003); and it was dully rechristened as 
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Kizilay Square (Cengizkan, 2002). In this point, it is necessary to 
consider the role of renaming practice regarding national identity 
building. According to Azaryahu and Golan (2001), in the 19th and 
20th centuries, national toponymies were systematically constructed 
for nation building, state formation and national identity construction. 
Naming and renaming practices have been an important part of this 
systematic construction. For expressing themselves on urban space, 
ideological values take advantage of place names’ symbolic role 
(Cohen & Kliot 1992). Republican ideology also used this tool 
systematically in an effective way. While naming the places, the main 
aim, on the one hand, was to strengthen the Republican ideology on 
urban space, on the other hand, was to remove Ottoman’s traces; so 
mostly Cumhuriyet (Republic), Ataturk, Hurriyet (Liberation)  were 
chosen as names of symbolic places intentionally. This name change 
became a part of reproducing state ideology and emphasising civil 
contributions on space building. 
 
Up until here, what the author argued was that in order to 
command over the contending ideologies, state follows some 
strategies like designing and naming the public spaces, deciding their 
architectural styles, and dictating public life. However, with the 
construction of Kizilay Building, the state let a semi-public 
organisation not only contribute to space production for national 
development but also propagate its ideology (Batuman, 2015). The 
existence of Kizilay, being non-profit, volunteer-based social 
service institution, and social events held by Kizilay created new 
publicity. More specifically, founding ideology reproduced itself 
through renaming, constructing spaces, and since civil contribution 
tried to be part of this space construction, it is obvious that on 




























Figure 15 Kizilay Building and its park 
Source: https://www.pinterest.com/pin/265219865526179109/ 
 
Similar to other open spaces on Ataturk Boulevard, Kizilay 
Square with its design, surrounding area, physical and social 
elements became the symbol of the newly born nation-state and 
identity of its citizens. Kizilay Square and its landscape have never 
been free from ideology, yet they always transformed according to 
the ideological inclinations. Hoelscher and Alderman (2004: 350) put 
it as different interest groups try to control over spaces to form a 
political order since the ideology has always influenced urban 
landscapes. Kizilay Square on the Ataturk Boulevard is located in a 
narrative landscape of nation state’s power which includes 
Government Quarter, National Assembly and Kizilay Building with 
their modern architectural and urban design. Kizilay Square was 
designed to represent the national past in its spatial context being the 
symbol of national identity through its place identity which describes 
as a modern space. In general urban squares with their design 
elements such as monuments, parks, names, built environment 
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convey an ideological message, so they are considered as arenas 
where displayed certain ideologies. Moreover, ideological messages 
were more overt especially in the design of Kizilay Square. 
 
According to Batuman (2003) the last step of completing the 
formation of the square was achieved with the erecting Guven 
Monument that symbolising the combination of recreational space 
where modern lifestyle was introduced to the society and 
representational locus of nation-state where national identity was 
displayed according to the secular nationalist ideology. The building 
of the monument, on the one hand, helped to materialise the national 
identity and spatialise it in the public sphere, on the other hand, it 
could be displayed in the social space. Therefore the square became 
social as well as political. Following this spatial configuration, 
Guvenpark was designed simultaneously as creating the combination 
‘square-park’ and the symbol of the political locus of the new 
republic and public sphere of citizens in Jansen’s plan. The name 
was chosen accordingly to the statue at the centre of the park 
(Memluk, 2009). In the very beginning, the park was named 
‘Emniyet (Security) Park’ same as the monument called ‘Emniyet 
Monument’ (Senyapili, 2004). However, following the Turkification 
of language as part of the national identity building project, the 
monument and the park began to be called Guvenlik (Security). In 
time, the name of the park shortened and became Guvenpark (Trust). 
The park as two equal parts was located on the invisible axis running 
from Ankara Castle to Ministry District (Keskinok, 2009). Ministry 
Buildings were located along this axis which ends with the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly (Memluk, 2009). Guvenpark with its name, 
location, and meaning played a significant role in strength the 
meaning of Kizilay Square. 
 
The square and the monument celebrate the power of the state 
and the success of the Turkish nation. The monument in Kizilay 
Square called as Guven Monument, is highly visible and accessible to 
the public in the centre of the new capital city, conveys the subtle 
 
 80 
and explicit message that propagandise the nationalist ideology, 
future aspiration for the newly established nation, power of Kemalist 
revolution. In a public space, it is an inescapable element of daily life 
visual experience and with its ideological message has a high impact 
on citizen’s collective memory. In his seminal article, Classen (2009) 
argues that since middle ages, for different ideological purposes, 
monuments have played a critical role while not only designing urban 
spaces but also dictating of everyday life practices of citizens in their 
experiences of remembrance and forgetting. In addition, Sargin 
(2004: 662) states that “the monuments were believed mainly to 
provide a cultural sphere for constructing a new collective ethos, 
indicating a continual tendency away from the political influences of 
the old regime…to create mythic places where authority, discipline, 
and power were now publicly visible and legitimate. In fact, the state 
elite thought that power could be mobilized best via shared 
perspectives and learned experiences; and, in this respect, 
spatialisations of monuments were the necessary constituents of all 
ideological expectations.” 
 
The monument in the square and the square itself were a strong 
message of nation's power and classical narrative of modern nation 
state’s representation in both form and theme. With deploying this 
monumental area in the very heart of Ankara aimed to be formed a 
national identity. In order to convey some certain ideological 
messages, they demanded Hanak to define the theme as police and 
gendarme when they proposed this monument to him. In the centre 
of the Guvenpark, the role of police and gendarme in reinforcing the 
state was displayed. Moreover, the police and gendarme willingly 
dying for the sake of their mission and Ataturk doing his duty were 
brought to the public’s eyes and consciousness (Ertuna, 2005). 
According to Tekeli (1998) creating a national consciousness was 
the most important component of a nation-building project. The state 
demanded that Hanak to illustrate the unshaken foundations of 
Turkish Republic, order and security of newly established nation-
state, fearless people who took the role in the construction of Turkish 
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nation, happiness and the power which the Turkish nation will always 
have in the future (Ertuna, 2005, 7). 
 
According to Bozdogan (2002) Early Republican Era when 
Turkish nationalism dominated over other contending ideologies, this 
monument in the heart of new capital city might be “the most 
pragmatic monument” which was built by Anton Hanak and Joseph 
Thoraka, dedicated to Turkish security forces in order to show the 
Turkish citizens’ respect, gratification, and sympathy towards them. 
On the one side of the monument, there is a figure of Ataturk flanked 
by four youths. The other side of the wall there are two figures that 
one is young and the other is old, considered as musicians according 
to Hanak’s interest in music, symbolise the old and new regime with 
their serious expressions. These two young and old figures became 
the symbol of transition from the past to the future. In the foreground 
young figures flank, Ataturk symbolises the history of Turkish 
nations focused modern lifestyle with future aspirations (Ankara 
Enstitusu Vakfi, 2013). The reliefs on the pedestal portray Turkish 
villagers carrying weapons to the front line, the medical team at the 
hinterland, the efforts of security forces, craftsmen from various 
professions, artists and philosophers were portrayed. Besides these 
figures, date in Roman numerals and Ataturk’s famous phrase "Turk, 
be proud, work hard, and trust!" (Turk, ogun, calis, guven!) took 
place on the monument. The emphasis of this phrase on "Turk" should 
be analysed considering the Kemalist revolution and its "Turk" 
definition. Kemalist revolution promotes “Turkish nationalism as a 
territorial identity” which refers to the people who live within the 
territory of Turkey (Karal, 1981 cited in Gulalp, 2002). Therefore 
with this definition, all ethnic, religious, and sect differences tried to 
be overcome. More precisely, the monument as an apparatus of state 
made it possible to combine the social and political functions of the 
identity building and politicising the social environment (Batuman, 
2005: 37). Sargin (2004; 660-664) argues that the Republican Era, 
the need for monuments originates from three reasons: first, to 
promote secular national identity; second, to erase the Islamic, 
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Ottoman codes; and finally to develop an original Turkish nationalist 
ideology and “the monument truly manifests the empowering role of 
the Republican ideology by which the presentation of an official 










Figure 17 In the background, old and young figures symbolise the 
old and new regimes; and Ataturk’s famous phrase "Turk, be proud, work 




According to Ayoglu (2010) with the construction of the 
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monument, the spatial narration of Guvenpark and Kizilay Square 
completed and this place became the focus of Ankara as a symbolic 
space. Both the monument and the park became significant landmarks. 
Ertuna (2005) argues that late 1930s, in order to teach the War of 
Independence and Turkish nationalism, the monument became a 
popular destination of school trips on anniversaries of the 
establishment of the Republic. According to Yalim (2001), the events 
which for anniversaries of the Republic day, celebrations, festivities, 
balls began to be held at this new environment and citizens became a 
part of nation-state building practices. All these developments 
should be considered in the context of the concept of invention 
tradition and imagined communities which emphasise that national 
celebrations are so significant component of national identity building 
practice. 
 
Finally, Kizilay Square as the symbolic locus of the nation-state, 
was surrounded by Guvenpark, Kizilay Building with its park, Guven 
Monument, ministry buildings in the southern direction and National 
Assembly Building (Batuman, 2002). As Whelan (2005: 67) argues 
that “public buildings provide an important means of gaining access 
to the meaning embedded in the urban landscape”, the built 
environment of Kizilay Square gave the representative meaning of 
the square. The meaning, form, and function of the square were 
constructed according to the formation of national identity. Every 
single detail of designing issue of the square was carefully and 
strategically calculated for constructing the meaning for each other. 
Sumartojo (2015: 7) corresponding to the connection between 
meaning and space argues that “spatial context shapes discursive 
meaning”. In other words, with Jansen’s plan, Kizilay Square 
became a significant public sphere where state displayed the ideology 
of the new republic, and introduced the socio-spatial practices of 
modernity to the citizens. The intersection of two main streets, 
Kizilay Square, was standing as the symbol of new modern nation-
state, national identity, and nation. Moreover, Kizilay Square can be 
considered as a "monumental space" which is defined “each member 
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of a society an image of that membership, an image of his or her 
social visage. It thus constituted a collective mirror more faithful than 
any personal one” (Lefebvre, 1997: 33). The square regarding its 
meaning, design, function, contains all aspects of spatiality, the 
perceived, the conceived and the lived spaces. And the monument is 
located in the park is more noticeable to the consciousness of people 
than other structures around. As Lefebvre (1997: 133) argues “the 
monument thus effected a ‘consensus’, and this in the strongest 
sense of the term, rendering it practical and concrete.” Thus, Kizilay 
Square wasn’t only public space, but it served to adopt alternative 
life, European way of life. The national identity which was defined as 
modern, secular and European was reproduced on it. Sargin (2004: 
662) argues that “the ordinary people of Ankara could now be 
invited into those imaginary urban stages where a distinctly powerful 
national identity as a representation of reality rather than as a simple 
reflection of reality was possible.” 
 
In conclusion, Early Republican Era, the ideology of Turkish 
nationalism used the urban planning and architecture in constructing, 
displaying, and propagandising national identity very effectively 
through constructing Kizilay Square as a public sphere and symbolic 
locus of the nation-state. The social and spatial reforms of the newly 
established nation-state were introduced in general these squares, 
particularly Kizilay Square that became both the scenes and subjects 
of urban policy in this period. More precisely, Kizilay Square with its 
built environment, the government district, axis from Ankara Castle, 
Ataturk Boulevard, and Turkish National Grand Assembly were of 
prime significance in expressing the rejection of the Ottoman heritage 
and its capital city Istanbul in favour of a new regime, and ideology. 
 
4.2.2. Kizilay Square as a Junction (in Transition Period, the 
1980s) 
This period is defined as ‘erosion of modernity’ while cities 
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began to lose their modern characteristics, post-modernist 
developments began to emerge (Tekeli, 2010: 39) with structural 
changes. As mentioned before, coup d’etat in 1980, Turkey 
experienced a structural transformation in the political, economic and 
social context. These changes had an impact on the spatial policies. 
According to Sargin (2004) conservatives gave importance to 
Ankara’s new spatiality in order to provide spatialisation of religious 
identity. Military intervention gave a chance for executing this desire, 
and they began to change the symbolic meaning of Kizilay Square. 
With the policies of the military government, Kizilay Square began to 
have features of junction rather than an urban square. Kizilay Square 
began to be “conceived space” for only vehicles by closing it for 
any pedestrian circulation. Spaces for vehicles are considered as 
dominated space (Kocak, 2008). According to Lefebvre (1991: 165) 
“in order to dominate space, technology introduces a new form into 
a pre-existing space”. Thus, dominated space means that 
transformation of spaces by technology or new practices. 
Unfortunately, the current circumstances of Guvenpark of which the 
significant part transformed into a bus and dolmush stops in the mid-
70s, strengthened the image of the square as a junction. Moreover, 
with the destruction of Kizilay Building and its park which was 
designed as the stage of nation-state where the public sphere was 
created in order to introduce new national identity, this area turned 
into a meaningless parking lot at the end of the 1970s (Batuman, 
2002). The traffic and transportation on and at Kizilay Square and 
Guvenpark destroyed the characteristics of public spaces to a great 
extent. Thus, the spatial representation of them changed through this 





Figure 18 Kizilay Park after turned into the parking lot 
Source: Batuman, 2000 
 
Kizilay Square wasn't anymore the symbol of either the newly 
established nation-state or the national identity of its citizens. As a 
reaction to the domination of Marxist ideology in university campuses 
through the 1960s and 1970s (Waxman, 2000), local and central 
authorities focused on the new spatial policy to rebuild public sphere 
in order to make them turn into the stage of local/traditional values 
displayed after coup d’etat. Moreover, it would help to neutralise 
highly politicised society. In this environment, Guvenpark became a 
node for the security forces. Moreover, in 1982, it was decided to 
monitor the prominent squares of metropolitan cities including Kizilay 
Square, with ‘visual surveillance system’ (Coskun 2000, cited in 
Batuman, 2000). Kizilay Square became a place socially controlled 
that made people reluctant to spend leisure time. Carmen et al. (2003: 
834) argue that “public space should offer the opportunity for 
political display. Rarely allowed in quasi-public space, the presence 
of such activities is an indicator of publicness... Another indicator of 
publicness is whether photographs can be taken. As urban designers, 
architects and others are aware, property owners are increasingly 
 
 87 
sensitive to having pictures taken”. In this period, Kizilay Square 
began to lose characteristics of public space with control tools of 
government for security concerns and political displays was banned. 
Batuman (2000) argues that in order to de-politicised Kizilay Square 
and turned it into a meaningless junction three projects were held: 
the renewal project of Guvenpark, reconstruction of Kizilay Building, 




Figure 19 The Circumstances of Kizilay Square, Guven Monument, 
Guvenpark and Guvenpark Bus&Dolmush Stops (Red ones) 
Source: Ayoglu, 2010 
 
First, in 1985, Ankara Metropolitan Municipality proposed the 
renewal project of Guvenpark. This project had two dimensions 
which were beneath the park and in the park. Under the park, a one-
story shopping mall was designed with its two-storey parking lot. It 
was proposed to redesign Guvenpark and relocate Guven Monument 
from its original spot. Furthermore, right behind the monument, an 
amphitheatre was designed. For the place where monument resides 
now it was suggested a clock-tower which was arranged 
automatically every hour display the Seymenler -local folk dancers 
of Ankara- with a particular song and a model of Ankara Castle 
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(Batuman, 2002). With this project, very significant green area of the 
city centre was about to be destroyed. The historical, political and 
socio-spatial meanings of Kizilay Square were ignored. The modern 
elements of it that was the symbols of national identity once would 
be replaced with local and traditional ones. Especially, replacing the 
original location of the monument with a clock-tower was the 
annihilation of modern identity representation. Moreover, the new 
location suggested for the monument was nothing but a junction 
(Batuman, 2000, 2002). In other words, this project by changing the 
modern identity of Guvenpark was aimed to turn the park into a 
commercial zone with local and traditional symbols. However, with 
the intervention of a civil contribution, the group of people who called 
themselves as ‘Environmental Sensibility Group’ objected the 
project and in 1986 with the opinion of experts, this project was 
cancelled. 
 
Second, in 1980 Kizilay Headquarter announced an architectural 
competition for the new building on the site where the original 
building resided before it was destroyed in 1979. The project got 
awarded first prize was a 14 storey over-sized building which 
didn’t fit the spatial organisation of the square in scale-wise. When 
the construction was completed, the shape and volume of the new 
building didn’t only block the view of the square but also had a 
negative impact on the image of it. While the original building was 
designed, one of the main aims was to make citizens feel the nation 
state’s power. Thus, Kizilay Square with its built environment was 
the symbol of national identity and representative focus of nation-
state and its principles like being modern, secular, and western. 
However, this over-sized building made the square insignificant 
regarding physical appearance which also had an impact on the 
representative display. Batuman (2000) argues that glazed faade of 
the building was located facing the junction instead of facing 
boulevards, and this glazed facade with its mirror effect reproduces 









With this new building of Turkish Kizilay Association of which 
construction began in 1993 and completed in 2001, a very large part 
of Kizilay Square was occupied. The building finally was opened in 
2011 as shopping mall which wasn’t integrated with the square but 
just became a part of vehicles and traffic congestion. 
 
The last project that not only changed the spatial organisation of 
Kizilay Square but also destructed its meaning, form, and function 
was the newly designed subway system. On the intersection of two 
major subway lines which run from the Sogutozu-Cebeci Rail System 
and the Kizilay-Batikent Rail Transit System, the square began to 
serve as a subway station while the whole area is monitored by CCTV, 
with the extensive control and security measurements. Even taking 
a photo was prohibited. During underground of the square was 
transforming into a transport and commercial node, the spatial 
formation of the Guvenpark saved by the civil initiative from any 
possible destruction of the renewal project of Guvenpark was 
influenced by this project (Cengizkan, 1990). The design of the 
entrance of the subway station and chimneys for ventilation 
destructed the whole composition. Keskinok (1998) argues that 
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during the construction of the subway, the historical narration of the 
square and its elements were ignored, the square turned into a 
construction site, and the entrance of subway and chimneys for 
ventilation were located without considering the monument and its 
location. Further, with the 1980s, it was obvious that the approach to 
the urban greenery was also changed. According to Cengizkan 
(1990), the green area of Ankara which was designed via the 
guidance of Jansen accordingly to ‘Garden City’ approach had 
strong relations with the physical elements of Ankara. One of the 
most significant examples of it was Guvenpark and green area of the 




Figure 21 Metro entrances, chimneys for ventilation 
Source: Google Earth  
 
Besides these physical interventions to the square, relocating the 
central business district (CBD) from Kizilay to Gaziosmanpasa after 
1985 took the function of Kizilay Square being CBD (central business 
district) away. Following this development, prestigious services like 
Sheraton and Hilton Hotels also chose the site at Gaziosmanpasa, 
instead of Kizilay. Finally in 1989 with the construction of first 
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shopping mall of Ankara in Cankaya, called Atakule Cankaya became 
another attractive place for CBD functions. Kizilay began to lose its 
function as being the CBD of the city, and its economic vitality also 
declined. 
 
In conclusion, these three urban-scale projects; even though one 
of them couldn’t be executed luckily, aimed to change the meaning, 
form, and function of the Kizilay Square. The meaning of the Kizilay 
Square and the Guvenpark as being the public sphere and the symbols 
of nation-state got damaged. The values of Early Republican Era 
began to vanish with the destructive interventions of authorities to 
the square, the park and the monument (Cengizkan, 1990; Keskinok, 
1998). Following the physical destruction of the area, increasing in 
control with the security purposes made people reluctant to spend 
time but just pass by. The new spatial organisation of Kizilay Square 
and Guvenpark influenced social and cultural practices in their 
surrounding area. Lefebvre (1999: 312) argues that “when an urban 
square serving as a meeting-place isolated from traffic (e.g. the 
Place des Vosges) is transformed into an intersection (e.g. the Place 
de la Concorde) or abandoned as a place to meet (e.g. the Palais 
Royal), city life is subtly but profoundly changed, sacrificed to that 
abstract space where cars circulate like so many atomic particles.” 
Kizilay Square and its surrounding environment once were “lived 
space” in other words “spaces of representations”, yet turned into 
a junction dominated by vehicles and excluded pedestrians. That is, 
the function of the square became a junction. Space which was 
designed for introducing the modern lifestyle to its citizens by 
nation-state became a meaningless junction. According to Atabas 
(1994), during the 1980s with the implementation of these projects, 
the characteristics of public space, Kizilay Square and Guvenpark got 
profoundly damaged. The spatial policies which focused on the 
increasing publicness of the square by creating pedestrian zones 
connected to the square, and pedestrian-priority spaces, were left 
with the military intervention. Instead, the square and the park turned 
into a junction, and whole space began to be considered just as a 
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rental area. Although during this period, a discursive national identity 
building on Kizilay Square wasn’t observed, it was apparent that the 
interventions to space destructed the representative elements of the 
national identity. The renewal project of Guvenpark and its traditional, 
local components might be interpreted as an attempt to build the new 
identity which was defined with the reference of traditional and local 
values. However, this project which would have demolished the 
existence of the park, couldn’t be executed with the effort of the 
civil initiative. It is necessary to remind that these changes gave 
chances to build a new national identity with a new narration through 
public space. When Kizilay Square was designed, it was planned to 
be the main component of the city centre with its park, monument, 
and the surrounding environment. Every single design element 
served to support it being the iconic site of the nation-state and 
national identity. However, these changes caused it to lose modernist 
narration. More precisely, the whole space, once had been the 
representative of modernity project of the newly established nation-
state, the significant public sphere with its green area, the facilities 
and symbolic locus of the nation-state, national identity in urban 
scale with its historical narratives and the significant monument until 
the 1950s. However decrease in the size of green area, destroying 
the designed elements regarding scale, material, and the holistic 
composition of the whole space made the square lose its meaning, 
form, and function. It is necessary to consider the ideological 
transformation in order to evaluate the changes in spatial policies. 
The dominant ideology of Republican Era which is called as secular 
Turkish nationalism, or founding ideology did not dominate the other 
ideologies anymore. Through those projects not only the square 
turned into a junction, undefined vacant area without any connection 
to city life; but also the collective memory of citizens destroyed. 
According to Tekeli (2001), this period what Turkish cities 
experienced was: (1) erosion of the modernisation project of secular 
Turkish nationalist ideology, (2) the increase in illegal constructiong 
with the migration from rural to urban, (3) cultural degeneration. 
More precisely, the modern, secular, western identity of Ankara 
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began to be destructed and transformed into another thing.  
 
4.2.3. Islamic Representation at Kizilay Square (the 1990s) 
This part deals with spatial policies of Islam-inspired party on 
public space and corresponding to socio-spatial changes how Islam 
began to be visible at Kizilay Square. Since the most significant 
political incident of this period was the success of Islamic-inspired 
Welfare (Refah) Party at local elections in 1994 and general elections 
following year. These results were the concrete evidence of the rise 
of political Islam in local and general scale. 
 
During this period, the spatial pattern and the representative 
meaning of Kizilay Square became one of the main concerns of the 
Ankara Metropolitan Municipality. In order to change the spatial 
meaning of Republic, Islamic ideology purposely attacked, destructed 
the symbols of the Republic and replaced them with local, traditional 
and Islamic elements. While the spaces of Ankara were losing the 
meaning of being the symbol of the modern national identity, the 
Islamic identity which was prohibited from the public sphere and 
restricted to the private sphere by secular Turkish nationalism, 
became visible on the public sphere. Sargin (2004) argues that 
conservative central governments and pro-Islamic local authorities 
gained significant political power to transform the spatial landscape 
of Ankara and create a new architectural approach which depends on 
the mimicry of the Ottoman heritage or Islamic ideology, in order to 
make Muslim identity visible on the spatial landscape of the city. 
According to Keith and Pile (1993, cited in Sargin, 2004: 663) “the 
city of Ankara's secular sense of time and space as well as its space- 
making mechanisms were now in the constant challenge; so were the 
Kemalist qualities of its identities and memories.” 
 
With the populist policies of the Metropolitan Municipality, the 
square as well Guvenpark began to be considered as an empty place 
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that any peddlers, street vendors could earn in the city centre 
(Ertuna, 2005). Another function of the park emerged very first time 
in this period. With the rise of pro-Islamics in the governing elite, 
iftar dinners began to be introduced and institutionalised among 
bureaucrats during the Ramadan for the first time in the country's 
history (Yavuz, 2005). Following this event, iftar dinners opened up 
to the public in big cities’ public spaces. Since 1997, every year 
during Ramadan for a whole month the municipality has set up a tent 
for Ramadan dinners at Guvenpark. Obviously, Ramadan is 
considered as the common religious practice of society, and Ramadan 
dinners make people come together and share common interests. 
Although there are several places for putting up the Ramadan tents, 
choosing Guvenpark is nothing but ideological. This park was built to 
represent secular, modern, and westernised national identity 
according to the secular Turkish nationalist ideology. These kinds of 
religious-based events destruct this modern identity, and they are 
means of building an Islamic identity on the public spaces. According 
to Batuman (2002), while Islamic identity became visible on the 
public sphere, with these kinds of events, it gained legitimacy and 
power. Islamic identity began to be displayed at the symbolic focus 
of the nation-state while harming its representative spaces. 
Engaging new functions to the public spaces especially religious-
based ones either permanent or temporary, following the change in 
activities taking place at the public spaces, perception and image of 
them also changed. The ideology of secular Turkish nationalism and 
its efforts to create a national identity were undermined and made 
insignificant. Even though Ramadan tent is there only for one month, 
it changes the visual appearance of the park, the monument, and the 
square and undermines the significance of the whole place and the 
ideology behind it. Sargin (2004) argues that as part of Islamists’ 
social engineering, municipalities hold events, commemorative 
ceremonies during the Ramadan and offer a free meal to urban poor. 
However, these religious events are not neutral containers; yet in a 
public space once a symbol of modern and civic Republic like squares 
and parks, they construct “semi-closed public tents”. Moreover, 
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Sargin (2003: 675) states that “the commemorative ceremonies and 
such constructions, of course, both provide necessary means for 
ideological performances to fabricate radical identities and to evoke 
the most-desired religious memories. Of many implementations to 
commemorate religious events and to foster their images since the 
mid-1980s a recent urban construction deserves a second thought.” 
 
 
Figure 22 Iftar Tent, During Ramadan at Guvenpark 
Source: http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/gundem/52115.aspx 
 
This period, a significant act to harm the secular, modern national 
identity was to change the symbol of Ankara, and this new symbol 
was used at every event held at Kizilay Square. As a part of the 
national identity building project, the symbol of the capital city was 
chosen from the Hittites civilisations, who settled the Anatolia in the 
second millennium B.C. concordantly the Pre-Islamic Turkish 
history that portrayed the connections ancestors of Turkish people 
who migrated from central Asia. The image of Hittite Sun was 
acknowledged as the symbol of Ankara, and the representative 
monument of Hittite Sun was erected on Sihhiye Square in 1978 by 
efforts of Dalokay who was the former mayor of Ankara from 1973 
to 1977. However, in 1995 with the decision of the Municipal Council 
the official city symbol was replaced with the image of Atakule and a 
dome of a mosque in between a pair of minarets with three stars (zer, 
2003). This new symbol is the ideological representation of the 
mayor that is Islamic, and conservative nationalist. It became a 
controversial issue among professionals and the public, and a 
campaign against this change began. Opponents took the decision to 
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court. Although the court decided against the new symbol, it 
continued to be used until it was changed again in the 2000s. 
 
 
Figure 23 The Emblems of Ankara, Hittite Sun Disc before 1995, the 
new one after 1995 
Source: http://www.farketmez.net/ankara-belediyesine-yeni-logo 
 
Another intervention in this period was to construct a mosque at 
Kizilay metro station which is under the Kizilay Square, although 
Kocatepe Mosque is very close to Kizilay Square. Especially 
Friday’s pray, huge crowded gathered at Kizilay underground 
mosque to perform religious practice and because of the capacity of 
this small mosque lots of people have to occupy corridors where 
people have to pass to take the train. Besides Kocatepe Mosque, 
there are several masjids around Kizilay Square, people still insist to 
perform their pray here on Friday and the municipality does nothing 
anything to do solve it. This attitude of municipality can’t be taken 
as good intention but an ideological propaganda. This large 
participation to Friday pray has been used publicly to support the 
Islamic ideology and during the 2000s it will be used as the excuse 
for building a mosque in Guvenpark by the Municipal authorities. 
Batuman (2002) interpreted it as degeneration of the secular 





Figure 24 The Distance between Kizilay Square and Kocatepe 
Mosque 
Source: Google Earth (Personal Rendering) 
 
Teber (2004) argues that Kizilay Square, Guvenpark and Guven 
Monument were designed as being the spatial representation of the 
Republic, yet they are no longer perceived accordingly to original 
design purpose. In order to demolish the collective memory of 
Republican Era, current municipality administration and its ideological 
inclination deliberately have attacked and destructed the Republican 
official and civil elements through constructing the representative 
element of religious cult’s power and hegemony. The mosque was 
located at Kizilay Subway Station under the square, makes, especially 
on Friday, this area turn into an oppression and hegemony tool. After 
all these implementations, Kizilay Square became the subject of 
discussions due to the ongoing tensions between nation and religion. 
This ideological stance of the municipality harms the process of 
building the civic, modern, public sphere. Degeneration of the square 
began with the changes in the physical environment and continued 
with the construction of the huge Kizilay Headquarters’ new building 
on the location of original Kizilay Building which defined the 






Figure 25 Friday prayer at The Kizilay Subway Station Mosque 
Source: http://wowturkey.com/forum/viewtopic.php?p=1821279 
 
Besides religious-based events, during the religious holidays 
(Eids) began to be provided free buses to Kizilay Square, plastic balls 
were distributed at the square (Batuman, 2002). For the first time, 
the square was opened to the celebration of religious holidays. 
However, considering the symbolic meaning of the square, it could 
only be the stage for national holidays in order to remember the 
Independence War, the efforts of people in the process of 
establishing Republic. Moreover, the platform of the monument 
turned into a stage, dancing floor, or an area for locating speakers 
and amplifiers while popular music and arabesque music concerts 
were performed as a social event that the municipality held (Batuman, 
2002). This area neither stadium nor empty lot but a significant place 
that has its own identity in the collective memory of public and with 
these kinds of populist policies it loses the symbolic meaning. Ertuna 
(2005) argues that the monument is beyond being only a physical 
outcome of secular nationalist ideology for building national identity, 
it is the spatial narration of Turkish Republic’s modernisation 
history. More precisely, the monument became the subject of 
forgetting and remembering as Sargin (2004: 660) argues that “the 
monuments of Ankara must be considered as pure representations of 
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Turkey's political tensions in order both to ‘forget’ and to 
‘remember’ distinct ideological geneses and their spatial faculties.” 
Thus, the municipality rather holding organisations and events at this 
area which threaten the symbolic values of it should have given the 
effort to protect it according to its original spatial narration with its 
surrounding environment. Further, the organisations and events 
neither directly related to the original identity of the square nor 
supporting the identity of it but undermine the significance of it. It is 
also necessary to highlight that current spatial policies and 
interventions harmed the scale and proportional relations between 
the monument and its surrounding environment. Thus, it lost its 
influential role in the national identity narration. According to 
Keskinok (1998) since 1980s Kizilay Square and its surrounding 
environment turned into a construction area, without any reason. The 
sidewalks which are quite newly upholstered has kept being renewed 
without considering the waste of resources. This proves the 
municipality’s insensitivity towards the park and the monument 
which identified with the capital city of the newly established nation-
state, Republic and its future aspiration, national identity. Edensor 
(2002: 72, 73) argues that “still the most obvious and recognisable 
ways in which national identity is performed are at those national(ist) 
ceremonies with which we are familiar, the grand, often stately 
occasions when the nation and its symbolic attributes are elevated in 
public display… Such ceremonies are played out to legitimate the 
power, historical grandeur, military might, legal process, and 
institutional apparatus of the nation-state.” As an alternative for 
Republican ceremonies like Republic Day, Victory Day; religious 
festivals, popular concerts began to be celebrated in public spaces. 
Islamic identity created its formal rituals and invented ceremonies. 
In two big celebrations of Islam, Ramadan feast and Muslim festival 
of sacrifices, free buses to the Kizilay is the effort of bringing 
supporters of the municipality, and the representative of Muslim 
identity is only for making them visible in the Kizilay Square and 
Guvenpark once modern and civic. Batuman (2002) argues that 
during the 1990s, Islamic identity imposed on Kizilay Square 
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decorated it like a banal festival area ironically for taking revenge on 
the history of the Republic. 
 
As a reaction of these events which didn’t reflect the symbolic 
meaning of the Square, in 1997 Municipality of Cankaya District from 
Republican People Party (CHP) threw a ball at Kizilay Square similar 
to Republican Balls, in order to celebrate the 74th anniversary of the 
establishing Turkish Republic on 29th October. The mayor started to 
organise it four months ago from the date, and official permission 
from the Governorship of Ankara was taken. The public was informed 
for this event and finalised the preparations. Four days before the 
celebration, the Metropolitan Municipality of Ankara announced that 
they would hold another celebration at Sihhiye Square only 400-500 
meters away from the Kizilay Square (Solak, 1997). However, 
Welfare Party and the  Metropolitan Municipality of Ankara blamed 
not to be sincere. At newspapers some interesting titles came out the 
next day such as “The Welfare Party inclined towards the love of 
the republic makes our eyes water” which criticised this incident 
and showing that no one believed that this was the innocent 
coincidence, but an ideological conflict between secularism and 
Islamism. This title emphasised that an Islamist ideology which has 
deliberately attacked and harmed Republican ideology wasn’t 
sincere while celebrating the anniversary of Republican but tried to 









More specifically, the conflicts between the ideologies of Islamist 
nationalism and secular Turkish nationalism have taken place in 
Kizilay Square to build the desired identity. Thus, on the one hand, 
political Islam has tried to destruct the Republican places and replace 
them with its representative elements. Therefore, Muslim identity 
became not only visible in public space and legitimated its power, but 
also it could be constructed successfully. The modern landscape of 
Ankara began to be dominated with Islamic, traditional elements on 
the very centre of Republican spaces. 
4.2.4. Expression of Islamic Identity on the Kizilay Square in 
the Modern Context (the 2000s)  
Spatial policies of the municipality in the 2000s have been the 
follow-up to the spatial policies of 1990s. However, with the 
remarkable success of AKP, the Mayor of Ankara Melih Gokcek got 
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more freedom to execute his surrealist projects which have been 
considered as a huge joke by citizens. His surrealist projects keep 
harming the Republican spaces and deconstructing the national 
identity while constructing Islamic-Ottoman identity. Moreover, this 
period the mimicry of Ottoman architecture attempted to be applied 
to Kizilay Square. With many common characteristics, the built 
environment intended to be imitated Ottoman architectural style, 
mimicry of forms and using traditional motifs with reinforced 
concrete. What Turkish cities are witnessing now is that how Islam 
relates to space in the modern context and its expression at the 
institutional level which give a chance to observe Islamic identity. 
Aydin (2005) argues that since 1980, the most prominent attitude of 
the municipality administrations towards the squares which integrate 
to historical structures as being the significant components of 
collective memory, which became symbolic space with their 
monuments, which are the means of socialisation; has been to 
destruct them. After the 2000s, this attitude became more concrete 
and radical. 
 
In this period, very first and significant spatial intervention was 
to close the pedestrian ground from Ataturk Boulevard to Kizilay 
Square in 2003. Kizilay Square was already a junction, and the 
pavement on the Boulevard which maintained the continuity of open 
spaces became a narrow refuge. The connection between open 
spaces was destructed, and the square was closed from any 
pedestrian access through barriers and pedestrians forced to use the 
underpass. The last connection between citizens and the square was 
cut with this very unreasonable project. However, with the objections 
of Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) 
to the project, the municipality had to take a step back and remove 
barriers. The traffic oriented projects of the municipality which 
ignored the physical environment, social and cultural life of urban 
made citizens reluctant to use city centre. According to Bilsel (2004) 
this kind of infrastructure projects which encourage the ownership of 
automobile and discourage public transportation cause radical 
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interventions in existing urban centres. While Boulevard began to 
transform into a high way, the square is destroyed through harming 
the historical and symbolic value. The characteristics of Kizilay 
Square and Guvenpark as the public sphere of the nation-state, 
Government Quarter’s entrance scene, the symbol of harmony 
between official and civil architectural initiatives, representative of 
national identity, were harmed. They became only a transition area 
where bus and dolmush stop occupied, metro entrance platforms 
located without any aesthetic concerns, and pedestrians in a rush for 
transportation concerns began to use. 
 
While Kizilay Square was designed, it was considered to be the 
representative of modern, secular, and western identity and the 
people who were visible on the square had this identity. At Early 
Republican Era, it was the public space of bourgeoise and the 
symbolic focus of nation-state. Citizens were introduced modern 
lifestyle and expected to adopt the modern identity. However, this 
period, population of suburbs who migrated from rural areas became 
visible at Kizilay Square. This population are mostly conservative, 
and supporters of the Mayor Melih Gokcek. In other words, Islamic 
ideology manifested itself at suburbs of Ankara first. Then, as a duty 
of loyalty, Melih Gokcek used every power in order to make them 
visible at public spaces of the city centre. He brought new uses 
promoting Islamic elements to Kizilay Square. Municipality gives so 
much effort to make them visible on the square by free buses on 
holidays, free concerts, events, and iftar tents etc. With the current 
projects, these features of Kizilay Square intentionally have been 
harmed. Moreover, the users of the square mostly became the blue-
collar workers from suburbs of Ankara. Since Kizilay Square turned 
into a public transportations node, it was easy for new inhabitants of 
the city to reach here. New users of Kizilay Square are the 
representative of traditional, conservative, and Islamic identity. 
These masses reflect their spatial demands, the representation of the 
space cultures to the new formation of the square. For example, it 
wasn’t a simple coincidence that this period alcohol consumption in 
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public spaces was banned, private areas for only families were 
constructed, it became an insecure place after some certain hours for 
women. The square continuously loses its modern appearance and 
with its surrounding environment turns into a place where Islamic, 
traditional identity was represented. The new usage of Kizilay Square 
for Islamic rituals has been changing the identity of place which 
directly relates to the identity of users. 
 
The second project was Guvenpark Renewal Project which was 
proposed in 1987 yet because of the citizens' reactions had cancelled 
at that time, was brought to the municipality’s agenda again in 2003. 
The project proposed relocating the dolmush and bus stops to 
beneath of Guvenpark. As being another traffic-oriented project, it 
was subjected to the objection of TMMOB (Union of Chambers of 
Turkish Engineers and Architects). According to TMMOB’s 
published notices (2005a, 2005b) this project wouldn’t attempt to 
reorganise the green area of the park accordingly its original meaning, 
form, and function. Moreover because of the underground project, 
there wouldn't be enough soil to grow any plant, and finally, the park 
would turn into a concrete area. After all objections, it was decided 
not to realise this project. TMMOB Chamber of City Planners (CCP) 
press briefing in 2003 tried to take attention on the symbolic 
significance of the Guvenpark and the implementations of the 
municipality which were the outcomes of ideological stance of the 
administration and the mayor. According to CCP (2003), although 
Guvenpark and Guven Monument have been registered as grade 1 
natural site area and megalithic monument by the decision of Ankara 
Culture and Nature Preservation Board, today this park is occupied 
by buses and dolmush stops without any plan or legal decision. The 
board and court decisions regarding the relocating of bus and dolmush 
stops somewhere else were deliberately neglected and ignored by 
the municipality. Contrary to plan decisions, the billboards, street 
vendors, parking lots keep occupying the very large space of the park. 
In spite of all these illegal spatial interventions, Guvenpark with its 
75-year city image is still one of the most important public space as 
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square-park and a significant component of design elements of 
capital city which have been the representative of national identity. 
Thus, with its green texture, it has to be preserved its original design 
accordingly. In furtherance Bilsel (2004) argues that the project of 
the municipality began to be discussed among scholars, technocrats, 
and professionals because of legal issues and ideological symbolism. 
It seems to be directly related to the lack of awareness of the public 
sphere in society and the fragmentation of the public sphere. 
 
Another interesting spatial interference took place on the Kizilay 
underground station which served as the node transportation and 
commercial centre. In 2003, 70 large TV screens in the shopping area 
and 1600 small TV screens carriages of the trains were placed by 
the municipality (Isik, 2003 cited in Kocak, 2008). They were served 








Besides TV screens at Kizilay underground station, the square, 
Guvenpark and the monument have been occupied by advertisement 
billboards. These commercial based installations on the square 
created their spatiality and load new meanings to space. They are 
becoming tools to undermine and ignore the significance of the square. 
According to Teber (2004) the hegemonic forces, which consider the 
urban dwellers as consumer and customer mass, occupy and destroy 
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the public space through media, television and communication 
technologies. Moreover they transform public space into a platform 
where the municipality and the related ideology’s propaganda is 
made. More precisely, with TV screens where 7/24 show the 
municipality’s services, the square began to be used as an 
ideological tool of municipality. 
 
 




After 2010, the projects of the municipality became stranger 
which no one understands the true intentions of them. Very 
significant examples including the Gorilla and Dinosaur Models were 
placed at Guvenpark temporarily. At first, on 20th of April right three 
days before April 23 National Sovereignty and Children's Day 
national holiday giant Gorilla Sculpture was placed there. These kinds 
of holidays have been significant for the notion of the nation-state 
and the national identity. Several activities, events are held for 
children on this day. However, right next to the Guven Monument that 
symbolises the secular nationalist ideology to locate this meaningless 
giant Gorilla Sculpture with the emblem of the city of Ankara didn’t 








Following it, the Dinosaur Sculpture was located just in front of 
the Guven Monument on the invisible axis. The public space once 
symbolises the secular nationalist ideology, is destructed through 
undermining the significance of it and showing that anything either 
related to the identity of space or not can be installed here. These 
strange sculptures do not reflect the identity of the park. Or else they 
do not offer a new socialisation to space. According to Batuman 
(2002) with these kinds of spatial interferences, the symbolic spaces 
of the Republican Era were deliberately undermined in order to 





Figure 30 Dinosaur Sculpture in Guvenpark in June, 2012 
Source: Muge Akkar Ercan’s archieve cited in Sarikulak, 2013 
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In 2011, the municipality had another project which proposes the 
renewing the facades of every building that surround the Kizilay 
Square. According to this project, the original facades of buildings 
would be replaced with Seljuk style facades. Actually, this project 
came into municipality’s agenda in 2010, and since then municipal 
authorities and the owners of buildings have met several times to 
agree on what kind of changes would do for an aesthetic appearance 
front facades of the buildings. In the very beginning, it was intended 
to get rid of advertisement billboards on the building that created 
visual pollution. However, right before the elections Prime Minister 
promised this project and took attention to the historical background 
of Ankara which had connections to Seljuks. The mayor received the 
order and prepared this project. Ankara has been housing to several 
cultures. According to Yavuz (2001) in Ankara there are twelve 
artefacts from Seljuks, seventeen artefacts from the Roman Empire, 
and seven artefacts from Byzantium Empire. However, there are 
more than 100 artefacts from the Early Republican Era. In other 
words, the inheritance of Seljuk-Ottoman is not significant in Ankara. 
This fact was one of the most significant reasons behind it was 
chosen as the new capital city of the Turkish Republic. Ankara never 
means being the inheritor of Seljuk or Ottoman. However, with this 
project, Seljuk and directly Islamic identity were intended to be 
visible around the square. More precisely, this project represents 
how Islamic ideology relates to space in modern time. In order to 
build the Muslim identity, the representative elements of this identity 
are constructed through mimicry. Rather than creating a new 
architectural style or urban planning, imitate the historical artefacts 
is discursive of Islamic ideology. However, with the objections of the 
Chamber of Architects project was cancelled because of legal issues 




Figure 31 The Visual Representation of Municipality’s Project  
Source: http://www.spo.org.tr/genel/bizden_detay.php?kod=2917 
 
The same year, the mayor decided to change the symbol of the 
city second time. This time it was proposed Angora cat which is also 
known as Turkish Angora, as being the symbol of Ankara. Angora cat 
is a unique species to Ankara. However, as a capital city to be 
represented by a cat is quite unusual. To emphasising a local species 
on the symbols of cities might be acceptable for an ordinary city, yet 
to design a cat as an emblem for a representative capital city caused 
conflicts and interpreted as the destruction of city’s identity. 
 
 
Figure 32 The Smiling Cat as Emblem of Ankara in 2011 
Source: http://www.farketmez.net/ankara-belediyesine-yeni-logo 
 
In 2013, as a result of spatial policies of government, Gezi Park 
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protests began and spread all over the country, out of 81 cities, 
protests were held at 80 cities. The citizens of Ankara also didn’t 
remain insensitive ongoing protests, and in several significant places 
of Ankara, protests were held and Kizilay Square also one of those 
places. Kizilay Square had gained its political characteristic around in 
the 1950s. However, after the 1980s with the military intervention 
its political characteristic degenerated (Batuman, 2002). From 31st 
of May till June 19th Kizilay Square had been housing the most 
inspiring movement of Turkey, although the Square had been banned 
any political protests for a long time, with Gezi Movement it was 
occupied several times by protesters and clashes between police and 
protesters took place there. Thus, Kizilay Square after for a long time 
gained its political characteristic again while closed off any traffic 








Gezi Park protests have been discussed from so many 
perspectives by scholars. However, in this dissertation the major 
topic is not Gezi Park, yet it changed the historical meaning and 
narration of both Kizilay and Taksim Square which are the focus of 
this dissertation, I will give a brief discussion about Gezi Movement 
in Kizilay Square. Moreover how Gezi Movement relates with the 
national identity building at pro-Islamic ideology will be explored. In 
this process Kizilay transformed into the political arena where 
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conflict and struggle between pro-secular and pro-Islamic identity 
became visible. Thus, it is necessary to consider the ideological and 
cultural conflicts behind this movement. According to Abbas (2013) 
Gezi Movement in larger scale related with the ongoing conflicts and 
struggles among different layers of society and government. He 
(2013: 19) states that “political disenfranchisement intersected 
with society’s aspirations with regard to dichotomies between 
conservatism and secularism, localisation and globalisation, and 
nationalism and majoritarianism.” Kizilay Square had been the arena 
of the Islamic ideology and politics since 1990s, with this movement 
square turned into a place where people criticised this ideology loudly. 
Abbas (2013: 23-24) argues that “in many ways what was being 
witnessed in Turkey was the configuration of a post-secular and a 
post-Islamist identity politics…the majoritarian conservatism of the 
AK Party is a way in which to reconfigure the memory of the Turkish 
nationalist project through the projection of a neo-Ottomanist, pro-
Islamic and pro-democracy future, but through the lens of a glorious 
past.” Moreover, in his seminal book Mardin (1989, cited in Atay, 
2013: 39) so many years before it happened states that “one cannot 
flatly deny the probability that there will arise two nations in Turkey, 
one secular, the other Islamic. The possibility of a violent 
confrontation between these two clusters seems distant but might 
become realistic in the future.” The confrontation between pro-
secular and pro-Islamist took place on Kizilay Square where both 
ideologies tried to build their desired national identity. 
 
 
Figure 34 Kizilay Square from Guven Monument to Kizilay Shopping 
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According to surveys while only 10% of the protesters supported 
Gezi Movement because of environmental issues, 90 % of them stated 
their reason as authoritarian discourse and attitude of Prime Minister 
and also 85 % of them acknowledged that there is an increase in 
interference of people’s lifestyle (Atay, 2013). The new rules and 
regulations which mostly religious inspired and authoritarian caused 
frustrations among pro-secularist and they felt their lifestyle was 
threatened. Prime Minister's discourses and speeches over sensitive 
issues made them more frustrated and annoyed. His popular 
exclamations which protesters carried on their slogans, banners, and 
street writings were: “at Republican Era citizens were encourage to 
consume alcohol. Beer, raki (traditional Turkish drink) was promoted 
as a national drink by state, however, our national drink is yoghurt 
drink (ayran).”, “we do not want a drunk youth,” and “go, drink 
at your home, not outside!”. He told them after announcing new 
regulations on alcohol consumption at public spaces. According to this 
regulation sale or serving of alcoholic drinks between 22:00 and 
06:00 was prohibited. It was considered as an attempt to Islamisation 
of public life and restricting people’s freedom. The drink has been 
a significant component of the secular culture of the Republic. While 
Republican balls, celebrations drink was always part of it. Ataturk is 
known to be fond of raki. According to Zubaida (2013) Prime Minister 
finally found a proper ground to criticise freely Early Republican Era 
and applied his Islam inspired regulations after a decade of electoral 
success, governing as a single party, the army not a threat anymore. 
Prime Minister defended himself as “We do not ban alcohol. We are 
taking measures in order to protect our citizens and let them raise 
healthy children. Opponents can blame us, yet this does not prove 
that we are not right. In time citizens even opponents will appreciate 
us. Constitutional amendment package includes alcohol regulations. 
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We have to do it. The law which was prepared by two alcoholics has 
been valid so far, so why not a law that religious orders would be 
accepted?” Pro-secularist argued that Prime Minister referred to 
Ataturk with his alcoholic reference and the law that he made 
prepared. Erdi (2015) argues that “the restriction of alcohol 
consumption in some public spaces highlight not only a symbolic 
transformation but also a breakdown of spatial practices in a 
conservative manner under the rule of AKP”. Related to alcohol 
prohibition Zubaida (2013) states that “a central issue for the Gezi 
Park and Taksim protesters is that of the unrestrained building and 
development boom in Istanbul, razing old neighbourhoods for gated 
housing and shopping malls. The beneficiaries are cronies of the AKP, 
given access to public land and development permits. Private 
developments and shopping malls privatise public space and public 
assets. Like restricting and hiding alcohol and its associated 
sociability, this is part of the process of controlling, restricting and 
moralising public space. Erdogan responded to protesters by telling 
them to drink at home.” Moreover, in his article Atay (2013) argues 
that government is not anymore leader of civil-plural democracy but 
an architect in the construction of a new identity and culture in 
Turkey accordingly to Islamic ideology. 
 
Figure 35 Street writings and banner related with Prime Minister’s 
exclamations about Ataturk 
 
Figure 36 Alcohol was prohibited, nation gets sober/Yoghurt drink 
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junkie/The last beer wouldn’t be banned. 
 
This street writings related with the prohibition alcohol 
consumption in public space, and Prime Minister’s speech about the 
alcohol. 
 




Gezi Movement also had an impact on the relations between 
Turkey and the Western countries regarding Turkey's European 
Union membership. In the very first decade of the AKP, the founder 
of the party Recep Tayyip Erdogan, different from other pro-Islamic 
parties since then, made an impression democratic, pro-western, and 
capitalist. However, in time his party began to lose its characteristics 
of being pro-western, democratic. Several chances to become closer 
to the EU but they could not be used effectively. For example, while 
Arab Spring, foreign policies of Turkey could not be effective and 
dialogue with Europe could not be appropriately achieved 
(Yorulmazlar & Turhan, 2015). This made AKP, and PM Erdogan turn 
his face to the Middle East. Pro-western discourses with AKP were 
replaced with anti-Western discourses. The attitude of PM Erdogan 
during Gezi Movement ruined this damaged relations. He was blamed 
to be Orientalist, traditional, and Islamic. Muslim identity became 
more visible among the government elites in this process. Moreover, 
Western countries criticised the excessive use of force by police 
during the movement. The EU enlargement commissioner said that 
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"peaceful demonstrations constitute a legitimate way for groups to 
express their views in a democratic society. Excessive use of force 
by police against these demonstrations has no place in such a 
democracy" (Morris, 2013). PM Erdogan (2013) blamed EU being 
the hypocrite and added that “similar protests have taken place in 
Britain, France, Germany and bigger ones in Greece”, that countries 
also used the police force in order to deal with it. However, EU has 
been kept using several illogical arguments to prevent Turkey’s EU 
membership. Turkey faced “unjust obstructions” (Morris, 2013). 
During the Gezi Movement, he visited some countries that Arab 
Spring took place. His trip provoked opponents more.  However, his 
supporters welcomed and cheered him, when he landed to Ataturk 
International Airport. With this support, PM Erdogan threatened the 
protesters and told them to be careful, 50% of the population -
referring to the religious-conservative majority according to the 
election results- was just waiting for his orders to go out the streets 
and deal with them. 
 
Following the Gezi Movement, Guvenpark closed to the public for 
security reasons and occupied by police forces. To interfere in any 
potential political protests or meetings immediately, a group of police 
permanently began to stay in Guvenpark. They also surrounded a 
significant part of the Park with barricades which disturb the 
transition. According to Sahin (2018) because of the security issues 
and terrorist attacks, police spots became permanent, and the 
physical disturbance of them cut the relations between Kizilay Square 
and Guvenpark. In her study within the context of survey analyses, 
Yilmaz (2016) asked sixty people that “what Guvenpark reminds 
you?” and the majority told them “police park”. Until 2014, it was 
not allowed people to enter the park. 
 
The pedestrian alley from Guvenpark to Parliament designed as 
a keystone in Jansen’s plan, expected to be walked by citizens who 
are at peace with the state, has been closed to the public. This 
significant open space, which is the spatial representation of the 
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Republic, can no longer be perceived in a sense it was designed. The 
present municipality administration harmed the collective memory of 
Early Republican Era through the implementations of public space 
accordingly to its ideological stance. Thus, while the square and the 
park directly became the subject of political conflicts; traditional 
mentalities, religious-cult norms, and the subcultures belonging to 
them spread all over the city (Teber, 2004). 
 
 




Probably the most effective incident happened at Guvenpark was 
the terrorist attack in 2016 that thirty seven people died and more 
than three houndred fourty nine people injured severely (CNN, 2017). 
After this incident, people were so scared to even pass from this park. 
Moreover, for many people, park turned into a place which began to 
remind only their loss and suffering. The park of which was named 
after “trust and security” became a place where people do not feel 
secure anymore although police occupy the significant part of the 





Figure 39 Guvenpark, the exact spot where the terrorist attack 
occurred 
Source: Google Earth, 2018 
 
 




A Strange Tulip Monument on Kizilay Square was placed. Tulip 
has been the representative flower of Ottoman Empire. In the history 
of Empire, as a symbol, tulip had always been prominent. In 
traditional artefacts of Empire such as miniature, Ebru, tile, literature; 
tulip is the most common symbol. The reason behind the chosen tulip 
as a representative flower at the Ottoman Empire was highly related 
to Islamic concerns. According to Atay (1997), the letters of the tulip 
in Arabic includes all letters of “Allah” (God in Arabic) also, and 
according to “ebced” calculations they refer to same numbers. 
Moreover, if tulip is read backwards, it means “crescent” which 
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was the symbol of the Ottoman Empire (ibid). Because of all these 
Islam related concerns, the Ottoman Empire gave importance to tulip. 
 
 
Figure 41 The Tulip Figure in Miniature, Ebru, and Tile in Ottoman 





However, Ankara is neither a place where tulip grows nor any 
special history tulip takes place importance. Moreover, it is not either 
an aesthetic monument which makes environment beautiful or 
practical, on the contrary, it only disturbs drivers and has the 
potential to cause an accident. Then, the intention of the mayor 
arouses curiosity, and it becomes necessary to ask what possible 
reason could be behind the erection of this monument on Kizilay 
Square. Of course, there are different motives behind this 
reconstructing of the symbolic urban square, yet the most significant 
one is the ideological inclinations like Knox and Pinch argued. 
According to them “powerful symbols and motifs from earlier 
periods are often borrowed in order to legitimise a new social order. 
For example, the reason behind Mussolini’s effort for copying the 
symbols of Augustan Rome in Italy is to legitimise Fascist urban 
reorganisation.”(Knox&Pinch, 2010: 203). Finally, it is a huge 
success to erect the Tulip Monument which is the symbol of Ottoman 
and Islamic identity, on the very significant representative Square of 
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secular Turkish national identity. 
 
 
Figure 42 Tulip Monument on Kizilay Square Daytime and Night-
time 
Source: Sahin, 2018 (left) and youtube.com (right) 
 
After 36 years 1980 coup d’etat, in 2016, 15 of July Turkey 
witnessed another coup attempt when a section of Turkish military 
launched a coordinated operation in metropolitan cities to topple the 
government and unseat President Erdogan. The Turkish government 
blames Fethullah Gulen, the leader of a religious cult known as 
“Hizmet” (Service), which have media organisation, foundations, 
associations, and schools in Turkey and also abroad, for the failed 
coup attempt (Aljazeera, 2017). Gulen and his cult was a strong ally 
of President Erdogan once, and during this period several critical 
public positions were served to Gulen cults followers. However, their 
relationship began to be eroded by several incidents and finally in 
December 2013, within a corruption investigation AKP’s 
bureaucrats arrested by police officers who blamed to be Gulenist by 
the government. Thus, the cold war which was going on for some 
time between the government and Gulen cult replaced with concrete 
incidents that parties attacked each other. President Erdogan claimed 
that Gulen cult is behind all these arrests and blamed Gulen cult for 
forming a state within a state which is called “the parallel state 
structure” by the government. During conflicts between the 
government and Gulen cult ongoing, both sides tried to eradicate the 
other and the supporters from Turkish political life. 
 
Finally, on 15 July 2016, the significant move from Gulen cult 
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came through as coup attempt yet it didn’t succeed. President 
Erdogan asked people to rally in public with this exclamation: “I urge 
the Turkish people to convene at public squares and airports… there 
is no power higher than the power of the people.. will swiftly respond 
to this attack” (Guardian, 2016). Following his call, hundreds of 
thousand unarmed people gathered in the streets and squares, in 
order to stop military intervention. During the ongoing clashes 
between the army and the ordinary people two hundred forty one 
people were killed, and almost two thousand two hundred were 
injured (Malsin, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 43 The clashes between army and citizens at Kizilay Square 
on 15
th




In Ankara, people gathered around Kizilay Square in order to 
support President Erdogan and fight against the army. The next 
couple of days the coup treat was over, yet almost two weeks people 
kept watch at Kizilay Square under the name of “democracy watch” 
in case of any potential army attack. Member of parliaments from 
AKP and Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Melih Gokcek also 
participated “democracy watch” in order to prove their loyalty to 









In Turkey, besides Gulen cult, there are many other cults. 
Although Early Republican Era, they were considered as an obstacle 
in front of modern, secular, western identity and they were banned 
in 1925. Ataturk intentionally tried to prevent them from being 
powerful at the political arena. It was the part of the modernity 
project, and it is necessary to consider this incident in the context of 
nation-state building. However, AKP’s close relations with cults 
made them have power in the political arena of Turkey, and they 
became having a strong impact on their followers during elections. 
After the coup attempt, other cults’ followers also participated in 
“democracy watch”, in order to show their loyalty to President 
Erdogan. However, they didn’t join this gathering like ordinary 
citizens, but they were in Islamic gown which was also prohibited 
from wearing at public spaces in 1925, in order to avoid any potential 
statue difference in public space. They circled a religious leader who 
conducted that special pray. “Democracy watch” and religious 
prayers were considered as the symbol of the Turkish nation’s unity 




Figure 45 Sectarians were praising at Kizilay Square during the 
"democracy watch" that began with Erdogan's call after the July 15 coup 
attempt 
Source:http://sendika62.org/2016/09/sarayin-sorusu-elimizde-
bol-bol-cemaat-ve-tarikat-var-bunlari-ne-yapalim-376382/   
 
After this tragic incident including Kizilay Square many symbolic 
places’ names changed for creating commemorative places to 
remember the death of civilians. On 26 July 2016, Kizilay Square was 
dully rechristened as 15 July Kizilay Democracy Square which was 
later amended as for July 15th Kizilay Nation Will Square on 9 August 
2016. With this name change, this incident was introduced into the 
everyday consciousness of the society and made them have 
collective memory related it. The one which dominates the other 
ideologies have the power to change place names in order to 
reproduce its power and also change the collective memory. Bardakci 
(2015) states that renaming practices which turn into the competition 
among different ideologies for engraving their names in history, have 
been occurred almost for the last century. He argues that if it is a 
way to take revenge on history, it is not only unnecessary but also 
inappropriate. Although in Republican history, places names have 
been changed because of security reasons, physical expansion of 
cities, ancestral ties, cultural proximity, political reasons, population 
of cities and land use changes (Aliagaoglu and Uzun, 2011), renaming 
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Kizilay Square is considered as the clashes of modern vs traditional, 
and religious vs secular. Chamber of Architects and Chamber of City 
Planners criticised this renaming and accused the municipality to 
demolished the identity of Kizilay Square. Chamber of City Planners 
(2017) argued that “as a symbolic square of Republican ideology, 
‘banned’ Kizilay Square was addressed as the gathering area for 
the “democracy watch” by President Erdogan and declared name 
changing is not a basic and simple renaming issue but ideological 
stance. This name change can only be explained through government 
is comparing this resistance for coup attempt with Independence War 
and Battle of Gallipoli which were the outcomes of Anatolian people 
fight against the imperialism. However, this attitude is just only 
undermining the significance of the Independence War. While 
resisting the 15 July coup attempt, lots of civilian people 
unfortunately died, and for their memorial, obviously, some 
arrangements should be made. However, changing the symbolic 
names which are well accepted among every segment of society will 
only create new arguments and new polarisation in society by 
separating people. In fact, this renaming of Kizilay Square has dealt 
a blow to its spatial identity.” Chamber of City Planners brought to 
trial this name change, yet still, it is on the court. 
 
While ongoing conflicts and contrasts related with the name 
change, following year government announced official 
commemoration program for 15 July and since then like a national 
day 15 July has been commemorated. In the 1990s with the 
leadership of Welfare Party, so many religious and Ottoman history 
related days like the Conquest of Istanbul or Holy Birth Week of 
Prophet Muhammed became to be commemorated at public spaces as 
an alternative to Republican commemorative days like Republic Day 
on 29th October, Victory Day on 30th August. According to Cinar 
(2001), this is nothing but the effort of building Ottoman-Islamic 








This incident brought a new dimension to the use of public space. 
The practices take place on urban squares changed dramatically. The 
Islamic practices and elements dominated the square in this process. 
Instead of questioning cults and their power on the political arena, 
conservative nationalism was honoured. The Muslim identity with its 
practices dominated the square during the “democracy watch”. 
 
Recently, the desire of building a mosque at the very centre of 
cities are becoming so popular among conservative religious 
municipalities. One of the most significant examples of it Taksim 
Square and the contradictive mosque project in it since the 1950s 
(next chapter, it will be explained detailed.). Similar to Taksim 
Square and the building of a mosque, Ankara Metropolitan 
Municipality began the discussions the building of a mosque in 
Guvenpark. Sargin (2004: 674) related to this issue argues that “the 
mosque is very popular among conservative bureaucrats and the local 
population for it is regarded as the most prestigious religious locale.” 
The Municipal authority proposed a mosque project on the place 
where Guven Monument locates. However, it is not realised yet. 
Tanyeli (2010: 10-11) argues that almost the only architectural 
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demand of Islamists corresponding to their ideology becomes 
concrete tragically at the architectural level by constructing 
countless mosques via associations of mosque construction. 
Therefore, it is not wrong to conclude that Islamists who are in the 
political arena do not consider the urban and architectural 
environment that is necessary for their demanding lifestyle. 
 
 
Figure 47 Kizilay Square, Guvenpark from south to north 
Source: Google Earth, 2018 
 
To build secular, modern, western identity, Kizilay Square with 
its surrounding area was designed through secular Turkish 
nationalism. Kizilay Square served on the one hand, as being social 
space where new bourgeoisie; on the other hand, as being conceived 
to represent the ideology of nation-state which needs a spatial 
organisation in the context of national identity building. However, the 
1980s the rise of political Islam made Muslim identity visible on the 
public space. In order to build Muslim identity through public spaces, 
Islamic ideology destructs the symbolic spaces of Republican Era 
which were the representative of secular Turkish identity. As a 
symbolic locus of the nation-state, Kizilay Square also 






Figure 48 Analytical Framework for Kizilay Square 
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Chapter 5: Case Study: Taksim Republican 
Square 
 
5.1. National Identity Building through Taksim 
Republican (Cumhuriyet) Square 
5.1.1. Taksim Republican Square as Symbolic Space of 
Republican Ideology (Early Republican Era, 1923-1950s) 
During the Early Republican Era, the priority was given to 
Anatolian cities and their reconstruction, however, the planning issue 
of Istanbul was also considered carefully regarding national identity 
building. Compared to Anatolian cities, very little investment in 
Istanbul was made by the state. Yet to create the national identity 
through national spaces; a new city centre of Istanbul was 
constructed based on the ideology of Turkish nationalism. According 
to Bilsel (2007), certain historians argue that since it was the capital 
of Ottoman Empire and the representative city of Islamic identity and 
culture, Istanbul was deliberately disregarded and debarred from 
public investment by the newly established nation-state. But still, 
the effort of state on constructing Taksim Republican Square 
deserves to be discussed in the context of national identity building.  
 
In the 19th century, Pera later would become to be known as 
Beyoglu, began to be the very significant centre of Istanbul. The 
urban fabric of Istanbul was similar to European counterparts had a 
city centre which consisted of social facilities, educational and 
commercial buildings, public buildings, company buildings, banks, and 
services. The infrastructure of this neighbourhood was also as 
developed as its European counterparts. In the different layers of 
history, some parts of Istanbul occasionally were a westernised 
because of the neighbourhoods with the high population of foreigners 
and non-Muslims. Beyoglu was one of those neighbours (Kuruyazici, 
2014). In the 16th century, the embassies of some European 
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countries in Istanbul chose this very beautiful place that had nice 
scenery with a view of the Golden Horn and the Bosporus for building 
their embassy buildings. During the 16th century, foreign diplomats 
mostly settled in Beyoglu district, and by the 19th century, it became 
a place where most of the population was non-Muslims bourgeoisie 
and foreigners. Here, it is necessary to remind that during the 
Ottoman time, Beyoglu as a non-Muslim district, reflected Western 
culture rather than Ottoman-Islamic culture regarding socio-spatial 
structure. However, as the backbone of Beyoglu, Istiklal 
(Independent) Street known as Grand Rue de Pera or Cadde-i Kebir 
had buildings which were peculiar to Islamic culture. (Kuruyazici, 
2014). Thus, the modernised and westernised ideals of the newly 
established Republic still did not coincide the existing social structure 
of district because of its multi-ethnic and heterogeneous features.  
 
 
Figure 49 Taksim Square 
Source: Google Earth 
 
This socio-spatial heritage was the most prominent political 
obstacle in the context of nation-building formation that newly 
established nation-state had to deal with. While state tried to 
homogenise the society under the national identity, and control over 
the society, on the one hand, Beyoglu with its “uncontrollable 
heterogeneity” became a threat to the Kemalist revolution and its 
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ideology of Turkish nationalism; on the other hand, in the cafes of 
district the communist ideas kept spreading (Criss, 1999 cited in 
Batuman, 2015). After all, it is not a surprise that state chose this 
place as the area where it represented its power, made it political 
focus, and more importantly made all ethnic groups recognise its 
power and embrace the national identity. Since once national identity 
was embarked by ethnic minorities, only then the treat would vanish. 
 
 
Figure 50 Istiklal Street, Tramway in 1928 
Source: Tekin, 2005 
 
Taksim Square, a 280-year-old square in Beyoglu, was named 
accordingly to Maksem (the reservoir for storing and distributing the 
city’s water) constructed by Sultan I. Mahmut was created in 1732-
1733 in order to arrange the water of Galatia-Beyoglu district. As 
being the morphological centre and being the gate of Beyoglu as well, 
Taksim Square surrounded by cemeteries on one side, a large 
Bosporus grove on the one hand and mulberry fields of Mecidiyekoy 
on the other. In the 19th century, Beyoglu district was still limited to 
Taksim. The area between Maksem and the water reservoir was 
vacant. However, with this water reservoir, it was created a natural 
threshold which limited this empty area from the Beyoglu-Tarlabasi 
and began to be an edge for any potential square. At the beginning of 
the 19th century, Artillery Barracks was constructed on the 
northeast side of this vacant area. The street run from the Artillery 
Barracks to Harbiye, Kisla (Barracks) Street, would become 
Cumhuriyet (Republic) Street after established Turkish Republic, 
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connected other districts to Taksim. Yet, it wasn’t a square in terms 
of modern urban planning pratices, but a quite large meadow that 
included two large barracks and a hospital (Aslan, 2014). Perhaps, 
this was not an interesting issue for the city with the Ottoman-
Islamic identity. Since the concept of square, as being centres of 
neighbourhoods in European cities, was an unfamiliar and new 
concept for the Ottoman-Islamic cities. Instead of a square, the 
mosque with its backyard was designed as the centres. Until the 
Turkish Republic established, a square in terms of modern urban 
planning did not occur. 
 
 
Figure 51 The place where Taksim Square locates in mid-1800s and 
in 1922 




Figure 52 Taksim Republican Square in the middle and Maksem on 




Taksim Square on the junction of the axis from the north side of 
old centre to Istiklal Street was the outcome of the nation state’s 
effort for national identity building. The main concern of Taksim 
Square was to create a modern public sphere to transform the 
Ottoman Islamic identity of society into western, modern and secular 
identity. The Square was a simple open space in the beginning and 
obtained an urban square character only after Republican Monument 
was erected in 1928. The square with the monument was conceived 
to convey the intended message to the public that the ideology of 
Turkish nationalism aimed to legitimise and recognise the new 
national identity in the eyes of the public. In the early periods of the 
Republic, the Square not only undertook public functions of 
Sultanahmet and Beyazit Squares but also played the role of being 
the symbol of the new regime. 
 
 
Figure 53 Taksim Square and its vicinity 
Source: Kubat (2015: 3) 
 
The three major reasons behind the selection of the Square as 
the public sphere where the national identity was built accordingly to 
the ideology of newly established nation-state are (1) since the 
Square was the most westernised and modernised part of Istanbul 
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(Oztas, 2010), newly established republic wanted to use it for 
spreading modernity across the country, (2) displaying the ideology 
of nationalism and putting across the national identity to the 
neighbourhood where non-Muslim bourgeoisie highly settled, (3) 
during Istanbul was occupied, the enemy forces used this area 
because of the fact that Artillery Barracks which made Taksim 
associated with military occupations. The erection of the monument 
became evident of liberation of Istanbul from the enemy’s 
occupation. More specifically, the non-Muslim and multi-ethnic 
characteristics of Beyoglu district were controversial issues of the 
Republican regime. This district was considered more modernised 
and open to reforms; however, it was also seen as a threat to the 
nation-building project. Republican cadre solved this controversy 
through building a national identity at the very centre of it on the 
urban square. Thus, it became possible to legitimise the 
modernisation project in the eye of the public and eliminate this threat 
(Batuman, 2015). After this arrangement, the Square on the 
intersection of Istiklal Street in the context of national identity 
building became the modern axis of Beyoglu district and the old city. 
 
 





According to Batuman (2015), the placemaking history of Taksim 
Republican Square happened in two phases: (1) by creating the 
modern public sphere where modern lifestyle and national identity 
were introduced to society, (2) building the representational focus of 
nation-state and its symbolic elements. In the process of building 
this square, Kizilay Square was taken as the model. 
 
In the first phase, the most significant attempt to create a 
representational focus for nation-state which happened by erecting 
the Taksim Republican Monument after physical arrangements on and 
around of square. To represent the nation state’s ideology and 
building national identity accordingly this ideology in the Square, the 
theme was defined as the Turkish Independence War and the 
Foundation of Turkish Republic. Italian sculpture Pietro Canonica, 
who made the Ataturk Monuments in Ankara, was offered to make a 
monument with two main scenes representing the theme Turkish 
Independence War and the Foundation of Turkish Republic. The 
landscape plan was prepared considering the ceremonies to be held 
in front of the monument by Italian architect Guilio Monceri. Thus, 
after erecting the monument, many buildings in Taksim and Artillery 
Barracks were reconstructed along the curvilinear border to define 
the circular shape of the Square. The tramway which came from 
Istiklal Street and passed through Barracks and reached Republic 
(Cumhuriyet) Street circulated through this monument. Thus, the 
existing of the monument and its centrality were emphasised more. 
The monument and the Square were designed as the stage of 






Figure 55 Parade of Nurses at Official Ceremony/ Parade of School 








Figure 57 Taksim Square, Parade at Official Ceremony 




After erecting the monument, the Square gained a socio-political 
meaning as being a ceremonial space where the national holidays and 
national-political events, Republican Days parade are held, and it 
began to be addressed with the name Taksim Republican Square. 
According to Kuruyazici (2014), the Taksim Republican Square has 
been a very significant focus of the social life from the beginning. 
However, when it began to host the Republican Day parades, national 
ceremonies and commemorations, protests and demonstrations, only 
then, it became the symbol of modernity, secularity, and democracy. 
The Republican Monument had characteristics of monumental space 
that refer to national unity. In that prospective, it was a “conceived 
space” as the spatial representation of the nation’s power. 
 
The monument was designed as four facade monument. On the 
front side, Ataturk within civilian dress, with other commanders that 
played a significant role of Independence War, soldiers, and public 
were symbolised the newly established Republic. On each of the two 
lateral facades, some soldiers hold Turkish flag, and on the one lateral 
facade there is a veiled woman’s face living in captivity which 
symbolise the period before Republican Era, other side there is an 
unveiled smiling woman’s face that symbolises the contemporary 
woman after establishing a nation-state. Like other monuments, the 
emancipation of secular image from religion emphasises with the two 
figures of veiled and unveiled women in this monument. On the back 
side, the Turkish War of Independence was represented, and Ataturk 
was depicted within his military garments. The images got discursive 
meaning through the monuments and they contributed to Ataturk 
becoming a cult, and his thoughts and ideas reaching the masses. With 
this monument, on the one hand, Independence War of Turkish was 
focused, the effort of Ataturk and his followers was appreciated, on 
the other hand newly established nation state’s future aspiration, 
modern Turkish women were displaying in the stage of the 
representative public sphere where modern lifestyle was introduced 
to society. The first time through a figurative narration, Ataturk and 
the new regime were introduced to the society. Moreover, according 
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to Yaman (2011), not only republican ideals displayed at the very 
significant location of the old capital city but also perhaps the most 
crucial representation happened regarding the victory against the 
Ottoman past. The military force and the power of the newly 
established nation-state were visualised at the most cosmopolitan 
and central district of last capital city of Ottoman Empire through the 
construction of this monument. More precisely, different from Ankara, 
in Istanbul newly established nation-state tried to display its power 
at significant spaces of Ottoman Empire in order to transform 
Ottoman related spaces into Republican spaces, and also with its 
future-oriented aspirations to get the consent of citizens and 
legitimise its power in the eyes of the public. 
 
 
Figure 58 Opening ceremony of the Taksim Republican Monument 




Figure 59 Taksim Republican Square in 1930s 
Source: http://eskiesvaplarim.com/taksim-meydani-1930lar/ 
Following the erecting of the monument, the area called 
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Talimhane being zoned for development just opposite of the Barracks 
on the left of Cumhuriyet Street. With the construction of 5-6 
storeyed apartments between the roads that intersect one another 
vertically, the present day Talimhane district was born. After a while, 
in front of these buildings, another building was constructed 
accordingly to matching with the curvilinear border to define the 
circular Square. While the first two floors of this building where 
shops and working places located were recessed, the third floor was 
protruding to create well-known Kristal Club (Kuruyazici, 2014). 
Finally, the Square not only took the form of a proper, well-defined 
square but became an open space which surrounded by buildings. 
 
 




The effort of Mayor Lutfi Kirdar and Henri Prost’s plan started 
to the second phase of placemaking for Taksim Republican Square. 
In this stage, Taksim Republican Square surrounded one of the most 
significant Ottoman Empire heritage, Artillery Barracks constructed 
for military purposes. Because of the socio-political incident at 
Ottoman time, this building was quite damaged. After that, it wasn’t 
used for the military purposes. In 1921, the yard of the Barracks 
transformed into a football stadium, and national matches began to be 
held there. However, in time the Barracks became more damaged, 




Figure 61 Taksim Republican Square and Artillery Barracks in 1930s 





Figure 62 After destruction of Artillery Barracks’ three facades 
(only the facade nearby Cumhuriyet Street remained) 
Source: Istanbul Cultural and Natural Heritage Preservation Board 
Photograph Archive 
 
This phase mostly shaped around, on the one hand, the demolition 
of Artillery Barracks and Talimhane; on the other hand, the 
construction of Taksim Municipality Casino and Inonu Promenade 
which later began to be called as Gezi Park. These three projects 
can’t be evaluated without ideological stance. Taksim Municipality 
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Casino with its high standards as an alternative to Kristal Casino of 
which standards were considered as low, located on the spot of the 
Intercontinental Hotel today, was opened on 29 October 1939 at 
Republic Day. It served as the place where bourgeois and mostly 
tourists had western style food and entertainment. Moreover, balls, 
tea parties and many other activities which are considered as part of 
the modern lifestyle were held there. 
 
 
Figure 63 Taksim Municipality Casino 
Source: http://baronvonplastik.blogspot.com/2015/02/ 
 
Three years after opening the Taksim Municipality Casino, the 
construction of Gezi Park was completed on 30 August 1942 at 
Victory Day. Both Taksim Municipality Casino and Gezi Park were 
opened on very significant national days. This wasn’t a coincidence 
but on purpose as the official ideology of the time. Following to the 
official parades at Taksim Square, Taksim Municipality Casino hosted 
balls. Gezi Park was completed the spatial narration of national 
identity building at Taksim Square. It was designed as the public 
sphere of nation-state where modern lifestyle is introduced to 
citizens accordingly to the secular nationalist ideology. After this, like 
Kizilay Square, Taksim Republican Square also have its square-park. 
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Gezi Park and Taksim Municipality Casino were together social space 
as components of Taksim Square and its urban practices. Taksim 
Square with the monument, park and the casino as the “conceived 
space”, indicated a spatial representation of modern identity and its 
spatial practices of leisurely activities. 
 
 





Figure 65 Gezi Park and Taksim Municipality Casino 
Source: Bilsel (2010, pg. 358) 
 
In this phase Taksim Republican Square had two functions: (1) 
being representative space of nation-state, (2) housing national 
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ceremonies and commemorations. Another function heaved into sight 
in this phase. Pro-state rallies made Taksim Republican Square 
transform a political arena (Batuman, 2015). As a part of the national 
identity building project, state-supported rallies for controlling over 
ethnic differences were used for dominating public space with 
nationalist elements. Regarding identity issue, Wagon-Lits incidence 
started one of the biggest demonstrations. The company's non-
Turkish working policy got the reaction from the students, a massive 
demonstration began at the Square and continued with the attack of 
students to the company building (Unal, 2002).   
 
 




Batuman (2015) argues that these nationalist political 
demonstrations had ideological bases in the context of national 
identity building. Having nationalist ceremonies, nationalist political 
demonstration at the ethnically divided neighbour through dominated 
over public sphere was the reflection of the desire to control over 
differences which became the most significant obstacle preventing 
the state from creating a homogeneous nation in terms of identity. 
Different from Kizilay Square, from the beginning Taksim Square has 
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its own political discourse regarding national identity building. After 
all, the square had a meaning of three components. One is being the 
representative elements of the nation-state, second is being the 
modern public sphere, and third is being the political stage. These 
three components of meaning nourished the national identity building 
project of state. 
 
To sum up, although the Square is a 280-year-old square, only 
with the establishment of the new nation-state it gained a new 
identity through reconstruction within the framework of a new 
modern urban planning principle. Besides, its socio-spatial 
transformation many of buildings which define the square have 
undergone major changes and many have been destroyed over the 
years according to dominant ideologies, and created explicit or 
implicit impact on the meaning, function, and form of the square. 
Behind all these physical interventions of ideologies on the square, 
the main aim was to build their desired nation and national identity. 
More precisely, the Republican cadre desired to visible in the imperial 
capital of Istanbul. Thus, it was planned to construct an urban square 
with a monument that would convey the ideology of the nation-state. 
 
5.1.2. Taksim Square as Banned Public Space (1980-1990s) 
In time, Taksim Square became a symbolic space for grassroots 
movements. In the very heart of the city of Istanbul, Taksim Square 
serves as the stage on which ideologies become visible and legitimate 
in the public eye. The official purpose behind the construction of 
Taksim Square has gained another meaning; being the arena of power 
struggles. The struggle over the square occurred in different modes. 
Distinct ideologies have tried to dominate the square through 
temporary events like demonstrations, protests rallies, and 
permanent-temporary physical changes. Different representations 
and identification which attempt to change the character of the square 
have tried to be controlled. At the end of the 1960s and 1970s, 
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Taksim Square hosted several violent fights among leftist and rightist 
demonstrators, or students and police which ended with several death 
and injured. Especially with the incident of 1969 when leftist students 
organised an anti-imperialist rally which is also known as Mustafa 
Kemal rally to protest against the visit of the Sixth American Fleet 
to Turkey. When they arrived at Taksim Square, police were already 
there, and rightist was ready to support the police against the leftist. 
After clashes, two protesters died, and hundreds were severely 
injured. According to Baykal (2000), this incident would be 
interpreted as the very first conflict between seculars and Islamist. 
After eight years from this incident, in 1977 on Labour Day, people 
including leftist political organisations, students, workers were at 
Taksim Square for Labour Day. This time after clashes, thirty-three 
people dies, hundreds were injured. After these incidents since 
Taksim Square became associated with ideological struggles, it was 
closed to any protests or demonstrations. Even after the Square 
closed to any demonstrations or protest rallies, it has remained as a 
symbolic space and political arena where those can gain or lose the 
victory in the subconscious of ideologies. 
 
 
Figure 67 Taksim Square in 1986 
Source: Istanbul Encyclopedia, 1994 (cited in Yalcin, 2011) 
 
In 1980, coup d’etat occurred. Similar to Kizilay Square, Taksim 
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Square also got impacted profoundly from this military coup. As I 
mentioned before, although the square was closed to any protest 
rallies and demonstrations during the 1980s, it was recalled as a 
resistance area in the political history of Turkey. Most of the projects 
couldn’t be executed this period because of the political climate, yet 
the most significant physical changes in Taksim occurred via the 
Mayor Bedrettin Dalan who was famous with the destruction of the 
historical pattern of Istanbul. He also involved the demolition of so 
many historical buildings in Tarlabasi in order to build Tarlabasi 
Boulevard just next to Taksim Square in 1986 (Keyder, 1996). 
Kristal Casino was also destructed in the same year. Moreover, at 
the end of the 1980s, beginning 1990, Istiklal Street attempted to be 
pedestrianised (Erbey, 2017). These two projects, the opening of 
Tarlabasi Boulevard and the pedestrianisation efforts of Istiklal 
Street, damaged the whole area regarding perspective and scale. 
Thus, the damage in the vicinity of Republican Monument had the 
impact on the perception of the square. It turned into an undefined, 
empty place rather than a representative focus of nation-state or 
political arena of grassroots movements (Erbey, 2017). 
 
 
Figure 68 Taksim Square and AKM in 1986.  
(The monument still was there, yet it lost its perspective. Ataturk 
Cultural Centre (AKM) is on the left.) 




A comprehensive discussion of the relations between the 
ideological initiatives related to economic model and their reflections 
on the urban context is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
However, to give a better understanding to the circumstances of the 
country and their impact on Taksim Square, it is necessary to remind 
that during mid-1980s Istanbul became the subject of global city 
discussions, as a part of a marketing efforts. According to Bartu 
(1999:32), Istanbul was marketed as “the East in the West and the 
West in the East” and “gateway to the Orient””. In this 
representation, the multi-layered past of Istanbul regarding its 
history, culture and identity was not considered. However, it is a 
significant ideological struggle how these layers of these kinds of 
cities are represented in the space. Therefore, Taksim Square 
became the focus of different ideologies about how different cultural 
heritages, identities, and past would be referred. After the 1980s, 
debates related to Taksim Square mostly shaped around contested 
ideologies and their power struggle among building the national 
identity. 
5.1.3.  Taksim Square under the Pro-Islamist Administration 
(1990-2000s) 
The most significant change in the political climate of the Turkish 
Republic was the success of the Welfare Party at local and general 
elections in this period. Especially, the success of the Welfare Party 
taking the seats of Beyoglu District and Istanbul Metropolitan City 
was considered as a historical moment. In the definition of Turkish 
national identity Istanbul has a significant place in both secular 
nationalist ideology and Islamist nationalist ideology. Therefore, 
secularists believed that Istanbul under the rule of the pro-Islamist 
party would become the representative of Islamic identity and 
Turkish national identity which is defined as secular, modern and 
western would be damaged through the Islamic visibility in public 
sphere. According to Bartu (1999), the debates on local elections in 
1994 shaped the identity issue. Recep Tayyip Erdogan (the present-
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day president) was elected as the mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan City 
in 1994. Mayor Erdogan from pro-Islamic party covenanted to 
resurrect the Ottoman-Islamic identity to the city of Istanbul and 
right after elections, in order to keep his promise, he developed urban 
design projects for cultural heritage sites (Baykal, 2005). According 
to Bora (1999), Islamic ideology has two symbolic approaches for 
the city of Istanbul: one is to construct Ottoman-Islamic hegemony 
over the space and second is to symbolise Islamic justice and 
pluralism. Bartu (1999) argues that with this result, according to 
secularist Istanbul wouldn’t be Istanbul that they know anymore, 
and Beyoglu would be the public space where transformation was 
most evident than anywhere else. Under the rule of Islamists Istanbul 
became the representative of Ottoman-Islamic civilisation and 
contrary to Ankara, Istanbul was highlighted as the centre of “real” 
Turkish nation. Istanbul is open not only to the local but also to the 
global audiences. Thus, any ideological display in Istanbul would be 
more effective than it would be in any other city. Cinar (2005) states 
these phenomena as building and displaying of national identities in 
global locations rather than local will help them to be visible and gain 
legitimacy and recognition because of the global gaze. Welfare Party 
contrary to other parties did not embrace the global city project but 
focused on the Ottoman identity with the slogan “conquest of the 
city the second time” concerning “real owners of the city”. 
Moreover, Bora (1999) argues that the global city project and 
Welfare Party’s political rhetoric conflicted and they built their 
alternative version of the global city. Thus, the municipal authority 
began to reconstruct the city of Istanbul as cultural capital or 
alternative version of the global city. 
 
Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the socio-spatial 
transformation of Taksim Square in the context of building cultural 
capital city project of Islamist nationalist ideology. According to Bartu 
(1999), the struggle over Beyoglu reflected mostly the conflict of 
identity between who we are and who we were. In this respect what 
Welfare Party did was to transform Taksim into the object of Islamic 
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and Ottoman nostalgia to show that Turkish people were Ottoman 
once. In this process, the Municipal authority began to emphasise that 
the identity of Istanbul should reflect its Islamic features. To highlight 
its Islamic identity, the idea of building a mosque at Taksim Square 
again came into their agenda (Bora, 1999). Erdogan as the mayor of 
Istanbul said “this is the point of attraction of Istanbul’s tourism. 
The person who comes there should be able to tell that he has arrived 
in an Islamic city…As we succeed in uncovering the historical and 
cultural texture of our city, its Muslim character will become apparent 
to the visitors” (Tayyip Erdogan, Yeni Zemin March 1994 cited in 
Bora, 1999: 49). In order to give a better understanding, it is 
necessary to remind the circumstances of 1990s Taksim Square and 
its surrounding environment. Taksim Square as being the locus of 
secular nationalist ideology with its monument and structures were 
the significant nationalist urban landscape where official ideology was 
displayed. On the heart of it, Republican Monument as the symbol of 
national identity was there. Moreover, Ataturk Cultural Centre 
(Ataturk Kultur Merkezi, AKM) as a significant structure including 
concert-exhibition halls, theatres where modern art exhibition or 
cultural events such as opera, ballet, symphony orchestra were held. 
According to Cinar (2005: 113) “AKM stands as a monument of 
official Turkish modernity that recognises and adopts the standards 
of European high culture as the universal norm of civilisation.” Thus, 
secularists had a great deal of sensitive towards the square and its 
spatial organisation. However, as much as secularist’s sensitivity, 
Islamists also highly attached to the built environment of the square. 
As an Islamic element to build a mosque which came to their agenda 
around the 1950s was insisted this period also. 
 
The ideological struggle between secularists and Islamists over 
the building mosque at Taksim Square dates back to 1950s. 
Throughout the last six decades, the idea of building a mosque at 
Taksim Square had found supporters although secularists within the 
state and civil society strongly were opponent to the project. Both 
supporters and opponents of this project have their reasons. 
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Opponents of this project argued that since Taksim Square is a 
significant Republican landmark and the representative of modern, 
secular, and western identity; any related religious element would be 
inappropriate here. More precisely, this project is a deliberate way 
of challenging to national identity which is defined as modern, secular 
and western. However, supporters of this project argue that “true” 
identity of the city of Istanbul is embedded in the Ottoman-Islamic 
heritage and in order to make visible this identity, it is significant to 
construct the mosque in the very heart of Istanbul. According to 
Baykal (2005) rather than practical reasons, the debate over the 
mosque project has always been the “political-symbolic” 
implications. 
 
This period, the mosque project agenda of the municipality began 
again. Three months after Mayor Erdogan came to power in 1994, 
city council proposed a project of building mosque in Taksim Square. 
On the one hand Islamists promoted this project as one of the largest 
and tallest mosque in the Middle East, on the other hand secular 
media had a strict campaign against the project, asserting it as 
“unfeasible,” “ideologically motivated,” “destructive to the 
environment,” “aesthetically repulsive,” and “damaging for 
tourism” (Cinar, 2005). However, the Cultural and Natural Heritage 
Conservation Board insisted on the archaeological excavation for any 
evaluation. After archaeological excavation, it was discovered that 
there were not only the remains of 18th-century water channels but 
also traces of late Byzantine and Ottoman periods. Therefore, the 
board decided that an evaluation could not be made according to the 
conditions of temporary restructuring and a plan should prepare with 
a holistic approach in the urban design scale for Taksim Square. 
Therefore, any possibility of building a mosque behind the Maksem 
was gone entirely. However, following the previous attempts to 
construct a mosque at Taksim Square, city council came with a new 
project proposal. According to this new project, the mosque as an 
Islamic Cultural Centre was planned to construct at Gezi Park which 
is just nearby the Taksim Square. Because of the elevation difference, 
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Gezi Park overlooks the square and the monument. This location of 
Gezi Park was considered as a chance for dominating the square by 
Islamists. 
 
The leader of Welfare Party Necmettin Erbakan in a meeting with 
Welfare Party’s mayors told that: “people demand a mosque at 
Taksim Square. We won’t construct it at the periphery of the square 
but right in the Gezi Park” (cited in Baykal, 2000). However, the 
Chamber of Architects objected mosque project. They argued that 
the square and the park are the symbols of Republic and they 
interpreted this project as an antagonistic approach of Islamists 
towards the Republican heritage and identity. According to White 
(2000), the square which was surrounded by Republican elements 
like Ataturk Cultural Centre housing the display of western modern 
art such as opera, ballet; yet building a mosque in Taksim Square 
would be a deliberate insult to this spatial narration of secular 
nationalist ideology. Cinar (2005: 117) argues that “the controversy 
over the Taksim Mosque project was over Turkey’s national 
identity. What was at stake in this dispute between secularists and 
Islamists was whether or not Turkish national identity would 
incorporate and use Islam as a self-defining mark. The adamant 
secularist reaction against the project reflected the reluctance of 
secularists against granting Islam a visible presence in the Turkish 
national identity. On the other hand, the aggressive promotion of the 
project by Islamist circles reflected a desire to insert Islam into 
national space both the nationalised space in Taksim Square and the 
conceptual space of the nation wherein the national identity was 
formulated. Therefore, the Taksim Mosque became an attempt to 
inscribe Islam upon secular-national space, and emerged as the 
articulation of the Islamist version of nationhood as part of an 
alternative nationalist ideology that designated the national space of 
Taksim Square as the appropriate place to establish itself as a 
contending nationalist project.” 
 
In this process, Gezi Park became the public space where Islamic 
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identity, elements and traditions are visible in the eyes of the public. 
It was also a way of legitimising the Islamic ideology. Because of the 
location of park, it seemed to be a better option for displaying 
ideological content of Islam since the Square is dominated with the 
secular element of monument. Mayor Erdogan told that at the cultural 
centre which would be built in Gezi Park there would be seminars 
related with Islam and Islamic life, conferences which Muslim 
countries were welcomed and Islamic arts would be performed. 
During the waiting period of building the mosque, Gezi Park hosted 
several Islamic events, cultural programs, and various activities. 
Every Ramadan, Beyoglu Municipality sets up iftar tents in Gezi Park 
and also many activities like concerts, exhibitions were held. 
Following these arguments, on 29th May 1996 at Taksim Square, the 
Conquest of Istanbul Day was played and further events to celebrate 
this Ottoman-Islamic related historical day were held through the 
organisations of city administration of Istanbul and National Youth 
Foundation which is an Islamist NGO (Non-Governmental 
Organisation). That day, in a theatrical way, the conquest day was 




Figure 69 29th of May, 1996, celebration of Conquest of Istanbul 
Day at Taksim Square 
Source: Cinar (2001: 374) 
 
One of the most important tactics of political Islam for dominating 
public space and making Muslim identity visible is to arrange Islamic 
ideology related gatherings, meetings, commemorative programs, 
events etc. at Republican spaces as an alternative to Republican 
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national holidays. Sargin (2003) argues that celebrations, festivities 
and events for remembering religious days or historical Ottoman days 
which traditional garments become prominent, became part of radical 
remembrance of political Islam. Islamist ideology celebrates an 
alternative history based on the Ottoman-Islamic identity which 
secular nationalist ideology tried to cut any ties with. Cinar (2001: 
365, 379) puts it as “these Islamist performances of history serve 
to construct an alternative national identity which is Ottoman and 
Islamic, evoking a civilization centred in the city of Istanbul, as 
opposed to the secular, modern Turkish Republic centred in the 
capital city of Ankara…The commemoration of May 29 also 
addresses broader questions about the making and contestation of 
national identity through daily practices in public life… the 
celebration of May 29, 1453, as a part of national history has unset 
effects on the official constructions of national identity”. Moreover, 
these tensions became more concrete in 1996, Habitat II, the Second 
United Nations Conference on Human Settlements which took place 
in Istanbul. From all over the world, several participants from NGOs, 
universities, media including foreign and domestic, state officials 
would visit Istanbul for two week period, and both secularists and 
Islamists tried to use this broad participation on promoting “true” 
identity of Turkish nation and Istanbul. It is not surprising since the 
discourse of Islamist ideology about Istanbul has been shaped on the 
Islamic and Ottoman identity regarding creating the global city 
concept for the city of Istanbul. 
 
 






The city administration also tried to take advantage of this event 
by promoting Istanbul to global gaze by focusing on the closer areas 
to conference venue at Beyoglu District and Taksim Square. Although 
city administration wasn’t the official host, parallel events were held 
by them. These events mostly focused on promoting the Ottoman-
Islamic identity of Istanbul which was considered as true national 
identity. Islamists argued that secularist perception of global Istanbul 
rejects its history and identity while embracing the Hittite and 
Sumerian civilisations. They organised alternative events and 
meetings at Gezi Park which was so close to Conference Venue. Gezi 
Park once again became the site for Islamists’ activities. 
 
 
Figure 71 Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Newsletter Special to 
Habitat II 
(Left corner Mayor Erdogan appears to plant a tree. On the bottom, 
the title is “Islam is peace and love”.) 
Source: https://oui.hypotheses.org/3074 
 
However, with the National Security Council -kinda military 
intervention- the hegemony of Islamist ideology tried to be 
decreased by initiating several measures in 1997. While Welfare 
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Party was closed, its leaders were banned from politics including 
Mayor Erdogan. The rest of politicians from Welfare Party 
established another pro-Islamic Party with the name of Virtue 
(Fazilet) Party, and they won over the local elections again in 
metropolitan cities including Istanbul. By the time according to 
measurements of National Security Council Taksim Mosque project 
was cancelled and following it new city administration from Virtue 
Party proved their loyalty to Republican ideals with the sign right 
across from the Republican Monument which was written on it: 
“75th Anniversary-Long live Republic-Istanbul Metropolitan 
Municipality.” Thus, with the removal of Erdogan from Mayor, 
although practically same party members established another pro-
Islamic party, their discourse of Ottoman-Islamic identity seemed to 
be left and related events, seminars were cancelled. 
 
 
Figure 72 Opposite to the Republican Monument, the sign placed by 
the city administration to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Republic in 
1999 





5.1.4. The Representation of Political Islam on Taksim Square 
(the 2000s) 
With the decision of National Security Council, Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan was prisoned and banned from politics for life-long in 1998 
because of the fact that the poem he read at a public meeting. That 
poem was “The minarets are our bayonets, the domes our helmets/ 
the mosques our barracks and the faithful our army” (Batuman, 2013: 
1098). However, with a change in the law, his ban was removed on, 
and released from the prison. In 2001, Islamists split into two factions: 
fundamentalists and relative moderates. Recep Tayyip Erdogan led 
to relative moderates and established AKP. The very first election it 
joined was in 2003 and he became the Prime Minister with the 
success of AKP. Regarding the national identity, the vision of AKP is 
the nation in Islam rather than the nation itself (Batuman, 2016). 
More precisely, since the 1980s the national identity defined through 
the synthesis of Turkishness and Islam became more visible with 
AKP. 
 
The Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality was Ali Mufit 
Gurtuna from Virtue Party. The local elections held in 2004, Kadir 
Topbas from AKP was elected. Similar to the Mayor of Ankara 
Metropolitan Municipality Melih Gokcek, Kadir Topbas also continued 
his political career as mayor until 2017 when President Erdogan 
asked him to resign. This period spatial policies mostly shaped 
around neo-liberal economic policies and ideals of the Islamic 
nationalist ideology and direct interventions of President Erdogan. 
This period the electoral successes of central government and local 
government from the same political party coincided and began a new 
process that wipes out the power struggle between central 
government and local while bringing the cooperation between them. 
During this period, conflicting projects such as building Taksim 
Mosque, rebuilding Artillery Barracks etc. were approved rapidly 
through either dismiss the opponent members or change the member 
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of decision maker boards. According to Batuman (2016: 340) while 
the rise of Islam as a trans-national political force in globally, 
blending Islamism with global market as a way to alternative 
reference for trans-national Islam which is compatible with the 
Western world and also the authentic way to Islamic representations 
are the successes of AKP. Moreover, Unsal and Kuyucu (2010) 
argue that neoliberal Islamism dominated this period while urban 
space became a significant means of capital accumulation with the 
spatial policies of pro-Islamic AKP. According to Islamist nationalist 
ideology, Istanbul and its planning practices had always been so 
substantial regarding creating cultural capital, yet within AKP the 
planning practices of Istanbul became a potent tool to take revenge 
from secular Turkish nationalism. The city administration, on the one 
hand, has tried to destroy the Early Republican spaces, on the other 
hand, has rebuilt the Ottoman Empire’s heritage. Tanju (2007) 
argues that modernity project of secular Turkish nationalism 
excluded Islam from the public sphere and alienated Islamists while 
building public spaces which are the symbols of the nation-state. 
Thus, Islamists are not visible on the public spaces of Republic. 
Islamists try to make itself visible on public spaces through defying, 
destructing Republican spaces and building alternative spaces.  
 
In other words, what Early Republican ideology tried to do was 
to put distance between the Turkish nation and Islamic civilisation; 
yet what political Islam has done lately is to use these two words 
metonymical. The ties with Ottoman Empire which were broken in 
1923 with the Turkish Republic, established again and the efforts of 
westernisation replaced with the efforts of being Muslim world’s 
leader (Batuman, 2016: 323). However, the architectural approach 
of AKP, unfortunately, can’t go beyond the imitation of Islamic-
Ottoman architecture. More precisely, spatial policies of Islamist 
AKP not only focus on eradicating the symbolic spaces of Republican 
ideology but also serve as an instrument in rebuilding an alternative 
national identity concerning the elements of Islam-Ottoman. 
Batuman (2016) puts this phenomenon as, during the 2000s, mimicry 
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as a state project of Islamism targeted to rebuild the golden age of 
the glorious Ottoman Empire in today’s circumstances at urban 
space. According to Aslan (2014), Taksim Square hosts the conflicts 
of two ideologies; on the one hand, neo-Ottomanist and Islamists who 
do not like the image of Ataturk and Republic history much, but define 
itself through the resuscitating the Ottoman history; on the other 
hand, secularists who consider the square as the symbol of nation-
state, national identity and try to protect it from any contested 
ideology's intervention. In order to give a better understanding of 
what happened in Taksim Square in this period regarding identity 
building, related projects will be discussed in detail.  
 
The first Taksim Pedestrianisation Project which covers Gezi 
Park, Siraselviler and Istiklal Street, AKM (Ataturk Cultural Centre) 
as a pedestrianised zone to connect Gezi Park and Taksim Square 
without any vehicular traffic was introduced to the public in 2007. It 
was aimed to take the vehicle traffic underground and separate 
pedestrians and vehicles. However, the coexistence of pedestrians 
and cars did not cause any problems; on the contrary, it feed the 
vitality of the square. The project created only a vast undefined area 
and harmed the perspective of the monument. Moreover, after so 
many years since it was banned to any political demonstrations or 
rally protests, Taksim Square was opened to the May 1 celebrations 
in 2010 and 2011; yet unfortunately, it was banned again with the 
excuse of pedestrianisation project construction. 
 
 






Figure 74 Taksim Square before and after the project 
Source: http://www.arkeologlardernegist.org/aciklama.php?id=6 
 
In 2011, PM Erdogan announced that two new dimension added 
the project; (1) a ‘neo-Ottoman architectural style’ the replica of 
Artillery Barrack including a shopping mall and luxury residences on 
the place where Gezi Park locates would be constructed, (2) the bus 
stops, traffic flow around the square would move to beneath of the 
square, and the monument would be removed. All these projects have 
not been executed, yet it caused the Gezi Movement. The 
negotiations between the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and the 
Taksim Solidarity Group had been continued for one year; however, 
they couldn’t meet on the middle ground. On 27th of May, the 
destruction of the wall of Gezi Park and uprooting the trees made the 
real democratic debate for Gezi Park impossible. Thus, the only 
option for environmentalist activists was to occupy the Gezi Park to 
protect it and also make their existence visible. The prevalent 
tendency of municipalities related to public spaces is to decrease 
social, political or cultural importance of public spaces by replacing 
their multifunctional features with a principal traffic function or 
privatise them. Demonstrators were there to announce their opinions 
about the demolishing Gezi Park and building Artillery Barrack, yet in 
time it turned into declaring their disturbance about the party in 
power especially the oppressive attitude of PM Erdogan and 
demanding freedom. The increase in the number of shopping malls 
and the decline in the number of parks, squares, open spaces have 
been already controversial issues among urban planners, architects, 
and activists who criticise this transformation. Therefore, the 
destruction decision of Gezi Park which is one of the significant public 
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space in the very heart of Istanbul created a tremendous impression 
on not only professionals but also on public. In the very beginning, a 
few environmental activists gathered to stop the demolition. However, 
it caused clashes between police and activists and the 
disproportionate use of force of police made the public support Gezi 
Movement no matter their political view was. Moreover, it attracted 
the attention of press, social media and spread all over the country. 
 
 











Figure 77 Gezi Park and its vicinity 
Source: Google Earth, 2018 
 
 











Figure 80 Artillery Barracks original (left) and replica (right) 











Although it was a local resistance one of the most significant 
reasons that the Gezi Movement supported by all over the country 
was to identity conflict between secularists and Islamists. There are 
so many papers, researches, thesis, debates related to the Gezi 
Movement in the context of environmental policies, neo-liberal 
incursion in the space, architectural style etc.. However this study 
focuses on the issue of building Ottoman-Islamic identity as an 
alternative national identity through destructing the Gezi Park, 
Taksim Square, removing the monument, and building replica of 
Artillery Barrack from Ottoman time. Gulersoy (1986: 23) argues 
that the construction of the monument started the conflict between 
secularists and Islamists. According to her rather than the 
monument's architectural style, its existence in the very centre of 
Istanbul was the sign of the abandonment of the Ottoman-Islamic 
tradition. Ottoman Empire did not need any parade ground happens 
around a monument which is European tradition because belief in 
Allah requires no material thing as a symbol in the centre. Islam as a 
religion, prohibits any monuments which remind people of any related 
religious icons. As a natural outcome of this belief, the projects of 
Taksim Pedestrian Project and Artillery Barracks do not portray any 
monument in the square at all. The Mosque project at Taksim Square 
also was proposed with similar intention which is to make invisible 
any secular, modern, western element and replace it with or dominate 
it through the Islamic element. Esen (2012) attributes these projects 
as a catalyst of the Gezi Movement and through these projects 
political power strikes a significant blow to the spatial organisation of 
Taksim. 
 
Perhaps, building the replica of Artillery Barrack was one of the 
most ideological interventions among the projects proposed for 
Taksim Square. Besides its physical restrictions on the pedestrian 
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flow and the usage of public space, the ideological dimension of it 
regarding representation wise caused debates among technocrats, 
scholars, professionals, and the public. To destruct the Gezi Park and 
build the replica of Artillery Barracks according to the Islamist 
nationalist ideology is kind of confrontation of Islamists with 
secularists. Oncu (2007: 235-236) argues that this project is part of 
rebuilding the national identity, and she puts it as: “Many of the 
ancient monuments and heritage sites that symbolise the unique 
attractions of Istanbul in transnational markets refer back to layers 
of contested memories, dislocations and serial destructions that have 
been a part of nation-making. The designation of particular sites in 
the material fabric of the city (and not others) as 'historical treasures' 
has been accompanied by intense political debate, calling forth 
competing interpretations of different epochs in the city's history. 
More broadly, the mobilisation of Istanbul's imperial legacy to 
articulate future aspirations for a 'global' future have challenged the 
modernist imagination of the Republican past”. Specific to Taksim 
Square, Artillery Barracks with its architectural style of the previous 
era would be the representative of Islamic-Ottoman identity in the 
very centre of the global city. 
 
Here the problem is both Islamist nationalist ideology and 
secularist nationalist ideology perceives and represents the history 
of the Ottoman Empire as a whole. While secularist nationalist 
ideology denies the entire Ottoman Empire as the dark age, Islamist 
nationalist ideology accepts and aggrandises it without any criticism. 
Both of them do not consider the different layers of 600-year history. 
To deny or accept and aggrandises without questioning each layer of 
Ottoman Empire’s history caused first the destruction of Ottoman 
historical elements and then rebuilding it. Each ideology proposes 
radical projects for Taksim Square to dominate over other distinct 
ideologies through demolition and construction. Thus, Taksim Square 





The second project is Taksim Mosque Project of which the first 
phase (1950s-1990s) was discussed in the previous part. It mostly 
shaped around the debate of the project between secularists and 
Islamists. The discussions ended with the close of Welfare Party. 
However, with the great success of AKP and the banned politician 
Erdogan becoming Prime Minister started the debate on Taksim 
Mosque project again, yet this time they succeed in building a mosque. 
According to Batuman (2013), the spatial demand of Islamists mostly 
has been shaped around the mosque as a symbol of their political 
power, so they are quite enthusiastic about building a mosque at 
Taksim Square which is very symbolic spaces of secular nationalist 
ideology. Here it is necessary to remind that with spatial policies of 
AKP each year almost 1000 new mosques are built all around the 
country and older mosques replaced with Ottoman replicas and Mass 
Housing Administration built 480 mosques between 2005 and 2013 
which means mosques became social spaces in newly built residential 
areas (Batuman, 2016). However, none of these mosques caused this 
much debates that Taksim Mosque did. According to Ekinci (2012, 
cited in Ozsoy, 2017) during recent years, in Turkey especially in 
Istanbul perhaps every day another mosque construction has begun 
yet only Taksim mosque has caused debates and conflicts. Moreover, 
even though almost all of those mosques have constructed without a 
plan, or often at a green space or a park or mostly their first floors 
are designed as shop like a rent project. The explanation of this 
conflict is undoubtedly related to Taksim Square and its historical and 
spatial narration. In spite of the enormous social opposition and legal 
obstacles, Islamists who want to build a mosque in this square are 
still and constantly insisting because they aim to harm the identity, 
lifestyle, social values and cultural heritage that Taksim Square 
represents. 
 
During his time as the Mayor of Istanbul, PM Erdogan was the 
sincere supporter of the mosque building project at Taksim Square, 
and he brought the project onto the agenda again in 2011. Right after 
PM Erdogan’s speech about the mosque, in 2012 the plan for 
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Taksim Mosque was proposed. The architect of this proposal argues 
that he did not copy the architectural style of mosques from Ottoman 
time, but developed his own style in the context of mosque debates 
going on between secularists and Islamists. He told that “I tried to 
find common ground between secularists and Islamists. Thus, on the 
one hand, I consider the Islamic elements, on the other hand, I 
developed modern architecture and design for the mosque. I even did 
not name it as Taksim Mosque but Mosque of the Republic & Museum 
of Religions” (Anonymous, 2013). With this project, the architect 
Ahmet Vefik Alp got award International Union of Architects in 2012. 
However, PM Erdogan rejected this proposal for being too modern. 
According to Batuman (2015), PM Erdogan himself is a fan of 
neoclassical architecture which displays as mimicry of Ottoman 
architecture. PM Erdogan insisted in neoclassical architecture since 
he aimed to make Islamic identity a brand. 
 
 
Figure 82 Project Proposal for Taksim Mosque Project in 2012 
Source: Anonymous, 2013  
 
According to Batuman (2016), Islamic ideology uses the 
architectural mimicry to form the synthesis of Turkishness and Islam 
in the context of national identity building. Moreover, Sargin (2004) 
argues that architectural mimicry is a political apparatus creating 
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counter memories and historical images that can replace Republican 
identity with the Islamic one. According to him (2004: 674): “the 
replica of the very Ottoman architecture is surely the visible 
legitimization of pro-Islamic identity and the monument is its 
theatrical stage on which countermemories and histories can now be 
explicitly represented…Now the orthodoxy of Ottoman architecture 
is believed to be the best political means to cultivate 
countermemories and replace the secular elite's constructions that 
are also invented traditions and imaginary narrations (Hobsbawm and 
Ranger, 1983). For the conservative power block, the memory crises 
since the 1920s, therefore, could be defeated only by establishing 
countermemories, and the spatialization of historic images seemed to 
be the best political apparatus.”  
 
In 2011, Beyoglu Municipality prepared two projects in scale 
1/1000 and 1/5000. However same year, Cihangir Embellishment 
Association (Cihangir Guzellestirme Dernegi) and Galata Association 
filed charges against Beyoglu Municipality, Istanbul Metropolitan 
Municipality and Ministry of Culture and Tourism. In 2013, the court 
accepted cancellation of the plans unanimously. Beyoglu Municipality 
objected to a court decision and applied higher status court which 
reverses the cancellation judgment. In 2017, the project of Sefik 
Birkiye and Selim Dalaman was accepted by Istanbul number II 
Regional Committee for the Conservation of Cultural Assets. More 
precisely, the legal procedure that was the biggest obstacle of 
building a mosque at Taksim Square also completed with the approval 
of Istanbul number II Regional Committee for the Conservation of 














After Taksim Pedestrianisation Project, iftar dinners also have 
been moved to Taksim Square right opposite of the monument. 
According to Sargin (2004), these kinds of religious activities and 
events legitimise the Islamic ideological performance and serve for 
building radical identities. Moreover, Erdi (2015) attributes that the 
construction of a mosque on the very strategical places, performing 
related Islamic ideology events and activities highlight not only a 
symbolic transformation but also transformation in spatial practices 
in a conservative way. In other words, the visibility of Muslim identity 
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through public displays of Islamic practices became much more 
natural this period. Finally, Taksim Mosque as the spatial expressions 
of religious identity became a symbolic claim to acceptance and 
recognition of Muslim identity in Taksim Square. 
 
 




Following the acceptance of the mosque project, the destruction 
of Ataturk Cultural Centre (AKM) of which history rooted to Early 
Republican Era, began to be prepared. In his plan prepared in 1936-
37, Prost also proposed a Theatre House in Taksim Square to 
complete the spatial narration of the modernity project. In 1946, a 
project was developed by Turkish architects and construction began. 
Because of some technical and budget issues, the construction could 
be completed in 1969. In the beginning, it was considered only as 
Opera House, yet in the construction process it turned into a cultural 
centre and was opened as Istanbul Culture Centre (Istanbul Kultur 
Sarayi) (Can, 2014). According to Batuman (2015), the building is 








Figure 87 Newspaper, next day of opening ceremony 




In 1970, Istanbul Culture Centre burnt down and it could not be 
used anymore until 1978. After completing the reconstruction, it was 
reopened with the name Ataturk Culture Centre. AKM as a symbol of 
 
 169 
Republican era with its modern architectural style and being the 
representative of displaying modern, western art, has always been a 
target for Islamic ideology. From time to time, Islamists proposed to 
demolish it. With the political power of AKP, the attempt to destroy 
the building became agenda again in 2005. In 2005, Minister of 
Culture and Tourism proposed the destruction of the centre for being 
completed its economic life and replacing it with a giant structure 
which serves as trade and congress centre. However, because of the 
widespread opposition from NGOs, art and architecture platforms, 
protests through the press made this decision cancelled. They 
opposed to this decision, and they argued that before taking any 
decision related with this centre, the qualities of AKM like being a 
part of memory and identity of spatial practices of Republican-era 
should have been considered rather than giving priority to its 
economic life. In 2007, Istanbul number II Regional Committee for the 
Conservation of Cultural Assets registered the centre as first-
degree monumental structure. In 2008, after restoration project 
prepared for the centre, it was closed to audiences and since then 
waiting for restoration. 
 
 
Figure 88 AKM, after closing for restoration 
Source: https://projedetaylari.com/yeni-akm-projesi/ 
 
In 2010 Istanbul was announced as the European Capital of 
Culture. Political power used it as an excuse to demolish the building 
 
 170 
and asked Sakarya University to prepare a static report with the 
expectation of supporting destroy decision, yet the decision didn't 
support the destroy (Erbey, 2017). Nevertheless, the debates 
continued for a long time. Since the Gezi Movement in 2013, the 
building had been used by the Istanbul Police Headquarters. Same 
year one of his speech PM Erdogan told that “I hope AKM will be 
demolished. We are going to build a spectacular culture centre in 
Baroque architecture. Yes, we are going to build also a mosque. I will 
not ask permission from anyone.” 
 
 
Figure 89 New Culture Centre Project 
Source: https://projedetaylari.com/yeni-akm-projesi/ 
 
Batuman (2015) argues that Taksim Square with its vicinity and 
important structures like AKM, Gezi Park, Municipality Casino were 
designed as instruments of national identity building. According to 
him in order to create politically conscious citizens, nation-state 
developed modernity project as a social engineering project. The 
reason behind the Islamic ideology's desire to demolish the AKM was 
to harm and undermine the modernity project of secular nationalist 
ideology. After AKM destroyed, what kind of building would be 
constructed or what kind of services would be offered does not 
matter at all. The important thing was to get rid of any symbolic place 
of secular nationalist ideology since AKM was the symbol of the 
Republican era and representative of nation-state’s power. 
Although there were so many opposition, finally, in 2018 May, the 
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demolishing of AKM was completed. 
 
Lastly, alternatives to Taksim Square, Yenikapi Square and 
Maltepe Square were developed. In the very beginning of AKP, there 
was massive opposition from military and judiciary towards AKP 
(Batuman, 2015). In order to deal with this opposition, democratic 
rights were emphasised at the agenda of AKP. As a matter of fact 
that this issue, Taksim Square was opened for the May Day parade 
in 2010 after 33 years. Next three years, May Day parade took place 
at Taksim Square until it was banned again with the construction 
excuse and announced that it was just a temporary ban. However, PM 
Erdogan denied it and told that he had plans to build two new squares 
in Istanbul (Batuman, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 90 Taksim Square and the location of two new squares 






It is necessary to remind that at Taksim Square, 15 July coup 
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attempt was protested in 2016 and commemorated following years 
without any police brutal or political obstacle. Alternative 
commemorations, celebrations on the square serve to create 
alternative historical narrations which are a very significant part of 
the building and legitimising national identity. Accordingly to different 
readings of the past, the present political debates constantly change. 
 
 




Building alternative squares for Taksim Square is the ideological 
inclination of AKP. Behind it, there is a hostile attitude towards the 
historical, spatial narration of Taksim Square and with these attempts, 
it is tried to be undermined and harm the Early Republican effort and 
Republican ideals and values. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the 
reason behind to construct two squares with so many efforts and 
capital. These two squares are isolated from anywhere. They are 
surrounded by sea and high ways, literally no connection with life. It 
is so difficult to reach there by public transportation. For any special 
events or activities of AKP, the municipality serves free buses; 
however for any alternative events held by opponents do not get the 
same support. In other words, these squares are just built for serving 
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to strength AKP’s political power while opponents were 
discouraged through urban facilities and they lost the very significant 





Figure 92 Analytical Framework for Taksim Republican Square (Personal Rendering)
Analytical Framework for Taksim Republican Square
Pera (Beyoglu), Taksim which 
were Partially Modernised 
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Chapter 6: Findings of Case Studies 
 
This study investigates the role of ideologies in the social 
construction of spaces as it relates to building national identities. In 
developing countries, the concepts of a nation and national identity 
are socially constructed. Moreover, space is a social product which 
is intricately linked to ideology. In fact, it is a common practice to 
construct nation and national identity through the use of space. In this 
process, public spaces have always played central roles. This study 
examines urban squares because they are the most public spaces.  
 
The case studies of Kizilay Square and Taksim Square are 
important in the urbanisation history of Turkey in the context of 
national identity building. In this context, national identity was built 
through the production process of these two squares and how they 
became representative symbols of the nation-state. They were both 
constructed for serving as the representative spatial configuration of 
nation-state and subsequently were both reconstructed for offering 
an alternative narration of history. They have also been the centre of 
ideological struggle and conflicts. 
  
Those struggles act like a catalyst that makes the spatial pattern 
of squares transform in order to build the desired social order. The 
most common ideological struggles in Turkey are the struggles 
between traditional and modern, old and new, Islam and secularism, 
and left and right. The two case study squares have witnessed each 
such struggle at different times. The first time period was the Early 
Republican Era when the Turkish Republic tried to construct its 
concept of the nation state and national identity through spatial 
practices. In this era, secular Turkish nationalism dominated all other 
contending ideologies. The tension between traditional vs modern, 
old vs new, and Islam vs secularism was highly visible in the process 
of constructing the national identity. The state dominated the 
urbanisation process and a holistic approach was adopted. European 
architects and urban planners were invited to develop the cities and 
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investments focused on the Anatolian cities rather than Istanbul, the 
last capital city of the Ottoman Empire. Ankara was declared the new 
capital city and developed according to a design by Herman Jansen, 
a German architect. In his plan Kizilay Square was designated as the 
symbolic locus of the nation state and the premier public space of 
modern society. It became the representative symbol of a modern, 
secular, and Westernised national identity. The primary planning 
principle was designed to serve nation-state building.  
 
However, Republican cadre needed to build a symbolic locus of 
the nation-state in Istanbul also. The area where different ethnic 
groups lived was chosen, and Taksim Republican Square was created 
with this effort. While developing it, Kizilay Square was taken as an 
example. Republican Monument in the very centre of Taksim Square 
was the representative of the nation-state. Both squares were the 
places where nation-state introduce modern lifestyle to its citizens 
in this period. The national identity was defined as secular, modern, 
and Westernised in this era. These two squares played a significant 
role in declaring this identity to citizens. State accordingly to its 
ideology, construct those squares corresponding to reflect this 
ideology and built national identity through them. The processes of 
creating the Kizilay and Taksim Squares were constructed by way of 
modern urban planning implementations and the effort of creating 
national architecture. As Lefebvre (1991: 42) argues “spatial 
textures which are informed by effective knowledge and ideology. 
Representations of space must, therefore, have a substantial role and 
a specific influence in the production of space.”  
 
Next period begins with the military coup that happened in 1980. 
In this period, national identity was redefined through Turkish and 
Islam synthesis. The main aim was to realise the depoliticisation of 
society. Islam was considered as an apparatus of the depoliticisation 
by state. Thus, public spaces which had political meanings, radically 
transformed into meaningless spaces. Kizilay and Taksim Square are 
prominent examples of this effort. Both squares had gained political 
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identity especially at the end of the 1970s. To depoliticise those 
squares, spatial policies were used significantly. They were closed 
to any demonstration, protests, etc. Moreover, they began to be 
watched through CCTV. At the beginning of this period, squares 
turned into junctions-their characteristics of being public space 
diminished. Following the 1980s, 1990s the rise of political Islam has 
affected all political climate of Turkey. In this period, Islam began to 
be visible in the public sphere. Islamic and traditional practices of 
society were opened up to public eyes. Further, Islamic related 
architectural elements, styles were created by imitating the Ottoman 
Empire. Mainly, the increase in the mosque construction became 
common spatial policy almost in every city. Mosque, similar to 
Ottoman Empire time, became the principal element of the public 
spaces. After the 2000s, with the massive success of AKP in 
elections, building mosque at very significant Republican spaces 
began to be normalised although a considerable part of society was 
opposed. The effort of Republican cadre to neutralise the public space 
from any related religious identity turned into a race that no open 
space without mosque with the AKP. Tanyeli (2010: 10-11) argues 
that almost the only architectural demand of Islamists corresponding 
to their ideology becomes concrete tragically at the architectural 
level by constructing countless mosques via associations of mosque 
construction. Therefore, it is not wrong to conclude that Islamists 
who are in the political arena do not consider the urban and 
architectural environment that is necessary for their demanding 
lifestyle. Further, Cansever (cited in Kocak, 2008: 95) remarks that 
since the mosque was constructed like a castle as a symbolic 
expression of Muslim identity, Republican regime considered mosque 
as a focal point of resistance. 
 
Although they have similar spatial development in time, since 
they locate in the two competitive metropolitan cities of Turkey, their 
development is quite impressive. Since Taksim Square locates in 
Istanbul which is considered as cultural capital city representing the 
Ottoman identity defined as true identity of Turkish people by 
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Islamists, has always been the very ideological space itself. Islamists 
want to construct their historical narration through spatial narration, 
and Taksim Square has always been the very first space they tried 
to dominate. To excavate Ottoman identity, Istanbul is the right place 
to begin. Ankara as being the representative city of secular nation-
state, Islamists tried to construct their representative city, and as 
being the last capital city of Ottoman Empire, Istanbul became 
reasonable choice. It has always been easier to transform a built 
place than to construct a new one. Moreover, it helps to wipe 
collective memory out related to the hostile one. After all, Taksim 
Square has become the arena where secularist and Islamist power 
struggle takes place. However, in time, its identity has transformed 
corresponding to socio-economic and cultural circumstances of the 
country. 
 
Hence, this dissertation aimed to answer first if squares as social 
products have transformed through ideological inclinations for 
constructing national identity and second by this objective, it is 
intended to investigate the spatial transformations of the Kizilay and 
Taksim Squares. Both the theoretical framework and case study 
indicated that in the process of identity building, public space is the 
subject of this construction. The most important finding and 
surprising as well, is discovering that any social construction always 
needs other social constructions to realised itself. What I mean is, 
national identity construction in developing countries is a socially 
constructed concept, moreover, building national identity is not 
possible alone without other socially constructed things. Public 
spaces as another social productions plays a significant role in the 
construction of national identity. Moreover, the production of space 
is not free from power struggles, and ideological conflicts. Public 
spaces have been the subject and also object of this construction. 
Public spaces are not only the place where national identity is 
constructed but also the place where this identity transforms. Massey 
(1985: 12) suggests that “space is a social construct-yes. But 
social relations are also constructed over space, and that makes a 
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difference”. His point is that spatial structures influence the social 
structures and process, yet it appears differently in distinct areas. 
Thus, space is not only a social product, but it has the potential to 
produce its social relations. The meaning, structure, and function of 
these squares have transformed both within the institutionalisation of 
socially dominant ideologies and also through conflicts and struggles 
of those dominant ideologies. 
 
Moreover, the conflict over spaces according to the Lefebvre’s 
conceptualisation of space’s triad tried to be explored. In this 
respect, Kizilay and Taksim Square in the Early Republican Era as 
“perceived spaces” comprised a significant part of the built 
environment and reflect the features of modern cities. Moreover, 
they were “conceived spaces” as a spatial representation of the 
nation-state and Republican regime. Lastly, they have been “lived 
spaces” where social and cultural practices took place in everyday 
life. Trust (Guven) Monument and Republican Monument within the 
squares comprised the “monumental spaces” that providing a sense 
of belonging a nation, pointing to the national identity. Guvenpark and 
Gezi Park were conceived as public spaces which symbolise the 
power of nation-state in Kizilay and Taksim Square. Further, since 
both parks were “conceived spaces” as the spatial representation 
of the power of the Republican ideology through social and cultural 
practices of them, they can be considered as “space of 
representation”. With the rise of political Islam, those spaces began 
to lose their meaning and experienced change in their forms and 
functions. In this period, Kizilay and Taksim Square first had lost 
their public space characteristics and had transformed from a meeting 
place into a peopleless space that is a “perceived space” 
comprising of a junction where vehicular and pedestrian traffic flow 
as a result of the spatial policies. While they were constructing, the 
built environment and buildings were considered carefully, as 
Lefebvre (1991:223) argues “buildings have functions, forms and 
structures, but they do not integrate the formal, functional and 
structural 'moments' of social practice.” Moreover, the balance 
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between building and the structure of squares tried to be protected. 
However, with new spatial enforcements in this period this balance 
has changed. According to Lefebvre (1991: 223), “the balance of 
forces between the monument and the building shifted.” Newly 
constructed buildings substituted the structural elements of squares. 
For instance, Taksim Mosque, according to Lefebvre’s triple 
conception, can be considered as a “monumental space”. The 
mosque is located right behind the Republican Monument, and it is 
sensed more vividly than other buildings in the square. Further, the 
mosque can be argued as a “space of representation” against 
secular nationalism. In this sense, it can be argued that Taksim 
Mosque, on the one hand, deformed the monumental characteristic of 
Taksim Square, on the other hand, gained the features of the 
monument itself. Therefore, though the monumentality of the mosque 
transcended the monument; functions, forms, meaning, and 
structures of the mosque cannot be adopted in the existing spatial 
practices. More specifically, the new modes of spatial practices 
defined with the modernisation project of Republican regime through 
offering European type of public spaces like squares, parks, etc., 
have been replaced with the new modes of spatial practices of Islamic 
ideology through constructing new public spaces like mosques. That 
is one of the most important measures of the Islamist against the 
secular ideology of the Early Republican Era has been the Taksim 
Mosque Project, conceived as a “space of representation”, 
indicating the political power of the Islamist. 
 
In conclusion, Kizilay and Taksim Square have been both 
products and apparatus of ideologies in the Early Republican Era as 
well as in the period when political Islam rise. The squares were 
created as public spaces representing the Republican ideology and 
the monuments in them refer to national identity in the Early 
Republican Era. However, they were constantly (re)organised and 




Table 2 Meaning, Urban Function, Spatial Form and Conflicts of Kizilay and Taksim Squares  
 Meaning Urban Function 
Activities  
 














locus of the nation 
state.  






Public space (concerts, cinema and 
theatre facilities, celebration ceremony 
for national days, commemorative 
ceremonies, marches) 
Indicating the power of new 




A significant monument 
A park-square concept 
At the intersection of significant 
boulevards. 
Kizilay Building and its park 





heritage of Ottoman 
Empire & the values 
and ideals of 
modernity project of 
newly established 
nation state  
Modern vs Traditional 
























Lost its political 
identity and public 
space 
characteristics 
Turn into a 
junction 
  
An informal scene for political struggle 
Central location for bus stops, and 
metro,  
A junction  
A space where people reluctant to 
spend time but just pass by. 
The Guvenpark Rehabilitation 
Project 
The construction of Metro station 
Barriers located along the Ataturk 
Boulevard 
Deformation of spatial organisation. 















Celebrations (new year etc.) that were 
planned by the municipality or the 
government. 
Religious symbols and practices on 
urban public spaces  

















An informal scene for oppositional 
demonstrations 
A place where religious practices take 
place 
Religious symbols and practices on 
urban public spaces  
Name changes 




Table 3 Transformation of National Identity and Kizilay and Taksim Squares  
 1923-1950 1980- onwards 




























the symbolic locus of 
nation-state 
the public space of modern 
society 
these two components of 
meaning nourished the 
national identity building 
project of state. 
lost their political identities 
turn into junctions 
 
The modern landscape of cities 
began to be dominated with 
Islamic, traditional elements on 
the very centre of Republican 
spaces. 
  
Transforming into the 
political arena where 
conflict and struggle 
















National Identity was defined 
as modern, secular, 
Westernised. 
National Identity was redefined 
through Turkish and Islam 
synthesis. 




recognition of Muslim 
identity in Kizilay Square 













Table 4 Lefebvre’s Triad for Production of Space and Re-interpretation of Kizilay and Taksim Squares  
 Conceived Space 

















Kizilay  and Taksim 
Republican Squares were 
conceived as the city centres 
and as public spaces with 
political and social life. They 
were both spatial 
representation of the 
Republican ideals, political 
power of the Republican 
regime and ideology. 
Guvenpark and Gezi Park 
were ‘conceived spaces’ as 
the spatial representation of 
political power of the 
Republican ideology and in 
terms of social and cultural 
practices they are alike to 
‘space of representations’. 
Trust and Republican 
Monuments were conceived 
spaces symbols of the state 
power  
All of them were conceived as 
spatial representations of 
national identity. 
Kizilay and Taksim Republican 
Squares are ‘perceived 
spaces’ as representing 
characteristics of the modern 
cities. 
 
Guvenpark and Gezi Park were 
‘perceived spaces’ as being 
public spaces of modern cities 
where modern lifestyle was 
introduced to citizens. 
 
Trust and Republican Monuments 
were ‘perceived spaces’ where 
national ceremonies were held. 
Kizilay and Taksim Republican 
Squares were ‘lived spaces’ as 
public space with their social and 
cultural practices. 
 
Guvenpark and Gezi Park were 
‘lived spaces’ as social, cultural 
urban practices. 
 
Trust and Republican Monuments 
were ‘lived spaces’ with their 
social practices.  
Trust and Republican 
Monuments can be 
considered as the 
‘monumental spaces’, 
providing a sense of 
collectivity and 
membership, pointing to the 

























Kizilay  and Taksim 
Republican Squares became 
‘conceived spaces’ for 
vehicles and closed for 
pedestrians. 
Guvenpark begin to be 
considered as ‘conceived 
spaces’ where bus and 
dolmush stops occupied, 
metro entrance disturbs its 
design. 
Kizilay  and Taksim Republican 
Squares begin to be ‘perceived 
space’ turning into a 
intersection of vehicular traffic 
which excluding pedestrians. 
Kizilay  and Taksim Republican 
Squares as ‘lived spaces’ turned 












 Kizilay  and Taksim 
Republican Squares became 
‘conceived space’ where 
Islamic ideology displayed. 
Kizilay  and Taksim Republican 
Squares as ‘perceived space’ 
turned into spaces where 
Islamic practices became 
visible.  
Kizilay  and Taksim Republican 
Squares as ‘lived spaces’ begin 
to be lived spaces’ where Islamic 
















Kizilay  and Taksim 
Republican Squares became 
space of representation 
against Republican. Islamic 
elements begin to be 
conceived as spatial 
representations of the Islamic 
ideology. 
Kizilay  and Taksim Republican 
Squares became spaces where 
Islamic elements are perceived 
more visible than other symbolic 
elements of Republican ideology. 
Kizilay  and Taksim Republican 
Squares became spaces where 
Islamic elements became part of 
physical environment and on lived 
space as social cultural practices. 
 
Taksim Mosque took place 
the Republican 
Monument’s role as being 
the monumental space. In 
Taksim Republican Square, 
Taksim Mosque is more 




Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
7.1. Concluding Remarks  
 
This study discusses the national identity building process as it 
relates to the use and repurposing of urban space, which results from 
ideological conflicts. Turkey, a developing country which struggled 
to establish a legitimate government and forge a national identity by 
following the Western model, constitutes the context of this 
dissertation. The discussions and analysis have examined how 
national identity is constantly changing through in concert with the 
use of space, specifically urban squares, which become political 
structures for ideologies. The spatial transformation of Turkish cities 
is discussed with respect to two specific squares: Kizilay in Ankara, 
and Taksim in Istanbul. The analysis is organized into four time 
periods. It begins with the establishment of Turkish Republic in 1923 
until the socio-political changes of the 1950s, then the period that 
starts with the rise of political Islam in the 1980s, then . The roles of 
the contending ideologies in the modern socio-spatial organisation 
are explored. The national identity building of Turkey, as a vital 
driver of the reconstruction of those squares, is the starting point of 
this dissertation. These two periods are determined according to 
ideological conflicts on national identity building and also the use of 
space. Several projects, uprisings and conflicts happened in these 
periods, which have impacted both the identity of those squares and 
of the nation. 
 
A significant concern of the dissertation is to explore the role of 
ideologies on the use and manipulation of the urban squares in order 
to serve their interests. The spatial patterns, in accordance with the 
identity building process, are analysed and discussed in relation to 
the issue of the ideological conflicts, in the context of a theoretical 
framework of the use of space, nation-building, and national identity 




Before introducing the case study of the dissertation, I discuss 
the ideological conflicts that accompany national identity building, 
beginning with the Ottoman Empire’s modernisation and continuing 
through the history of the Turkish Republic. In this part the general 
conflicts between secularists and Islamists are presented along with 
the concerns of their capital city. Secular Turkish nationalism played 
a central role in the context of nation-state building and the creation 
of the national identity. It was a social engineering project that made 
Turks who identified themselves as Muslim during the Ottoman 
Empire disengage from their religious identity and begin to identify 
as secular, modern and Westernised. The process of identity 
formation reflects varying levels of tension between different 
ideologies which still exist, especially the struggle between Islam and 
secular Turkish nationalism. In contemporary Turkey, the rise of 
Islamism is considered a threat to the official concept of Turkish 
national identity. 
 
The following chapter introduces Ankara, Istanbul and its primary 
squares by providing their socio-spatial and political contexts. The 
theoretical background of the socio-spatial analysis of the space 
through identity transformation is explained. The main topic of this 
chapter are the role of ideology and the evolving relationship between 
place identity and national identity by focusing on two squares in two 
significant cities in the history of Turkish Republic’s nation-state 
formation. One such city is Ankara, the capital city, which contains 
Kizilay Square a major space that enhanced the national identity. The 
other city, Istanbul, was the last capital city of the Ottoman Empire, 
yet it has made strides to modernise and Europeanise. In Istanbul’s 
Pera district, Republicans created Taksim Republican Square, 
intending it to be a national space and a representative symbol of 
Republic. The identity change in both squares is discussed through 
the Early Republican Era and the rise of political Islam. In these two 
periods, the changes in the identity of squares regarding their 
physical form, structure, function, and meanings are discussed as 




The first time period, from 1923 to the 1950s, spans the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic to the Multiple Party System. 
The spatial policies of the state in the context of national identity 
building are especially important at this time. The second time period, 
from the 1980s to 2018, marks the beginning of the rise of political 
Islam and contemporary Turkey, and is analysed through the spatial 
policies of municipalities and the state, especially as it relates to the 
reconstruction of national identity as a synthesis of Islam and Turkish 
nationalism.  In some ways, the two squares in Ankara and Istanbul 
illustrate the wider context of nation formation, national identity 
building, spatial patterns, and the social organisation of Turkey. 
However, the case studies have focused on how ideology manifests 
in the urban squares in the use of space while constructing the 
national identity. In regards to national identity building, the two time 
periods studied are critical to understand spatial policies and 
ideological conflicts. On the one hand, the Early Republican Era was 
dominated by secular Turkish nationalism, and oversaw 
modernization, especially as seen in European imagery in 
architecture, urban planning and design.  This created a modern, 
secular, Westernised identity. On the other hand, the period of 
political Islam, beginning in the 2000’s, was characterised by Seljuk 
and Ottoman imagery in architecture and urban planning in order to 
reaffirm a Muslim identity.  This had been banned from the public 
sphere during the secular period. This study, then, discusses the 
transition from an empire to a secular system, its effects on the built 
environment, and the identity of the citizens as seen in the public 
sphere. In the Early Republican Era, traditional and religious 
influence waned; the traditional order of Turkish society had been 
spatially transformed. Then, the rise of political Islam brought a new 
transformation of society. Although the governing system of the 
Turkish Republic is still secular, the national identity is independent 





The case studies explore ideologies and their spatial organisation. 
In the Early Republican Era, the actions of renovating  national 
architecture and declaring a new capital city were symbolic of its 
governing ideology. Ideology was also reflected in the spatial 
patterns of urban squares and urban planning and design. When 
political Islam began to gain influence, Ottoman and Seljuk styles in 
architecture were clearly visible in public spaces. This was 
reinterpreted as an attack to harm the republican nature of the spaces. 
In other words, besides the architectural, urban planning, and design 
inclinations of the ruling class, the intellectual atmosphere of the 
country reflected the circumstances of the country in general and 
specifically city of Ankara, Istanbul. Within these circumstances, one 
can comprehend the process of the production and transformation of 
a public space into a more modern one, and then into an Islamic one. 
In the beginning, Kizilay and Taksim Squares were representative of 
the manifestation of the Republican ideology. Yet their modern 
developments and national architecture were replaced with Islamic 
elements, which are evident of the ideological struggle between 
Islamist and secularists with respect to space. Space, society, spatial 
policies of power, the resistance tactics and strategies of social 
movements, and citizens’ perceptions are explored. It can be 
concluded that ideological conflict is not a just political issue: it is 
narrated through spaces. More specifically, the perception and 
construction of ideology become tangible in spaces. 
 
In order to better understand the connections between the 
transformation of spaces and the socio-cultural and political 
circumstances of the case study cities, every spatial aspect is 
examined in detailed. The intricate urbanisation and spatial history of 
Turkey is full of uprisings, ideological conflicts and struggles, so it is 
necessary to consider any circumstances that affects those 
connections. Moreover, the European type of modernity brought by 
secular Turkish nationalism and then the ancient Seljuk and Ottoman 
Empire imagery of political Islam, both brought radical 
transformations of public spaces in Ankara and Istanbul. The 
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resulting impacts on their physical and social structures are explored. 
 
Throughout the study, the role of ideologies in the formation of 
spaces for constructing the national identity in Kizilay Square and 
Taksim Square are highlighted. The spatial manifestation of 
ideological conflicts, the tensions between secular and Islamic and 
old and new are clear in the spatial transformations of these squares 
and this transformation reflects the changes in symbolic 
representations and identities. These ideological struggles, conflicts, 
and representations are expressed in everyday life as well. 
 
7.2. Further Implications  
 
In the formation of Turkish spaces and society, ideologies with 
aspects of Turkish modernisation in the context of national identity 
building have played a pivotal role. The traditional and religious 
structure of the Ottoman Empire evolved to a modern and secular 
nation-state with the establishment of Turkish Republic, and then 
the rise of political Islam altered the spatial trends again. The 
approaches taken with respect to architecture and urban planning and 
design have constantly changed accordingly to ideological inclinations. 
 
This study analyses the spatial transformation of public spaces 
loaded with ideological conflicts. Ankara provides an ideal case for 
such a study, since it was designated as the capital city of a newly 
born republic and has changed drastically throughout the history of 
Turkey. Multiple factors, such as secularism, Islamism, and the 
tensions between modernism and tradition have been reflected in the 
spatial patterns of public spaces. Moreover, as the last capital city of 
the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul also offers a significant case for this 
study. The efforts of Republicans to construct a modern square in the 
very centre of the old capital city, which previously represented the 
Ottoman Empire and the Islam religion, is quite interesting in terms 
of spatial transformation. Through analysing two periods with a 
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socio-spatial and political point of view, this study elucidates the role 
of ideology on the use and manipulation of space. 
 
Nation formation in developing countries and the institutions of 
states with relation to their ideological inclinations can be studied 
within the context of Ankara and Istanbul. Tools beyond those for the 
construction of national spaces, such as those regarding the 
inventions of traditions related to the legitimisation and domination of 
space, is beyond the scope of this study. Spatial issues in the context 
of the research could be explored within more comprehensive 
theoretical and empirical frames of study. Various major issues 
related to the discussion of ideology and space could be considered 
within the context of national identity building. This could form a 
basis for research of similar cases in Muslim locales undergoing 
modernization with regards to the conflicts between Islamism and 
secularism. In Muslim countries, national identities are constantly 
renegotiated accordingly to their political relations, ideological 
conflicts, and other circumstances. Trends in Turkish identity 
building are similar with other Muslim countries and are constantly in 
flux. Further, in order to construct a nation or a national identity, the 
use of space has had significant effects on political power and 
ideologies. These, in turn, affect national spatial patterns. Moreover, 
due to various socio-political and economic motivations, the 
transformation of public spaces has dramatically accelerated. The 
collective memory of the society and the city weaken, and each 
ideology brings a different narration for the past while rebuilding the 
city again and again. 
 
Further, not only for Muslim geographies, but also any country 
which experienced the formation of nation building can be the focus 
of these kinds of spatial discussions. In this sense, on the one hand 
Korea Republic and its capital city Seoul give a strong base for nation 
formation study, on the other hand, with a similar effort to Turkish 
Republic, the Gwanghwamun Square is the outcome of Korea 
Republic’s effort of nation building. In this respect, Gwanghwamun 
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Square with its monument of Sejong the Great who was the 
pioneering king of creating Korean current, modern alphabet; the built 
environment which consists of city hall, national museums, 
Gyeongbokgung Palace representative edifices of the Joseon 
Dynasty, has been one of the most significant symbol the Korea 
Republic. Besides its physical environment and design effort, the 
function and the meaning of the Gwanghwamun Square have always 
reflected the socio-cultural and political circumstances of the 
country. Since it was constructed, the Gwanghwamun Square has 
witnessed so many events, protests, and demonstrations that 
impacted on the socio-political climate of the country. For example, 
the memorial to Sewol ferry disaster, Candlelight protest against to 
Government’s corruption held at the Gwanghwamun Square. It can 
be concluded that through examining the Gwanghwamun Square, the 
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Summary in Korean (요약본, 국문초록) 
 
 
이 논문은 민족정체성을 구축하는 공간의 생산 과정 속에서 
이데올로기의 역할을 탐구한다. 이를 위해 연구 지역을 크즐라이 광장와 
탁심 광장로 선정했는데 두 군데 모두 공화당 정권 당시 세속적 
민족주의 이데올로기의 상징적 공간이었으며 이후에는, 종교를 상징하는 
공간으로 변모했다. 또한,이 두 광장의 형식, 기능 및 의미가 이 곳에서 
일어난 폭동, 사회 운동, 정치적 긴장과 합의 등에 따라 변해왔기 
때문이다. 초기 공화당 시대의 지배적  이데올로기는 민족 정체성과 
민족 의식을 구축하는 것과 같은 국가적 목표 달성을 위해 기념비를 
세우고 이 기념비에 애국적 상징성을 부여함으로 민족 정체성을 구축해 
나갔다. 터키 공화국의 수도인 앙카라는 새 정권을 대표하기 위해 
다양한 모습으로 디자인되어 왔다. 더욱이 이스탄불은 오토만 제국의 옛 
정권을 대표하는 도시로 재설계되었고 오토만 제국-이슬람 유산은 
의도적으로 거부 당했다. 
 
특히, 앙카라의 크즐라이 광장과 이스탄불의 탁심 공화당 광장 탁심 
광장은 당대 지배적인 이데올로기가 국가 정체성을 재형성하며 남은 
대표적 유산이다. 1923년부터 1950년대까지 초기 공화당 정권의 
세속적 터키 민족주의가 다른 대립적인 이데올로기를 지배했다. 이 당시 
국가와 종교는 분리되어 국가가 주체적으로 공간을 건설했고 국가의 
역사와 정체성을 해석하는 헤게모니적 지위를 주장했다. 1980년대 
이슬람이 정치세력으로 부상하면서 이슬람 이데올로기가 지배적이게 
되었다. 터키와 무슬림의 혼합적 정체성을 민족 이데올로기에 반영하여 
광장을 재구성하려 했지만, 건축 환경은  급격히 변화하게 되었다. 이 
점으로 비추어 봤을 때, 국가 정체성을 구축하기 위한 경험은 서로 
대립하는 이데올로기의 경쟁 전략으로부터 비롯되었다 할 수 있다. 역사 
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중에서도 특정한 부분이 더욱 부각되기 위해 기념비를 포함한 도시 
광장은 지워지거나, 잊혀지고 특별히 기억되고 있다. 이 논문은 
민족정체성이 도시 광장을 통해 어떻게 작동하는지, 그리고 그러한 
공간과 풍경이 민족정체성을 어떻게 반영 하는지를 논의하고자 한다. 
공간 정책에 반영된 민족정체성이 표현되고 수행되며 공간의 사용과 
구성이 어떻게 달라지는지를 보고자 한다. 본 논문은 민족정체성, 
이데올로기와 공공 장소의 공간적 생산이 어떻게 중첩되어 있으며 
연결되어있는지 밝히고자 한다. 첫째, 공간적 맥락에 의해 담론적 
의미가 형성된다. 이러한 관점에서 볼 때, 광장 경관과 공간의 담론이 
개인을 국가와 연결시키는 데 사용이 되고 있다. 둘째, 이데올로기는 
사회를 지배하기 위한 도구로 공공 공간에서 지속적으로 발현되고 있다. 
마지막으로 도시 광장의 공식적이고 실제적인 사용은 지배적인 
이데올로기를 강화하고 경쟁하는 이데올로기를 약화시킨다. 본 논문은 
민족이데올로기로 정의되고 공포되는 두 광장의 재건 사례를 통해 
논의를 이어가고자 한다. 
 
키워드: 이데올로기, 공간의 생산, 민족정체성, 공공공간, 세속적 민족정




Summary in Turkish (Oz) 
 
Bu tez ulus kimlik insasi sirasinda ideolojilerin mekan 
uretimindeki rolunu arastirmaktadir. Bu baglamda, Kizilay ve Taksim 
Cumhuriyet Meydanlari ulus kimlik insa edilirken Cumhuriyet 
ideolojisinin ve rejiminin sembolik alanlari olarak tasarlanmalari, 
izleyen yillarda ise dini ve geleneksel kimligin one ciktigi mekanlara 
donusmeleri sebebi ile ornek calisma alanlari olarak secilmistir. 
Bununla birlikte bu iki meydan bir cok ayaklanmaya, sosyal harekete, 
politik gerilime sahne olmus, bu nedenle de form, islev ve anlam 
baglaminda ciddi donusumler gecirmistir. Erken Cumhuriyet Donemi 
egemen ideolojisi, ulus kimligi ve ulusal bilinci insa etmek, yurtsever 
tarihi anmak ve ululamak icin kent meydanlarini anitlarla 
taclandirirken, calismanin ornek alaninin ilk kismini kapsayan ve 
Turkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin baskenti olan Ankara kentinin  yeni 
rejimin temsil mekani olarak tasarlanmasi adina bircok girisimde 
bulunulmustur. Calismanin bir diger kenti olan Istanbul ise, Osmanli 
Imparatorlugu’nun bir diger degisle eski rejimin ve ideolojilerin 
temsilcisi olmasi ve ayni zamanda Osmanli-Islam mirasinin da varisi 
olmasi gibi nitelikleri goz ardi edilerek yeniden tasarlanmaya 
calisilmistir. Daha ozelde ise Ankara'daki Kizilay Meydani’nin ve 
Istanbul'daki Taksim Cumhuriyet Meydani’nin, egemen ideolojinin 
ulus kimligi yeniden insa ettigi donemlerin mekanlari oldugu 
soylenebilir. Tarihsel bir inceleme saglandiginda ise Erken 
Cumhuriyet Doneminde, 1923’ten 1950'lere kadar sekuler Turk 
milliyetciligi diger ideolojilere egemen olmus, devlet ve din 
birbirinden ayrilmis; devlet, ulus mekani insa ederek ulus tarih bilinci 
ve kimligi olusturulmaya calismistir. 1980’li yillara gelindiginde ise 
siyasal Islam’in yukselisiyle birlikte, Islam ideolojisi egemen olmaya 
baslamis, diger ideolojilere baskin gelmis ve ulus kimlik Turk ve 
Musluman olmak uzerinden yeniden insa edilmeye calisilirken ayni 
zamanda yapili cevre de onemli olcude degismis, donusmustur. Bu 
bakimdan ideolojilerin ulus kimligi olusturmak icin mekan uretiminde 
rol almasi cercevesinde teze konu olan iki ideoloji ve bunlarin 
 
 225 
stratejileri calisma boyunca tartisilacaktir. Diger bir ifadeyle, kent 
meydanlari ve anitlar bu surecte bazi tarihsel anlatilari digerlerine 
onculemek, bazilarini unutturmak, bazilarini animsatmak uzere 
kullanilan onemli araclar olarak konumlanmaktadir. Bu tez ulus 
kimliklerin kent meydanlarini nasil etkiledigine ve meydanlarin 
peyzajlarinin kimlik kurgusunu nasil yansitildigina isaret etmeye 
calisacaktir. Bu isaret etme hali ideolojilerin mekansal politikalar 
uzerindeki rolunu de temsil etmektedir. Bu acidan tez, ulus kimlik, 
ideoloji ve mekanin uretimi arasinda ortusen argumanlari bir araya 
getirmeye calismaktadir. Oncelikle, soylemsel anlam, mekansal 
baglamda kurulur. Buradan hareketle, kent meydanlari peyzaji ve 
mekansal anlatisi ile bireyleri ulusa baglar. Ikinci olarak ise ideolojiler 
kamusal alanda cemiyeti kontrol altinda tutmak icin mucadele verirler. 
Sonucta kent meydanlarinin resmi ve pratik kullanimlari egemen 
ideolojinin gucunu pekistirirken diger ideolojileri yok sayar. Bu 
argumanlar ornek calisma alanlari ile desteklenirken, odak noktasi 
ideolojilerin ulusal kimlikleri tanimlayip yayarken kent meydanlarini 
nasil (yeniden) insa ettigi olacaktir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler : ideoloji, mekanin uretimi, ulus kimlik, kamusal 
alan, sekuler Turk milliyetciligi, Islam ideolojisi  
Ogrenci Numarasi : 2015-31366 
 
 
 
  
